Community cooperation in development

OF late, there has been something of a consensus amongst the academia and development activists regarding the topicality and urgency of involving local communities in any meaningful development initiative or project. Notwithstanding such rhetoric and emphasis, however, the challenge of effectively engaging communities and ensuring adequate cooperation from them -- remains as daunting as ever. Indeed, the history of community cooperation and collective action in voluntary and developmental activities is generally a dismal one where successes are often out weighed by failures.

Major studies on the experience of community involvement in developmental projects (especially in the context of South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa) suggest that popular participation is a particularly complex issue which is contingent on the surrounding socioeconomic and political environment. Often planners have proceeded on erroneous assumptions about community. `Community' has been viewed as an undifferentiated, harmonious unit of cooperation which, with some external help and inputs, would readily flourish into the most effective means of cooperation and development. Accordingly, the expectations about cooperative actions have been high and in many cases, disappointment at their actual results has been correspondingly bitter. These rather romantic assumptions have lately been widely challenged worldwide by prominent scholars.

In fact, there has been a cogent school of skepticism about the prospects of community cooperation. Scholars representing this school argue that large unorganised groups cannot produce collective action, even when they have common interests. Only when groups are small, or when they are fortunate enough to have an independent source of selective incentives, will they organise or act to achieve their objectives - the argument further goes. Such arguments are based on the assumption that man is a `rational' and `self-interested' being and will not act for `group-interest', unless coerced or `selectively' induced. This tone of pessimism on collective action is more popularly encapsulated under the phrase: `tragedy of the commons'; which refers to a situation of unrestricted usage of a open access resource where future is totally discounted and everybody is motivated to extract as much as they want for present without restraint, because the individual thinks that somebody else would later usurp all benefits. From the Bangladesh experience too, one may note that, the extremely poor level of community hygiene, misuse of irrigation water, lack of maintenance of local roads and canals may be some of the examples of the absence of collective actions of the community.

Researchers have been rigorously searching for alternative ways of promoting effective cooperation. In the course of the search there has emerged a convincing view that community members will cooperate only in particular situations, especially when they have a common interest and they are convinced that the common interest can only be met by acting collectively. In other words, community participation and collective actions are most likely to be selective and they are generally seen in the form of 'selective and negotiated alliances'.

There are several contextual conditions which pave the way for generating cooperative action and sustain it in the long term. It must be made clear at this point that, the process of cooperation and the interplay of regulating factors therein, are profoundly contingent on the specific contextual and regional realities. As such, there can not be any universal or generalised list of conditions for cooperation. However, it is certainly possible to identify some broad conditions from many empirical studies and analytical commentaries on the pursuit of collective action in rural South Asia, as have been enumerated below:

I.The nature of Local Institution: Proper institutional structure which acts in conformity with specific contextual realities and demands, is imperative for the success of cooperative action.

II.Reorientation of State's Role: Here the key considerations are: (i) state initiatives and interventions should not clash with the local traditional/indigenous institutions, (ii). `blue?print' imposition of some state?sponsored organizational structure in the name of cooperative?movement is unlikely to meet local conditions/demands, (iii) `transplantation' of `successful cooperatives' (which have been proved to be successful in a specific area) into an alien context, without due consideration of contextual and circumstantial differences is not likely to produce desired results, (iv) heavy state interference in local cooperative organisations `usually inimical' to success, i.e. a major reorientation of state?bureaucracy is imperative in order to make it more responsive, sensitive and flexible to public needs and contextual demands. This reorientation should include the following: shift from authoritarian to participatory styles and from responsiveness to orders from above to demands from below; a service?orientation with corresponding changes in the current elitist value orientation; providing `extension services' and `technical support' to local organisations and cooperative structures; decentralised planning and authority for dealing with local affairs; nurturing and fostering indigenous knowledge and `community problem?solving' capacity.

III.`Control' Structures: include: (i) punishment (or reward) for the breach of common rules (or abiding the rules) and effective enforcement thereof; (ii) detection of cases of free?riding; (iii) communicating and motivating people about rules and prospective benefits of cooperation; (iv) facing crises with further intensification of rule?enforcement and propaganda.

IV.The Nature of the Resource and of the Concerned Users: Indeed, the nature of resource is very important. When the resource is such that it is difficult or impossible to exclude its users individually and it is vitally needed by all, collective efforts may be considered most feasible in order to regulate restrained access to the resource and to increase net collective benefits. Problems like `free?riding' can be easily detected if the resource is a clearly defined one and users are aware of the utility of the resource and majority of the users would benefit from retaining the `common' status of the resource (instead of allowing sub?group enclosure or private property).

V.Degrees of Assurance: Different parties in a `common' situation have different interest and `stakes'. These groups are not likely to comply with collective arrangements for restrained use, unless they are assured of their shares. Such assurance, preferably by a recognised institution (i.e. `institutional assurance') is, thus, necessary.

VI.Pattern of Accountability: The leadership and the institution itself should have a well?established and acceptable mode of accountability to their members.

The above may provide some food for thought for all those who are involved in community-focused, participatory development, and thereby dare to face the formidable challenge of nurturing and promoting community cooperation ad collective action.

The writer is Professor of Development Studies at the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh and Honorary Research Fellow, Centre for Development Studies, University of Wales, UK. He can be contacted at: niaz.khan@yahoo.com