Constant games played by power politics

There are constant games of bureaucratic politics among a handful of central agencies in the area of administrative reform. These contestations usually occur among the agency responsible for financial issues or the budget, the agency responsible for human resources management or the civil service commission and the agency responsible for planning and evaluation of reform or overall management of the civil service system.
An example is the case of Canada. After the Glassco Commission report in 1960, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) within the Department of Finance raced to lead the reform strategies. In 1967, CSC set up the Bureau of Management Consultant, which later became the Department of Supply and Services (DSS). TBS set up the Management Improvement Branch, after it took over the responsibilities of the Bureau of Government Organisations, which was set up to lead reforms. The bureaucratic politics between CSC and TBS to control reform created confusion and duplications of reform efforts (Saint-Martin, 2000: 127).
In the U.K., David Lipsey  (2000: 45-55) recorded the battles that went on between the Treasury and Civil Service Department (CSD), which was created in 1968. After it, there were battles between the Treasury and the Efficiency Unit, which was created in 1979, within the Cabinet Office. Later on, the Treasury gave up most of their power on human resource management to the Office of Public Service and Science (OPSS). These are the evidence of contestation between central agencies over reform strategies in the U.K. before its implementation of reform policies in the 1980s.
Another example is the case of Malaysia. In the late 1960s, the Development Administration Unit (DAU) initially was assigned to undertake four tasks: personnel administration and training: planning, budgetary, and financial administration; management services, incorporating the former organisation and methods technicians; and the state and local administration (Esman 1972: 157). The DAU led several reform initiatives in the beginning, but it lacked the support of central agencies. Soon there were tensions between the DAU and the Treasury to have power over reform of budgetary issues. In the end, the Treasury was able to hold on to its turf, essentially it won the battle to lead reform and DAU was dismantled (Esman, 1972: 194-208).
Under the initiative of Mahathir Mohamad, then Deputy Prime Minister under Prime Minister Razak, the DAU was transformed into MAMPU in 1978. The DAU in Malaysia did not last because the advisers did not go for separation between human resources and financial resources reforms. The DAU was assigned to do both, while in reality the Treasury had the real power on budget issues. This was because the advisers were used under the US' OMB model and thus expected budget issues to be aligned with management issues. Up until today, the Treasury still takes full responsibility for performance-based budgeting or modified budgeting system (MBS), as what the Malaysians call it.
Similarly in Australia from 1984 to 1987, the powerful Public Service Board was gradually replaced by the less powerful Public Service Commission. The control of the number of staffs was transferred to the Department of Finance. The responsibility for adjudicating grievances was transferred to the Merit Protection and Review Agency. Some personnel management powers and functions were also delegated to departments (Holmes and Wileman, 1997). This case shows that the Public Service Board, which was mainly in charge of management and human resources, has lost its turf and power to another central agency responsible for financial issues. In the case of Thailand, prior to 2003, there were consistent tensions and struggles to dominate reform policies between the Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC) and the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) (Bowornwathana and Poocharoen, 2005).
However, when administrative reform policies, including giving government advice, implementation and evaluation responsibilities, were separated from the human resources agency - the OCSC, and put under the Office of the Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC) in 2002, the tensions became triangulated. That is, the OCSC against the OPDC for human resources work and at the same time, OPDC against BOB, for overall public sector reform policies. In a World Bank report (1999), the BOB and OCSC were to coordinate closely to develop and implement the core of the reform programme, which is performance-based management. They must first implement this concept in their respective agencies because they are the central agencies in financial and human resource management.
However, when the OPDC was created, this disturbed the coordination expected to occur between OCSC and BOB. The agencies are again back to square one in terms of struggling for power to control the direction and momentum of reforms. All of these five cases reveal this classic type of bureaucratic politics of competition between central agencies, which are usually responsible for man - human resources, and money - budget. And, as the cases point to, there is a third central agency, which is usually created to specifically lead reform in the area of overall management issues. Thus, the hauling and pulling goes on among the three 'M' agencies: man, money, and management.
The second type is the power struggle between core agencies and line agencies in the process of reform. Core central agencies have tendencies to increase their standardisation power over line ministries and departments. Meanwhile, line agencies consider themselves to be experts in their work and want to be autonomous from central agencies. From the perspective of administrative reform, this tug of war between central and line agencies means that both sides would try to change the course of reform to their own advantages.
Central agencies are usually closer to the centre of power in government such as the Prime Minister than the line agencies. Line ministries and departments can have power over reform decisions if their minister-boss is very powerful in government who can influence reform choices of government. The relationships between central bureaucrats and line agencies in the Thai government have evolved during 1932 to 2006.
