A tapestry of light and shadow

On the occasion of two hundredth anniversary of French Revolution, the great Chinese revolutionary leader Chou en Lai was asked to assess the historical significance of the earth shattering events in 1789. He replied, "Too soon to tell" (Schama, 1989, xiii). If two hundred years are not enough for evaluating the French Revolution, four decades are certainly trivial for appreciating the effects of Bangladesh Revolution in 1971. The challenges of objective evaluation of Bangladesh Revolution are compounded by the fact that dramatic and tragic twists and turns of last four decades in Bangladesh constitute the warp and woof of her confrontational politics today. Bangladesh was rightly characterised as a "country challenged by contradictions" by the American political scientist Ziring (1992, 1). These contradictions are not, however, aberrations. They emanate from the depths of her history. Echoing Joan Robinson's memorable quip on India; it would not be an exaggeration to say that whatever you hear about Bangladesh, the opposite is equally true. Against this backdrop of insufficient data and contradictory interpretations of a tumultuous phase of Bangladesh history, this paper seeks to make an assessment of the achievements and disappointments of Bangladesh during last four decades. As Boswell's anecdotes in Life of Johnson illustrate, the interpretation of same fact may vary depending on the idiosyncrasy of the interpreter. The following anecdote about the second marriage of Lord Auchinleck may be cited as an example. While reporting the second marriage of Lord Auchinleck, Boswell commented that the second marriage was an insult to his first wife's memory. "Not at all, sir, promptly refuted Samuel Johnson, "On the contrary, were he not to marry again, it might be concluded that his first wife has given him a disgust in marriage, but by taking a second wife he pays the highest compliment to the first, by showing that made him so happy as a married man that he wishes to be so a second time" (Boswell James, 1986, 143). Boswell's example suggests that reasonable men are likely to differ on interpretations of any incident. It is not, therefore, surprising that despite the accumulation of a plethora of facts, historians fail to reach consensus on most historical events. This essay does not, therefore, follow standard methodology of history or social science. This essay is based on what may be described as the methodology of Mulla Nasiruddin. Legend has it that on one occasion, a neighbour found Mulla Nasiruddin down on his knees by the side of a street light. "What have you lost, Mullah' '? he asked. "My key", said Nasiruddin. After a few minutes of searching, the other man said, "Where did you drop it"? "At home". "Then why for heavens sake are you looking here"? "There is no light at home. There is light here", justified Mullah Nasiruddin. Following Mullah's dictum, this essay begins where there are more data and agreement and moves gradually into more contentious areas. The paper is divided into five sections. Following the introductory section, the second section reviews those achievements of Bangladesh where there is a high degree of unanimity. The third section describes the twilight zone where there is interplay of the light of certainty with shadow of doubt. The fourth section delineates the areas of darkness about which our understanding is limited. The final section summarizes the main findings of this paper. II. Areas of Light and Broad Consensus On the morrow of its birth, Bangladesh was treated as a symbol of an impending doom. Henry Kissinger, then US Secretary of State, labelled it as an international basket case. The wide spread pessimism was based on four predictions. First, it was argued that because of extraordinary density of population and scarcity of resources, Bangladesh would fail to attain significant economic growth. Secondly, it was believed that the break up of Pakistan would make East Pakistan worse off. Thirdly, independent Bangladesh would emerge as a Malthusian nightmare where population growth would outstrip its capacity to produce food. Finally, as Bangladesh would not be economically viable, it would be increasingly dependent on foreign aid. All the four predictions were belied by the experience of last four decades. First, measured in terms of growth of real per capita income, Bangladesh's achievement is unparalleled in its recent history. Reliable GDP estimates of Bangladesh are not available prior to 1950. However, the trends in per capita income of undivided India may be used as proxy for Bangladesh. According to Angus Maddison (2061, 215), the distinguished expert on national income estimates, per capita income in India increased from $533 (international $ in 1990 prices) in 1820 to $ 619 in 1950 an increase