Experts have stated that issuing written orders specifying legitimate reasons for an internet shutdown could help prevent nationwide blackouts, like those in July-August 2024, in the future.
They noted that the series of shutdowns during that period were carried out solely through verbal notifications or unofficial channels, such as WhatsApp and other messaging apps, as directed by the regulator.
While existing laws may permit targeted internet restrictions in specific areas for valid reasons, they do not authorise an indefinite, countrywide shutdown, they told The Financial Express.
Had formal written orders been issued instead of verbal directives, the extensive internet blackout at the time could have been avoided, they also said.
Besides, they emphasised the need to review the existing laws to identify and close any loopholes that could allow similar incidents to recur.
Assistant Attorney General of the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) Tanvir Hassan Zoha emphasised that while targeted internet shutdowns for specific reasons may be necessary, they must be issued through written orders and for a limited duration.
He told The Financial Express orders through WhatsApp or messaging apps are not legitimate official communication.
Zoha also stated that the ICT team has requested explanations from mobile operators and other service providers for how last year's shutdowns were executed, assuring that a thorough investigation will be conducted to ensure accountability under the law.
Ahmed Swapan Mahmud, executive director of Voices for Interactive Choice and Empowerment (VOICE), pointed out that there are no specific legal provisions explicitly governing internet shutdowns.
He told The Financial Express that the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) can implement shutdowns under the existing telecom policies and regulations, but emphasised the need for an accountability mechanism.
Mahmud further stressed that the authorities must clearly declare the reasons for any shutdown through official written orders.
Internet was shut down multiple times during the student-led movement in July-August last year. The circumstances surrounding the shutdown - who ordered it, how it was implemented, and why mobile operators and internet service providers (ISPs) complied - have not yet been fully disclosed.
An investigation committee was formed after the interim government came to power, but its report has yet to provide complete clarity.
However, multiple investigations since then have uncovered the real reasons behind the shutdowns, revealing that the decision came from the highest levels of the former government and was implemented through a multi-tiered chain of command.
The primary objective was to suppress news and coverage of the youth-led protests.
The ousted government provided inconsistent statements regarding the shutdowns.
At times, officials claimed it was an unintended consequence, while on other occasions, they attributed it to sabotage by miscreants.
These claims later proved to be false. On December 18 last year, during questioning before the ICT, former state minister for information and communication technology Zunaid Ahmed Palak admitted that the internet shutdowns were ordered by the then prime minister Sheikh Hasina.
He further acknowledged that all justifications provided at the time were fabricated.
Investigations indicate that internet restrictions began on July 15, when mobile operators were first instructed to limit internet access, particularly on university campuses.
By July 17, mobile internet was completely shut down following orders from the National Telecommunication Monitoring Centre (NTMC).
The following day, Palak admitted at a press briefing that mobile internet services had been temporarily suspended due to "uncertainties" surrounding the protests, promising that connectivity would be restored once the situation stabilised.
BTRC subsequently instructed all gateway operators to halt broadband services.
It also created a WhatsApp group with all international terrestrial cable (ITC) operators and issued directives through the platform, warning of punitive action if the orders were not followed.
Internet services, including content from major social media platforms, are imported through ITC operators.
BTRC conducted a group call with ITC operators to order a complete service shutdown.
Similar instructions were given to Bangladesh Telecommunications Company Limited (BTCL) and Bangladesh Submarine Cables PLC (BSCPLC).
On the same day, all international internet gateway (IIG) operators were directed through a WhatsApp group to halt internet services.
The IIG operators, who purchase bandwidth from submarine cable and ITC companies and then distribute it among ISPs, were compelled to comply, leading to a complete disruption of internet services across the country.
Meanwhile, mobile operators had already suspended internet services a day before the BTRC's formal instructions, highlighting the informal, top-down execution of the blackout.
On July 23 last year, BTRC convened a meeting with Bangladesh Submarine Cables, ITC operators, IIGs, and ISPs.
ITC and submarine cable operators were directed to resume services, while ISPs were allowed to provide limited internet access for essential services, such as hospitals, embassies, courts, airports, banks, and utilities.
On July 24, BTRC ordered IIG operators to restore internet access, but social media platforms, such as YouTube, Facebook, and TikTok, remained blocked.
The following day, YouTube access was restored.
By July 28, mobile internet services were fully restored, and by July 31, broadband services, including all social media platforms, were fully restored as per BTRC's directives.
On August 5, following new government orders, mobile operators again suspended internet services, while ISPs continued to provide limited access.
Later that day, BTRC ordered broadband services to be halted through ITC and IIG operators.
However, after the fall of the former government, all internet services were fully restored by the afternoon.
This sequence of events highlights the continued legal framework in Bangladesh that enables the government to shut down internet services any time.
Section 97 of the Bangladesh Telecommunication Act 2001 grants the government authority to regulate telecommunications during times of war or internal unrest.
Consequently, all mobile and broadband operators were legally bound to comply with BTRC's instructions in July-August 2024.
Experts and rights groups continue to call for legal reforms to prevent arbitrary internet blackouts and ensure transparency and accountability in digital governance.
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