From 1932 onwards and before the Field Marshall Sarit Period of the 1950s, central bureaucrats were weak and line bureaucrats were strong. From the Sarit period onwards to 2000, central bureaucrats became much stronger with the establishment and upgrading of several central agencies. Under the Thaksin government, central officials retained their strength, while line officials became weaker. Opposite to that Thai situation, an example of central agencies being pressured to reduce and devolve their administrative powers to line agencies is the case of Australia. In 1976, the Fraser government weakened the Treasury Department by establishing the Department of Finance (Campbell and Halligan, 1992). The Treasury had overwhelming powers over budgetary and financial issues over line ministries.
By splitting off financial issues to the new department, the power of the Treasury was broken down and devolution of authority was passed on to line ministries and agencies. Thus, the line ministries and agencies were able to develop their skills and expanded their area of power, without being dominated by the Treasury. Also, the Public Service Board's power was reallocated to the line ministries. It was perceived to be "overstaffed, over-intrusive, unhelpful, more an impediment to improving administration than a benefit" (Holmes and Wileman, 1997). The Board had 780 staff in 1987 but was reduced to only 130 staff and changed its name to Public Service Commission. Excluding some powers, that went to the Department of Finance, almost all other responsibilities of personnel matters were devolved to individual departments (Holmes and Wileman, 1997).
The third type is the struggle for superior power among bureaucrats in different line ministries. After a reform, the power of a particular ministry vis-à-vis other ministries may change. For example, in a major restructuring of government, bureaucrats from different ministries may fight for the inclusion of a bureau under their structural domain. Or the creation of new ministries may ignite a fierce battle among bureaucrats in old and new ministries to incorporate as many agencies as possible in their turfs. In several countries, there is what one may call the phenomenon of a "super ministry." In the traditional Thai bureaucracy, the Ministry of Interior has been the super ministry.
Reforms have gradually reduced the power of the Interior Ministry by splitting several agencies such as the Police Department, the Office of the Attorney-General, and the Department of Labour from the Interior Ministry. In Japan, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was described by Chalmers Johnson as "an elite bureaucratic department with no precise equivalent in any country." Johnson attributed Japan's economic miracle after the Second World War to the success of MITI in collaboration of Japan's "capitalist developmental state's" role in the economy with the private sector (Johnson, 1982, see back cover; Johnson, 1995; see also Vogel, 1979, 53-96). Another powerful ministry in Japan is the Ministry of Finance. Some call the mandarins of the Finance Ministry "the elite of the elite" (Rafferty, 1995). Peter Hartcher argued that The Ministry of Finance in Japan is "a political, economic and intellectual force without parallel in the developed world. Claiming a divine right which supersedes elected governments, it enjoys a greater concentration of powers--formal and informal--than any comparable body in any industrialised democracy (Hartcher, 1997).
The fourth type is the politics between high and mid/low levels of bureaucrats. This type has been examined in the literature of public policy in general but not specifically on administrative reforms. Ralph S. Brower and Mitchel Y. Abolafia (1997) studied political activities among lower level bureaucrats. They formulated a model of politics from below that contrasts with Graham Allison's model of bureaucratic politics among those at the top. They found that lower level participants engage in political activities that are primarily about the pursuit of identity rather than specific organisational outcomes.
Another example would be O'Leary's (1994) examination of the bureaucrats at the middle and lower levels in the U.S. Department of Interior and the Nevada Department of Wildlife, while they were pushing for a new legislation. It was found that these career public managers were shaping the organisational environment and that most public servants have many masters and multiple directors of accountability. To some they are entrepreneurs, while to others they are deviant insubordinates. In the realm of administrative reform, there are also similar situations where mid/low level bureaucrats are quietly fighting to maintain their turf and power with high level bureaucrats. For example, an indication that low level bureaucrats are losing power is when the gap between high bureaucrats and low bureaucrats in terms of salary and reward widens after a reform, and low level bureaucrats show signs of low motivation and resentment towards the agency. In a study of rewards of high public office, Bowornwathana (2006c) concluded that reform initiatives approved by governments in the 1990s involving the systems of rewards for bureaucrats have substantially widened the income gap between high level and low level bureaucrats. Under programmes such as brain-drain prevention schemes and special allowances, high level bureaucrats are proportionally rewarded more than mid and low level bureaucrats.
(To be continued)
The writer is General Secretary, Bangladesh Economic Association, and Chairman, Emerging Credit Rating Limited.
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