of about 20 percent in 130 years. According to the same estimates, per capita income in India increased by about 22 percent between 1950 and 1973, while Pakistan in the corresponding period registered 25 percent real per capita growth. On the contrary, Bangladesh in the same period witnessed a decline of 8.0 percent in real per capita income. According to same estimates, real per capita income in Bangladesh increased by about 65 per cent during the period 1973 to 1998. Maddison's estimates suggest that there was almost imperceptible growth in Bangladesh during hundred years preceding the birth of Pakistan and it slightly declined during the Pakistan period (1947 71).Economic growth in Bangladesh significantly picked up since 1973. There was significant growth in Bangladesh during the period 1973-1998. The rate of per capita income growth has further accelerated in Bangladesh since 1998. Real per capita income in Bangladesh doubled between 1975 and 2005. According to BBS estimates, per capita income in real terms increased by more than 25 percent in the past six years (2005 2011). Obviously it is easier to achieve high growth rate on a low base. However, there are two redeeming features of growth in Bangladesh. First, economic growth over last 40 years had been stable and volatility of growth was among the lowest in the world. Secondly, Bangladesh economy demonstrated extraordinary resilience during last four decades. Despite recurrence of natural calamities and political uncertainties, GDP growth in Bangladesh was never less than 3.4 percent since FY 1972 73.It is a "remarkable feat for an economy that is persistently hit hard by weather related adverse shocks" (Mahajan, 2005, 93). Trends of real per capita income in Bangladesh clearly suggest that the birth of Bangladesh unleashed the latent creative energies of its people. Secondly, the opponents of independence of Bangladesh used to argue that economic growth and social advancement in the erstwhile East Pakistan would be jeopardised by its secession from West Pakistan. However, according to Bose (1983), per capita income in East Pakistan was virtually static during 1950 to 1970. A comparison of GDP growth in Bangladesh and Pakistan in pre liberation and post liberation period may be seen in Table 1. It is not at all surprising that growth rate in Pakistan surpassed that of Bangladesh in 1970s and 1980s if one takes into account the fact that Bangladesh experienced massive devastations to infrastructure in 1971. However, growth rate in Bangladesh exceeded that of Pakistan during 1990 2009. There have also been significant advances in social indicators in Bangladesh. According to World Development Report 1979, life expectancy at birth in Bangladesh was 42 years in 1960 and 44 years in Pakistan. In 1977, it increased to 47 in Bangladesh and 51 years in Pakistan. In 2009, life expectancy at birth stood at 67 in both Bangladesh and Pakistan, Infant mortality rate per 1000 live birth in Bangladesh was 145 in 1970; it fell to 41 in 2009. In Pakistan the corresponding rate in 2009 was 71 about 73 per cent higher than that of Bangladesh. Gross primary enrolment in Bangladesh was 54 per cent in 1970. According to World Bank, it increased to 95 per cent in 2009. Thirdly, the experience of last four decades has also exploded the myth of Malthusian nightmare in Bangladesh. Total population in 1949 50 was 42.3 million in East Pakistan and 36.5 million in West Pakistan. In 1969 70, East Pakistan had 69.6 million and West Pakistan 5 8.8 million people. In 197 1, Bangladesh had at least 10 million more people compared to West Pakistan. According to estimates of World Bar*, population in Pakistan in 2009 (170 million) exceeds total population of Bangladesh (162 million) by 8 million. Average annual growth rate of population in Bangladesh was 2, 5 in 1969 70 and 2.6 in 1970 82. It declined to 1.8 per cent during 1990 2009 and is projected to stand at 1.4 during to 2009 15. Population in Pakistan grew annually at the rate of 2.8 per cent during 1960 70; the rate increased t6 3 per cent during 1970 82. It dropped to 2.4 per cent during 1990 2009 and is projected to decline to 2.2 per cent during 2009 15. In hindsight, population growth has turned to be a much bigger problem for Pakistan than for Bangladesh. Bangladesh had achieved significant success in increasing food production. Table 2 shows the historical trends of food grain production in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Between 1949 50 and 2008 09, population in Bangladesh increased by about 275 per cent whereas food grain production grew by 340 percent. Thus growth of food grain production in Bangladesh has exceeded population growth. The same is true about Pakistan. Fourthly, Bangladesh was highly dependent in the initial years on official assistance for