An evolving EU needs to accept differentiation

The dimensions are dissimilar. So, the goals may also appear to be different. However, the way ahead is not about the false choice between incremental or radical change. At this point, change in the context of the evolving global political scenario will inevitably be radical. Nevertheless, when it comes to setting long-term objectives and taking bold decisions, the EU appears to have been unable to proactively move forward.
Analysts feel that in a transforming world there needs to be a transboundary and honest strategic exchange leading to a shared vision among the EU27 of what needs to be done-- incorporating and closely coordinating actions at both the national and European level.
However, experience - including the 2024-2029 Strategic Agenda adopted by the European Council in June 2024 - indicates that the EU and its members struggle to define and agree on an ambitious joint strategic vision, let alone a concrete strategic plan, given major differences between Member States on core strategic issues and questions. EU countries and institutions do not appear to have conducted a realistic assessment of what has or has not worked, and whether they have individually and collectively reached the point where they need to be at this moment in time.
Consequently, analysts feel that given the shifts that we are witnessing, there is a need to be more ambitious, even if this does not involve all Member States. But thus far, the EU has neither been able to be ready nor have they been able to define core strategic priorities and radically upscale their readiness to deepen cooperation at the European level, especially when it comes to deepening defence cooperation or substantially increasing spending at the European level.
In addition, when it comes to reforming decision-making in the European Council or preparing for major global risks, ambition and concreteness are sacrificed for preserving unity.
Geo-strategists have indicated that to strengthen the Union's capacity to implement its strategic objectives, the EU and its institutions will have to act more like a government than a legislative machine. This would particularly apply to contentious fields like foreign, security and defence policy. This would imply sharing of sovereignty.
In theory, groups of countries could move forward by using the mechanisms of differentiated integration available in the Lisbon Treaty, including the instrument of enhanced cooperation-- Article 20 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU)) or Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)-Articles 42(6) and 46 TEU). However, experience has shown that Member States are reluctant to use existing instruments, given that their application is rather complex in practice and on many occasions reaches legal limits, especially if they touch on areas where EU legal norms apply to all member states-- for example on Single Market issues.
So, if agreement cannot be found within the EU framework, given that governments of certain Member States block progress within the Union, an alternate route needs to be found, allowing cooperation outside, but in parallel to the EU treaties. In those cases, progress will have to rely on coalitions of those who are ready to create parallel avenues allowing and promoting systemic cooperation and integration in specific policy areas, even if they are not fully integrated and governed by the mechanisms of the EU. Something similar was done in the past in the case of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) which excludes those Member States that choose not to participate or support a common approach.
If a group of EU countries is ready to progress against the opposition of a limited number of national governments and can only do so outside the Union, the process should follow the notion of a 'supra-governmental avantgarde', allowing the willing Member States to extend the level of cooperation outside the EU treaty framework, while adhering to a transparent set of predefined principles, including the commitment to 'replicate', respect and promote the Union's supranational nature.
It must be clear that this Avantgarde is not an inter-governmental construct - even if it is established outside the EU treaties. It is rather something like a 'mini-EU' with binding rules and strong supranational features, including the specific role and involvement of EU institutions.
In more concrete terms, such a supra-governmental avantgarde should therefore: (a) be open to all Member States willing to join and respect common underlying principles; (b) involve or even strengthen the role of EU institutions in the differentiated areas, including the Commission and the European Parliament; (c) keep non-participating Member States informed; (d) refrain from setting up new permanent parallel institutional structures outside the Union, and (e) Aim to integrate the legal norms adopted and the cooperation initiated outside the EU into the Union's treaty framework as soon as possible. If the participating Member States follow these essential guidelines, they would not 'only' be able to move forward, but also, they could do so in a way that would respect the community method.
Strategic analysts have observed that such cooperation outside the Union's framework might create challenges for the EU system, in existing areas of integration, for example, by funding no longer being channeled through the Union. It carries the risk of also undermining the EU Single Market-- the backbone of the EU, and it could play into the hands of political forces on the far-right and left, who want to actively undermine EU institutions to establish a "Europe of Nation States".
