Bangladesh war of liberation
Saturday, 15 December 2007
Mashiur Rahman
IS Bhutto responsible for the disintegration of Pakistan? Ostensibly, it appears to be so. But the flaw lies much deeper than meets the eyes.
The simple fact is that, if interpreted objectively, Pakistan's military Junta had no plan and were rather intransigent and stubborn not to hand over power to Bangabandhu and his Awami League. The succession of cumulative events that led to the breakdown of Pakistan were brought about by the Government by dastardly violating the mandate of the majority, robustly demonstrated in 1970's general election.
" Whenever we, the majority of the nation sought to exercise our right to rule, we became victims of conspiracy and intrigue and repression was unleashed on us", said Sheikh MuJib.
The military generals had the perception and conviction emanating from the various intelligence agencies that Awami League would emerge as a single majority party in the Parliamentary election from the erst-while East Pakistan. But it was not in their slightest comprehension that Mujib would capture almost all the seats in the Parliament barring only two. By mid January, 1971 the generals decided, power would not be transferred to the people's representatives and they found in Bhutto, who captured majority seats in the then Pakistan, particularly in West Punjab a willing horse, to achieve the end. Bhutto, later on, was on record to have confessed publicly that, he had agreed with Yahiya that an armed intervention in the erstwhile East Pakistan was deemed necessary to bring the Bengalees to their knees.
It is relevant to mention that the Panjabi top-brass in civil and military services and various intelligent agencies had a personal stake if Bangabandhu was allowed to take power. They ill-advised Yahiya Khan that the Bengalees did not have the stamina needed for showing pro-longed resistance. He was allured that a short and harsh action would be enough to bring the Leaders of Awami League to their knees and not the least, they would be cowed down. It was natural, therefore, the upsurge of Bengali nationalism and their demands would cool down within a few days after military action. The killing of few thousand Bengalees, they argued, would not be too high price in keeping the country's integrity together. The fatal and heinous advice, ironically coincided with Yahiya Khan's own who, too, believed and convinced of the suggestion, "show the Bengalees the dragon teeth, they will be alright".
It is, however, deemed pertinent to make an oblique reference to the six-point programme launched by Bangabandhu on which Awami League fought the election and got the people's mandate. Six Points, if interpreted correctly, was not a secessionist movement as sought to be propagated by the vested interests and the reactionary elements in the then West Pakistan.
"East Pakistan was majority" Sheikh Mujib was quoted as saying, adding"' a majority never secedes from minority".
In fact, the basic essence of Six Points was to see to it as decentralised prosperity and power sharing for all the federal units including North West Frontier Province, Beluchistan and Sind-a development to which the vested interests could not reconcile. On the contrary, a massive propaganda offensive was launched against it. However, in the case of erstwhile East Pakistan, presently sovereign Bangladesh, Six Points could have been considered as a lifesaving drug, a drug containing all the vital ingredients in a condensed form, a drug which could have saved and salvaged them from the deep-rooted economic exploitation and political deprivation.
As professor Toynbee puts it, "What started as an economic autonomy within the framework of Pakistan was irrevocably transferred by the large-scale slaughter of the Bengalees into a mass movement culminating into the emergence of a sovereign Bangladesh. Indira Gandhi was quoted to have aptly said, "Any attempt to find military solution to political question is bound to be failure".
It is an irony, the military crackdown on the unarmed population of Bangladesh and its further extension to the urban and rural areas could not bring the situation under control. The illusion and ill-conceived strategy of bringing the situation under the ominous control of the then military junta proved to be an utter failure. It made the Bengalees inimical and more determined than ever in their fight against the military Junta and the then Pakistan Government. Further, it made the Bengalees totally hostile to the regime. A state which was overtly and covertly out to physically destroy and annihilate its own population, irrespective of castes, religions, colours and creed, had forfeited its right to the loyalty of its own citizens. They (the Bengalees) were, therefore, more desperate and prepared to do everything and make any sacrifice to sever their relation with Pakistan and form a new state of their own which is now sovereign Bangladesh. What also departed with the new reality was the two-nation theory on the basis of which Pakistan came into being and had existed so long.
The usurpers of power in uniform having little regard for democratic norms and ethics ruled the country since 1951, right from the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan's first Prime Minister. It was an irony, they refused to accept the mandate robustly demonstrated in 1970 General Elections, and refused to hand over power to the Leader of the majority party, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. To make things worse, they let loose a reign of terror, suppression and oppression on the unarmed population, resulting in the breakup of Pakistan in the eastern wing and substantially weakening the western wing.
A leading general of America, who played a key role in the War of Vietnam, was asked how could it be that America, despite being the mightiest military, economic and political power in the world had lost in Vietnam. Similarly, how the city of New York, the cockpit of economic activities of the world's most prosperous country was declared bankrupt by its Mayor. His reply was a classic one. He ascribed the debacle of America in Vietnam despite deployment of full might to a wrong strategy. " Any attempt to find military solution to a political issue is bound to the failure", he added, similarly, as the general put it, "in the case of New York, the city needed an economic solution rather than a political one".
Redeeming features, however, if any, were the individual acts of kindness by officers and men of the then Pakistan Army. These, however, were few and far between and drowned in a general sea of misery. One such person, was a general of the Pakistan Army who was travelling in a commercial flight in course of which he fell to talking with a fellow Bengalee passenger. While the conversation was on, he (The then West Pakistani General) remarked that he really did not understand this dabbling interference by the then Pakistan Army in politics. All that he knew was that he was a soldier and one whose job was to defend his country, no more and no less. To a Bengalee, he could not in those times have said more and neither could the former proceed to ask him about his reaction to the cruelties. However, implicit in this bare sentence, there seemed to have a touch of humility although cloaked in the garb of a pure professional. These were the instances of humanity and kindness.