import. In 1972 73, 7 1 per cent of imports were financed by aid. During the first five years, the ratio of aid to total imports varied between 50 to 71 per cent (see table 3). The share of aid in total imports was 50 per cent in 1990. It dropped to 15 per cent in 2003 and further declined to 6.0 per cent in 2009. The corresponding average for low income countries in 2009 was 24.9 per cent. These data clearly suggest that Bangladesh's dependence on aid has significantly declined. The time series data on the dramatic decline in the ratio of aid to imports in Bangladesh is supported by the trends of per capita aid in Bangladesh. The disbursed per capita aid to Bangladesh was only $11.8 in 1974 75. It increased to $17 in 1989-90. In 2009, it declined to $8. Table 4 clearly suggests that Bangladesh is today much less aid dependent compared to most developing countries. It appears from table 4 that per capita aid to Pakistan was $16 dollars in 2009 compared to per capita aid of $8 in Bangladesh. Four decades after the birth of Bangladesh, Pakistan remains much more aid dependent (basket case in Kissinger's terms) than Bangladesh. The highest per capita aid went to West Bank and Ghaza where per capita aid ($748) was 93 times higher than that of Bangladesh. The above analysis suggests that pessimistic projections propagated at the time of its birth about the future of Bangladesh were totally unjustified. Bangladesh made significant progress in the economic and social spheres in the face of declining external assistance. Her population growth slowed down and the production of food grain accelerated. The projections depicting Bangladesh as a non viable economy has been largely dispelled. The predictions about future of Bangladesh have been radically revised during last four decades. This can be best illustrated by comparing two assessments of World Bank on economic prospects in Bangladesh. In 1972, a report by the World Bank stated as follows: "Even under the best of circumstances, Bangladesh constitutes a critical and complex development problem. The population is poor (per capita income of $504 a figure which has not risen over the last twenty years) overcrowded (population density is nearly 1400 per square mile)'and becoming more so (population is growing 3 per cent per annum) short lived (life expectancy at birth is well under 50 years) in many cases unemployed (perhaps 25 to 30 per cent) and largely illiterate (under 20 percent literacy rate) (Quoted in World Bank 2007, 2). Thirty five years later, World Bank published a report entitled Bangladesh's Strategy for Sustainable Growth (World Bank, 2007); the Report expresses the hope that Bangladesh is likely to graduate as a Middle Income Country (MIC) in the near future. It observes, "Bangladesh with per capita gross national income (GNI) of $470 in 2005 could become a middle income country defined by International Development Association (IDA) as one with per capita gross national income (GNI) of $875 by 2023 if the average per capita GDP growth held at 3.5 percent of the last ten years. Bangladesh could become an MIC within a decade (by 2016) if it raised per capita income growth to 6 percent, implying GDP growth at a challenging but not an impossible 7.5 per cent". Similar soul searching is evident among economists who in the initial years were highly sceptical about the prospects of Bangladesh economy. In 1976, Just Faaland and J.R. Parkinson wrote a book entitled Bangladesh: The Test Case for Development. They concluded, "If development could be made to succeed in Bangladesh, there can be little doubt that it could be made to succeed anywhere else. It is in this sense that Bangladesh is the test case for development'. In 2007, the authors revisited the issue and conceded, "At this point, with three decades and more of experience of limited and chequered progress, sustained development in Bangladesh appears to be within reach though far from assured" (Fairland and Parkinson,2007). III. Twilight areas with light of hope and shade of doubt Last four decades in Bangladesh have witnessed a transition from darkness of despondency to sunlight of hope. Bangladesh has succeeded in breaking the vicious cycle of stagnation, in reducing significantly dependence on foreign aid, in decelerating population growth and in increasing food grain production. Bangladesh's real per capita income doubled in thirty years (1975 2005). Even by international standards, doubling of per capita income in thirty years is not an insignificant achievement. Beginning in late 18th century, United Kingdom took 58 years to double its per capita income for the first time. In the early nineteenth century, US experienced the first 100 per cent increase in per capita income in forty seven years and in late 19th century; the first doubling of per capita income