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Extremely slow execution of projects under Indian LoCs

Sunday, 4 August 2024


Mere 23 per cent use of US$7.36 billion external assistance extended under three separate lines of credit (LoCs) over a period of 14 years by India, by any measure, is deeply frustrating. The first LoC began with US$862 million in 2010 and the size of assistance increased to $7.36 billion in 2017 through the addition of two other LoCs. The low-interest-bearing Indian loans were obviously designed to help implementation of certain development projects. But the sad reality is that the execution of the said projects didn't really go anywhere, which is why it is important that both loan giver and recipient take stock of the situation.
Why this sorry state of affairs? Indeed, policymakers on both sides of the border reportedly have tried to expedite the execution rate but what is now crystal-clear is that bureaucratic hurdles in both India and Bangladesh have collectively sidelined fund disbursement. And this is translated into a mere $1.73 billion fund-release over 14 years! It is plain to see that no development project can successfully be executed if there is hold up of timely release of funds. It wasn't the political leadership that was at fault, but disagreements over the details of how project financing was going to happen is what derailed the implementation of projects under the LoCs. For instance, it took ridiculous amounts of time in appointing consultants for a number of projects. It is not as though Bangladesh has no experience in handling foreign-funded projects. The country has been handling multi-billion-dollar projects financed by other countries including China, Japan and Russia and multilateral lenders such as World Bank and Asian Development Bank. Precisely, why it took years to hire consultants remains a mystery. What has become clear is that although the funds made available under the LoCs at an interest rate of 1.0 per cent, it would seem that not much thought went into scrutinising the minute details of these finances prior to their signing.
It has become abundantly clear that terms of the loans in question were complicated and implementing projects financed by these LoCs would not be entirely beneficial for the country. It remains a mystery as to why Bangladesh chose to undertake so many projects simultaneously, for instance, the first LoC covered 15 projects followed by a slew of other projects in the following two LoCs. Needless to say, these were important infrastructure projects, but do policymakers in this country assess own implementation capacity prior to undertaking such loans? Just because the money is on offer doesn't mean the country should be taking them, especially in light of the fact that more often than not, Bangladesh ends up finding out the 'fine print' details of these loans after inking the deal.
Another major sticking point of these LoCs has been the fact that 75 per cent of the goods and services required for a project must be bought from India. Why? This is ridiculous, particularly because many of these "goods and services" are readily available domestically. This brings us back to the question about whether or not Bangladeshi negotiators are competent enough to read between the lines before committing to taking foreign lines of credit. Something needs to change here or Bangladesh will forever find itself at the short end of a stick.