However, at this point, the risks of a more differentiated EU are outweighed by the urgent need to overcome blockades and preserve Europe's capacity to act.
It is clear that there is an urgent need to progress forcefully in the area of defence. EU Member States in Europe need to be prepared to take more responsibility for its security. The EU will have to live with an aggressive Russia for years to come. It is also unlikely whether the next elected US President will continue to extend resources to defend Europe, especially if Washington decides to engage itself in potential conflicts in other parts of the world, particularly in Asia. It might then raise the denotation of isolationism.
Based on the realisation that the enhancement of EU's defence capabilities is a common European good that needs to be ambitiously pursued, willing Member States should be ready to jointly invest into European defence cooperation, financially supported by targeted joint and common borrowing mechanisms. Defence analysts feel that the current level of collective spending in the area of defence is by far not sufficient.
Bearing in mind constitutional concerns in a number of Member States, notably in Germany, and following the model pursued in the context of NextGenerationEU (NGEU), the money raised would have to be ad-hoc, target specific objectives like, for example, a common defence shield, and be collectively financed from outside the traditional Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).
Calls for leadership and initiative are usually being directed to Berlin and Paris. Yet, at this stage, the Franco-German internal engines, according to some, is relatively politically weak. Therefore, it has been suggested by some observers that the EU eyes should increasingly be on Poland, which will assume the EU Council Presidency in January 2025 with some other EU countries as potential anchors, promoters and drivers for an avantgarde in European defence.
Deep concerns have surfaced among some EU Members of the Eastern flank regarding Russia's aggressive neo-imperialism. As such, these countries in all likelihood will be interested in further steps to strengthen European defence, albeit strongly aligned with their objectives within NATO. There is also an opportunity to engage with non-EU countries such as the United Kingdom and Norway in such a process.
Needless to say, such an exercise of countries taking the lead need to increase their number to have a meaningful impact. As such, the creation of a supra-governmental avantgarde should and will also put pressure on Berlin and Paris to be on board.
For good reasons, the EU and its Members have, in recent decades, avoided major forms of differentiated integration in key policy areas. One can argue that such radical forms of differentiation could be dangerous for the Union's overall future, as it might undermine unity, cause distrust between the 'outs' and 'ins', erode the EU's institutions and, thus, entail the danger of potentially creating new divides in Europe.
These concerns are indeed valid. Nevertheless, the radical change that the EU is confronted with both from the outside as well as from the inside requires a re-evaluation and re-thinking of old recipes.
Given the different European and global problems that we are experiencing, a higher level of ambition is indispensable. As in the case of many other international groups-- SAARC, BIMSTEC and BRICS-- it might emerge that not all EU Member States will always be on board.
However, cooperation, at times, might need to be organised outside the EU Treaties. Conversely, if we sacrifice the necessary level of ambition for the sake of unity, EU will run the danger of continued under-delivery, which in return will further undermine the Union's legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens and play into the hands of those who want to radically downscale the level of European integration.
EU analysts have consequently observed that even if a fundamental higher level of differentiation in the context of a supra-governmental avantgarde entails some dangers and appear to be politically difficult to materialize, it is such a radical change that the EU requires.
Alternatively, there is a real risk that the Union as we know it, might undo itself.
As the new EU leadership is getting off the ground after the 2024 European elections, the political centre should boldly use its majority in the EU institutions to promote more ambitious strategic objectives in the coming years.
If the pro-European mainstream fail to do so, the political peripheries will continue to grow. Much more than in the past, the EU and Member States need to resist the temptation to merely focus on keeping the machinery afloat. This will not address the severe gravity of the fundamental challenges that the EU is facing.

Muhammad Zamir, a former Ambassador, is an analyst specialised in foreign affairs, right to information and good governance.
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