in Japan took thirty four years. However, two questions remain unanswered about Bangladesh's growth. First, to what extent did economic growth benefit the poor? Second, is the current level of growth sustainable? On the face of it, available data suggest a dramatic decline in incidence of poverty in Bangladesh during last four decades (see table 5) According to estimates based on national poverty line, the percentage of the poor by headcount ratio has declined from 82.9 per cent in 1974 to 3 5.2 in 2010 in rural areas. The percentages of poor in urban areas declined from 81.4 per cent in 1974 to 21.3 per cent in 2010. The share of poor in the nation as a whole fell from 58.5 per cent in 1982 to 31.5 per cent in 2010. These data clearly suggest that Bangladesh has succeeded in mitigating poverty in a significant manner. Nevertheless, there are three reasons for suspecting that Bangladesh's achievements in poverty alleviation are still fragile. First, poverty estimates in Bangladesh are based on Household Expenditure Surveys. They estimate the percentage of people who have the purchasing power to procure minimum calorie intake. They do not provide information on whether individuals actually take minimum necessary calorie. The consistency of these estimates could be verified by data on nutritional status of individuals. According to WHO nutritional indicators like anthropometric assessment of children (particularly of their weight for age) Continued from page 2 could be a more reliable indicator for poverty (Peter Svedberg, 2000, 1). Inspired by WHO approach of direct measurement of individual welfare, IFPRI has recently launched a Global Hunger Index (GHI) which is based on an average of the percentage of the undernourished persons, percentage of under weight children younger than five and proportion of children dying before the age of five. According to estimates of GHI in 2011, the incidence of hunger is much higher in Bangladesh than most other developing countries. There are only eleven courtiers in the world that had lower ranking in GHI than Bangladesh in 2011. Table 6 presents 2011 estimates of Global Huger Index for South Asia courtiers. Compared to most other courtiers, the percentage of under nourishment in children younger than five in Bangladesh is high (41.3%). Bangladesh has the highest proportion of undernourished in total population among the South Asian countries. Bangladesh's ranking by GHI is lower than all but eight sub Saharan African countries. This implies that the fruits of economic growth have not reached a significant proportion of population. Secondly, estimates based on national poverty lines are much rosier than those based on international poverty lines. Table 7 shows the discrepancy between the estimates of national and international poverty lines in Bangladesh. Bangladesh has one of the highest rates of poverty in the world by $2 a day poverty criteria. National estimate of poverty rate is less than half of estimates based on international poverty estimates. According to World Development Indicators 2011, there are only ten countries in the world where the incidence of poverty is higher than Bangladesh (see table 8). The main reason for the wide divergence of poverty ratios of national and international poverty lines is that $2 a day poverty line is much higher than national poverty line. The estimates based on national poverty line tends to underestimate poverty because the national poverty line was not adjusted upwards in last forty years though per capita income in real terms increased more than 100 per cent. Thus the rate of fall of poverty is overestimated in national statistics. Finally, increase in per capita income in real terms was accompanied by rise in income inequality (see table 9). Income inequality is usually measured by Gini coefficient. An increase in Gini coefficient suggests worsening of inequality. Gini coefficient varies between zero and one. The increase of Gini coefficient from 0.36 in 1983 84 to .467 in 2005 indicates a significant increase in income inequality. This suggests worsening of relative poverty. The above review of poverty statistics reveals the following broad trends. First, in tandem with growth of real per capita income, the percentage of poor declined in Bangladesh during last forty years. However, the official statistics overestimate the percentage of decline and ignore altogether worsening of relative poverty. Secondly, under nourishment particularly of women and children is pervasive. Finally, those who cross the poverty line do so by a very narrow margin. This implies that slight macro disturbances could make non poor vulnerable again. Bangladesh's gains in the struggle against poverty have not been consolidated as yet. The reversal of some of the victories cannot be ruled out. The decline of