IS Bhutto responsible for the disintegration of Pakistan? Ostensibly, it appears to be so. But the flaw lies much deeper than meets the eyes.
The simple fact is that, if interpreted objectively, Pakistan's military Junta had no plan and were rather intransigent and stubborn not to hand over power to Bangabandhu and his Awami League. The succession of cumulative events that led to the breakdown of Pakistan were brought about by the Government by dastardly violating the mandate of the majority, robustly demonstrated in 1970's general election.
" Whenever we, the majority of the nation sought to exercise our right to rule, we became victims of conspiracy and intrigue and repression was unleashed on us", said Sheikh MuJib.
The military generals had the perception and conviction emanating from the various intelligence agencies that Awami League would emerge as a single majority party in the Parliamentary election from the erst-while East Pakistan. But it was not in their slightest comprehension that Mujib would capture almost all the seats in the Parliament barring only two. By mid January, 1971 the generals decided, power would not be transferred to the people's representatives and they found in Bhutto, who captured majority seats in the then Pakistan, particularly in West Punjab a willing horse, to achieve the end. Bhutto, later on, was on record to have confessed publicly that, he had agreed with Yahiya that an armed intervention in the erstwhile East Pakistan was deemed necessary to bring the Bengalees to their knees.
It is relevant to mention that the Panjabi top-brass in civil and military services and various intelligent agencies had a personal stake if Bangabandhu was allowed to take power. They ill-advised Yahiya Khan that the Bengalees did not have the stamina needed for showing pro-longed resistance. He was allured that a short and harsh action would be enough to bring the Leaders of Awami League to their knees and not the least, they would be cowed down. It was natural, therefore, the upsurge of Bengali nationalism and their demands would cool down within a few days after military action. The killing of few thousand Bengalees, they argued, would not be too high price in keeping the country's integrity together. The fatal and heinous advice, ironically coincided with Yahiya Khan's own who, too, believed and convinced of the suggestion, "show the Bengalees the dragon teeth, they will be alright".
It is, however, deemed pertinent to make an oblique reference to the six-point programme launched by Bangabandhu on which Awami League fought the election and got the people's mandate. Six Points, if interpreted correctly, was not a secessionist movement as sought to be propagated by the vested interests and the reactionary elements in the then West Pakistan.
"East Pakistan was majority" Sheikh Mujib was quoted as saying, adding"' a majority never secedes from minority".
In fact, the basic essence of Six Points was to see to it as decentralised prosperity and power sharing for all the federal units including North West Frontier Province, Beluchistan and Sind-a development to which the vested interests could not reconcile. On the contrary, a massive propaganda offensive was launched against it. However, in the case of erstwhile East Pakistan, presently sovereign Bangladesh, Six Points could have been considered as a lifesaving drug, a drug containing all the vital ingredients in a condensed form, a drug which could have saved and salvaged them from the deep-rooted economic exploitation and political deprivation.
As professor Toynbee puts it, "What started as an economic autonomy within the framework of Pakistan was irrevocably transferred by the large-scale slaughter of the Bengalees into a mass movement culminating into the emergence of a sovereign Bangladesh. Indira Gandhi was quoted to have aptly said, "Any attempt to find military solution to political question is bound to be failure".
It is an irony, the military crackdown on the unarmed population of Bangladesh and its further extension to the urban and rural areas could not bring the situation under control. The illusion and ill-conceived strategy of bringing the situation under the ominous control of the then military junta proved to be an utter failure. It made the Bengalees inimical and more determined than ever in their fight against the military Junta and the then Pakistan Government. Further, it made the Bengalees totally hostile to the regime. A state which was overtly and covertly out to physically destroy and annihilate its own population, irrespective of castes, religions, colours and creed, had forfeited its right to the loyalty of its own citizens. They (the Bengalees) were, therefore, more desperate and prepared to do everything and make any sacrifice to sever their relation with Pakistan and form a new state of their own which is now sovereign Bangladesh. What also departed with the new reality was the two-nation theory on the basis of which Pakistan came into being and had existed so long.
The usurpers of power in uniform having little regard for democratic norms and ethics ruled the country since 1951, right from the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan's first Prime Minister. It was an irony, they refused to accept the mandate robustly demonstrated in 1970 General Elections, and refused to hand over power to the Leader of the majority party, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. To make things worse, they let loose a reign of terror, suppression and oppression on the unarmed population, resulting in the breakup of Pakistan in the eastern wing and substantially weakening the western wing.
A leading general of America, who played a key role in the War of Vietnam, was asked how could it be that America, despite being the mightiest military, economic and political power in the world had lost in Vietnam. Similarly, how the city of New York, the cockpit of economic activities of the world's most prosperous country was declared bankrupt by its Mayor. His reply was a classic one. He ascribed the debacle of America in Vietnam despite deployment of full might to a wrong strategy. " Any attempt to find military solution to a political issue is bound to the failure", he added, similarly, as the general put it, "in the case of New York, the city needed an economic solution rather than a political one".
Redeeming features, however, if any, were the individual acts of kindness by officers and men of the then Pakistan Army. These, however, were few and far between and drowned in a general sea of misery. One such person, was a general of the Pakistan Army who was travelling in a commercial flight in course of which he fell to talking with a fellow Bengalee passenger. While the conversation was on, he (The then West Pakistani General) remarked that he really did not understand this dabbling interference by the then Pakistan Army in politics. All that he knew was that he was a soldier and one whose job was to defend his country, no more and no less. To a Bengalee, he could not in those times have said more and neither could the former proceed to ask him about his reaction to the cruelties. However, implicit in this bare sentence, there seemed to have a touch of humility although cloaked in the garb of a pure professional. These were the instances of humanity and kindness.