Bangladesh's ranking in Human Development Index is a case in point. According to UNDP, in 2003 Bangladesh graduated from low to medium human development category. In 2010, Bangladesh was again downgraded to low human development category. In 2011 also, Bangladesh was classified in the lowest category. This clearly suggests that Bangladesh's progress in poverty alleviation is hesitant and a long struggle against poverty lies ahead because the absolute number of poor continues to be staggering. There are also uncertainties in Bangladesh's growth process. Economic growth in Bangladesh was not supported by good governance. The estimates of World Bank suggest a clear deterioration in governance during 1996 to 2009 (see table 10) Each governance indicator is measured in a comparative scale of 2.5 to 2.5 with mean around zero. The positive aggregate measure indicates above average performance and negative score suggests below average performance. Three points deserve attention here. First, Bangladesh's aggregate measures of all the six indicators are negative in both 1996 and 2009. This implies that Bangladesh's performance is below world average. Secondly, ranking of all governance indicators in Bangladesh are below lowest 20 percent. Thirdly,judged by aggregate measures, five governance indicators in Bangladesh declined significantly though there was, according to World Bank measurement, slight improvement in the indicator based on rule of law. Despite the obvious deterioration of governance during the period 1996 2009, growth in Bangladesh economy accelerated. During 1997 2002, average annual GDP growth in Bangladesh stood at 5.1 per cent; it increased to 5.5 per cent during 2002 2006, accelerating to 6.3 per cent in the period 2006-10. This inverse relationship between growth and governance in Bangladesh is known in the literature as the Bangladesh conundrum. There are three types of explanation on Bangladesh conundrum. First, it is argued by some that surge in GDP growth of Bangladesh is accidental. It is not likely to be sustainable. From this point of view, Fernandez and Kraay (2007, 103) argued, India has a great deal of scope for future growth, while Bangladesh's current relatively high income levels (given its weak institutional quality) are likely to be unsustainable". In the past, governance was not an insurmountable problem for growth in Bangladesh. The question is whether the past experience will be repeated in the future. The intellectual origins of second school may be traced to Merilee S. Grindle's theory of good enough governance. The point of departure for Merilee S. Grindle's theory is that all the prescriptions of good governance are not implementable in developing countries owing to management and resource constraints. However, all components of good governance are not needed for growth. It is sufficient to implement certain key reforms for growth. These key reforms are known as 'good enough governance'. This view was expounded by World Bank's (2007) report entitled Bangladesh: Strategy for Sustainable Growth. The Report argues that though Bangladesh did not implement many governance reforms, it undertook major reforms in following key five areas: (1) the State created space for the emergence of a vibrant domestic private sector (2) Successive governments encouraged the migration of Bangladeshi workers (3) the state recognised the limitations of its services delivery and established partnership with NGOs for providing public services. (4) Public expenditure was relatively 'pro-poor' compared to similar low income countries, and (5) the state has improved its capacity of disaster management. These measures were good enough for stimulating growth in Bangladesh. However, 'good enough governance is not a one shot affair; it has to be delivered continuously. This line of argument suggests that continuous improvements in critical governance are a prerequisite for economic growth in Bangladesh. A third approach to governance development nexus propounded by Pritchett postulates a kinked relationship between governance and economic development. At low levels of economic development, poor governance is not a major constraint for growth. There is no relationship between growth and development at this stage. At higher level of economic development, poor governance becomes gradually a binding constraint on growth. At this stage there is a positive relationship between governance developments. This approach suggests that though poor governance did not directly influence GDP growth in the past when the country was at a low stage of development, the past experience is not likely to be repeated in the future, GDP growth will be eroded unless governance is continuously upgraded. While the development experts disagree on the exact relationship between growth and governance, there is consensus on the indispensability of improvement of governance for take off of the economy. Economic growth of last four decades is not likely to be sustainable in Bangladesh unless there are discernible advances in governance. Furthermore, there are two dimensions of economic growth: quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative growth refers to GDP growth. Governance is one of the determinants of quantity of growth. It is not, however, the only determinant. The role of governance is radically different for ensuring quality of growth, which pertains to its capacity to deliver the benefits of growth to poor and disadvantaged groups. Good governance is not merely an element of quantity of growth, it is growth per se from qualitative point of view. In the absence of good governance, most of the benefits of growth will be misappropriated by the rich and politically powerful. The foregoing analysis suggests that economic achievements of Bangladesh in the last four decades, albeit impressive, may not be sustainable as yet. In poverty alleviation, more concerted efforts are needed to mitigate the pangs of hunger and malnutrition. The problem of rising income inequality needs to be addressed more vigorously. Governance deficits are undermining both quality and quantity of GDP growth. No meaningful progress in Bangladesh is possible without radical restructuring of governance. IV.Areas of darkness In 1971 Bangladesh was a politically united but economically shattered country. Today Bangladesh has a deeply divided polity with a vibrant economy. Political and economic development did not move in the same direction, they moved inversely. This sudden reversal of political development in Bangladesh is puzzling. Bangladesh is an "extremely homogeneous country" (Kochanek, 1993). Some 98.7 per cent of Bangladeshis are ethnically similar, 89.7 percent share the same religion and more than 98 percent speak the same language. There are very few countries in the world which can boast of such extraordinary homogeneity. Yet Bangladesh has a deeply divided polity where two major political blocs are locked in a protracted war of attrition against the backdrop of an illiberal democracy. Confrontational politics has split all segments of the society asunder. Even civil society in Bangladesh is not a unifying force. The polarised civil society reinforces politics of confrontation. Such acrimonious political conflicts defy logic and conventional wisdom. Usually, political conflict is nourished by heterogeneity and homogeneity unites the nation. In Bangladesh, the forces of division trump out the binding ties of homogeneity. The hallmark of Bangladesh politics today is its extraordinary instability. There are three widely used indices for cross country comparison of political instability. Table11 presents global ranking of political instability in Bangladesh. These indices suggest that Bangladesh falls within the lowest fifteen percent of politically instable countries in the world. Furthermore, World Bank estimates suggest that aggregate measure of political instability in Bangladesh fell from 0.89 in 1996 to 1.55 in 2009. Thus political instability in Bangladesh is continuously intensifying. Broadly speaking, there are following five types of explanations for political instability in Bangladesh: (1) Deficits of Social Capital (2) Dynastic politics (3) Limitations of the Constitution (4) Patron Client relationship and (5) a zero sum game for political power (Khan, 2010). These deficiencies are mutually reinforcing. These trends are not likely to be reversed without a radical restructuring of political system. The greatest casualty of political instability in Bangladesh is her democracy. The great Athenian statesman Pericles used to boast that Athens did not have to learn anything about governance from the rest of the world while others had a lot to learn from her. Were Pericles alive today, he would have said that Bangladesh had a lot to learn about governance from the rest of the world while others have nothing to learn from her. The deficiencies of Bangladesh democracy may be highlighted by comparing this system with Periclean democracy as described by Pericles in his funeral oration about 2400 years ago. In his funeral oration in memory of Athenian martyrs, Pericles identified four essential elements of democracy: (1) participation of the whole people or direct democracy, (2) the selection of incumbents of public office on the basis of actual ability, (3) poverty is no bar for participation and (4) tolerance and rule of law. Though on the face of it, political system in Bangladesh is elective, it does not meet any of the four criteria of Athenian democracy as enunciated by Pericles. Of the four deficiencies of Bangladesh democracy listed in table 12, two are very common in most democratic countries. First, in most democratic countries, government is run by the minority owing to system of indirect democracy and first past the post electoral system. Secondly, in most democratic countries democracy is tarnished by black money. The reforms in these areas are essential in most democratic countries.... However, effective solutions are not readily available. The other two elements relating to the appointment of the ablest in public offices and tolerance and rule of law in private and public life are practiced by all liberal democracies. However, deficiencies in these two areas are conspicuous in Bangladesh. Continued from page 3 I First, Bangladesh cannot claim like Pericles that "when it is a question of putting one person before another in positions of public responsibility what counts is not membership of a particular class but the actual ability which the man possesses". The membership of a particular party and not the ability of the incumbent is the most critical factor in the selection of candidates to elected and unelected offices in Bangladesh. In such an environment, the bad, dishonest and incompetent elbow out the good, honest and the competent. It undermines the incentive structure for encouraging people to excel. Democracy in Bangladesh is trapped in a vicious cycle where incompetent cronies reign supreme. Recruitment system does not reward the merit. There is no effective system of performance appraisal. Good deeds are not singled out for approbation and wicked deeds go unpunished. This is the core issue of governance. Democracy cannot function effectively without the participation of the most able in the administration. This leads to a paradox which occurs in money market frequently: bad money drives out good money. Such situation arises whenever democracy collapses. This also happened in Athens after her tragic defeat in Peloponnesian War. Aristophanes in his drama Frog described the situation in the following words, "The Course our city runs is the same towards men and money She has true and worthy sons She has fine new gold and ancient silver, Coins untouched with alloys, gold or silver, Each well minted, tested each and ringing clear Yet we never use them! Others pass from hand to hand, Sorry brass we just struck past week and branded with a wretched brand So with men we know for upright, blameless lives and noble names These spurn from men of brass". If democracy has to survive in Bangladesh, We must move from the world of Aristophanes to the world of Pericles. The torch of leadership must pass to a new generation who will differentiate between the good and bad. Secondly, tolerance in private and public life is a sine quo non of democracy. Unfortunately, polity in Bangladesh is characterised by extreme intolerance. The war of attrition between two major political blocs is fuelled by the desire of each group to eliminate the other altogether. This is an absurd goal because even the losing bloc in elections enjoys the support of not less fifty million people. Political culture in Bangladesh became "corrupted and criminalised and which developed a dependency on the bad and dishonest people, driving away honest and good candidates from election (Rahman, 2008, 74). Political tolerance is the quintessence of democracy. Underlying democracy is the acceptance and respect of the dissenter. Democracy implies the right to differ. It promotes the environment of dialog and give and take culture which is essential for conflict resolution. Political intolerance restricts the rights of dissenters. It promotes extremism which is unwilling to accept reality that does not conform to their preconceptions. It thus blurs the distinction between truth and falsehood and sense and nonsense. Such culture engenders a vicious cycle of conflict. Democracy in Bangladesh will have to struggle hard for its survival. As evidenced by the ranking of state failure index, the dark and ominous shadows of state failure still hover on the horizon in Bangladesh... It will be a tragedy of epic dimensions if the united, determined and extraordinarily homogeneous nation that won liberation through a process of sanguinary war in 1971 and made seemingly impossible goals possible commit political suicide through a politics of confrontation. The situation in Bangladesh today reminds us the immortal words of Euripides: "What we look for does not come to pass God finds a way for that none foresees". (41cesfis, Euripides) V. Retrospect The birth of Bangladesh was a traumatic event. The prophets of gloom and doom predicted on the morrow of her independence that she will be a liability for the world community. With a large population and a small territory with scanty natural resources, Bangladesh was viewed as a test case for development and a Malthusian hell where rapid population growth will turn out to be an insurmountable obstacle to sustainable growth... The experience of last forty years belies the gloomy predictions. Bangladesh succeeded in more than doubling her per capita income in real terms in this period. This contrasts sharply with one per cent growth in real per capita income in East Pakistan in twenty four years' of United Pakistan. Food production has tripled since independence. Population growth in Bangladesh has dropped from 2.5 per cent in the closing years of United Pakistan to less than 1.4 per cent today... The dependence on aid has been dramatically reduced. In 1972 73 nearly two thirds of imports were financed through aid. Today total aid constitutes about six per cent of imports. In terms of per capita aid, Pakistan is much more aid dependent than Bangladesh. The per capita foreign aid in Bangladesh is $8. There are at least fifty developing countries where per capita aid is above $24 at least 300 per cent higher than that of Bangladesh. In terms of per capita aid, Bangladesh received only 43 per cent of the average assistance given to all developing countries. Bangladesh made significant strides in social indicators like life expectancy, infant mortality, education etc. The NGOs and organisations like Grameen Bank were acclaimed world wide for their innovative activities. These promising achievements, though laudable, are not enough. These gains have not been consolidated as yet. The likelihood of reversal of many of these trends cannot be ruled out. There are already signs of slippages and reversals. In 2003, Bangladesh moved from the category of low Human Development to Medium Human Development category. Since 2010, Bangladesh has been downgraded to low Human Development category. The severity and incidence of poverty in Bangladesh is enormous. The official statistics suggest that poverty rate in rural Bangladesh has dropped from 82.9 per cent in 1974 to 35.2 per cent in 2010. However, the official statistics underestimate poverty rate by using an unusually low income for estimating poverty line. This is evident from the fact about 81 per cent people in Bangladesh are classified by World Bank as poor by the poverty line based on $2 a day income. Initiatives should be taken to address two major dimensions of poverty. First, the rates of under nourishment particularly of women and children are unacceptably high. Secondly, the distribution of income during last four decades has become more unequal. This has accentuated the problem of relative poverty. Secondly, significant growth of income has taken place despite a dramatic slide in governance. This does not prove that governance is irrelevant to Bangladesh. The most likely explanation is that governance is not a binding constraint for growth at very low level of economic development. However, the past experience of economic growth in Bangladesh cannot be repeated in the future as the governance demands of the economy have multiplied with the growth of the economy and globalisation. Furthermore, deficits of governance blight the life of the poor, disadvantaged and marginal groups who fail to reap the full benefits of economic growth. Thus improvement of governance is an essential prerequisite for increasing quantity and improving quality of growth. One of the paradoxes of Bangladesh is that here politics and economy are moving in opposite directions. In 1971 Bangladesh emerged as an incredibly homogeneous nation, which was strong enough to stave off any political tempest. However, its economy was in tatters in the wake of the bloodiest war in its history. Today the country has a vibrant economy with a divided nation locked in a bitter struggle for partisan supremacy. The democracy in Bangladesh has none of the characteristics of classical democracy as championed by Pericles. A black hole of confrontational politics threatens to engulf Bangladesh. There are two ominous trends. First, the incentive structure in the society has been severely undermined by the stark failure of successive governments to discriminate between the good and the bad. Secondly, the erosion of tolerance has created a vicious cycle of confrontational politics and violence. These ominous trends reinforce the evil forces of state failure. Bangladesh should learn fast from her own experience of last forty years. As the distinguished philosopher George Santayana rightly warned, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" ......................................... Dr. Akbar Ali Khan, is a former adviser to the caretaker government and a former secretary to the government of Bangladesh. This article will be published in a forthcoming book, Bangladesh at 40: Changes and Challenges to be edited by Prof Abdul Bayes of Faculty of Business Studies, Jahangirnagar University, Savar, Dhaka