For an effective Anti-Corruption Commission
Friday, 30 April 2010
The amendments to the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) Act adopted in principle by the Cabinet on Monday are nothing set on stone. The amendments are in proposal form and hopefully reactions and comments from enlightened sections of people would sensitise the Cabinet members about going for a rethink of the amendment proposals before sending the same in concrete form to parliament for its approval. Theoretically also, parliament would be in a position to scrutinise the amendment proposals and carry out modifications, additions or alterations to them. Nonetheless, the proposals to amend the Anti-corruption Act 2004 that have been made, cannot but raise concern in the short term as in their existing form these are seen to be designed to take away vital powers from the ACC in functioning truly independently.
Clearly, the ACC in the period under the caretaker government was noted for arbitrarily starting cases against individuals and many of these cases proved to be non-maintainable from lack of proof, insufficient investigation by ACC officials or their own corruption. But the accused ones suffered badly. Thus, the ACC earned a bad name for both inefficiency and oppression under the caretakers. So, there is justification that ACC should do its job seriously in the future and start cases against very well-deserved corruption suspects leading assuredly to their conviction. For attaining this objective, it has been suggested that anyone found guilty of starting false corruption cases would be punishable for doing so by five years of imprisonment. The false accusers to be recognised can be no other than the ACC's own investigation officers who issue charge-sheet for corruption. Thus, there is merit in the proposed amendment providing for penal action for starting false corruption cases. This would restrain ACC officials from acting hurriedly or unprofessionally or from starting cases before collecting maintainable proofs.
But even then, it needs careful assessment whether the fear of paying penalty on grounds of starting non-maintainable cases would now lead to complete or near complete loss of enthusiasm on the part of the officials to start corruption cases in the first place. In that case, the ACC will soon turn into an inactive organisation with no zest for work in its ranks. Thus, it may be thought out whether a way can be devised, apart from jailing, that would discourage ACC's members from starting cases on flimsy grounds and for them to issue charge-sheet only upon gathering enough credible and maintainable proofs of corruption.
As for the other major amendment proposal that the ACC should be accountable to the President and that it should seek the government's permission before starting cases against civil servants, both should invite due criticisms. Under the existing Act, the ACC is required to submit an annual report on its activities to the President by March every year and the President sends the report to the parliament for necessary actions. But doing anything beyond that in the name of accountability could lead to the ACC losing its independence.
The proposal to oblige the ACC to take permission from the government before taking steps against corruption suspects in the ranks of government officials, the same is transparently the very odd one among the amendments. Everyone knows that civil servants and even people's representatives or ministers presiding over them, they spawn the most corruption. Thus, the proposal to make the civil servants and their higher ups semi-immune or practically immune from direct taking of action by the ACC, would keep the scope wide open for indulging in corruption by these people. All of these considerations should make the case very strong indeed for a reappraisal of the suggested amendments to the ACC Act. Furthermore, government should also take up seriously the task of cleaning the ACC of corrupt elements to make that body fitter for fighting corruption.
Clearly, the ACC in the period under the caretaker government was noted for arbitrarily starting cases against individuals and many of these cases proved to be non-maintainable from lack of proof, insufficient investigation by ACC officials or their own corruption. But the accused ones suffered badly. Thus, the ACC earned a bad name for both inefficiency and oppression under the caretakers. So, there is justification that ACC should do its job seriously in the future and start cases against very well-deserved corruption suspects leading assuredly to their conviction. For attaining this objective, it has been suggested that anyone found guilty of starting false corruption cases would be punishable for doing so by five years of imprisonment. The false accusers to be recognised can be no other than the ACC's own investigation officers who issue charge-sheet for corruption. Thus, there is merit in the proposed amendment providing for penal action for starting false corruption cases. This would restrain ACC officials from acting hurriedly or unprofessionally or from starting cases before collecting maintainable proofs.
But even then, it needs careful assessment whether the fear of paying penalty on grounds of starting non-maintainable cases would now lead to complete or near complete loss of enthusiasm on the part of the officials to start corruption cases in the first place. In that case, the ACC will soon turn into an inactive organisation with no zest for work in its ranks. Thus, it may be thought out whether a way can be devised, apart from jailing, that would discourage ACC's members from starting cases on flimsy grounds and for them to issue charge-sheet only upon gathering enough credible and maintainable proofs of corruption.
As for the other major amendment proposal that the ACC should be accountable to the President and that it should seek the government's permission before starting cases against civil servants, both should invite due criticisms. Under the existing Act, the ACC is required to submit an annual report on its activities to the President by March every year and the President sends the report to the parliament for necessary actions. But doing anything beyond that in the name of accountability could lead to the ACC losing its independence.
The proposal to oblige the ACC to take permission from the government before taking steps against corruption suspects in the ranks of government officials, the same is transparently the very odd one among the amendments. Everyone knows that civil servants and even people's representatives or ministers presiding over them, they spawn the most corruption. Thus, the proposal to make the civil servants and their higher ups semi-immune or practically immune from direct taking of action by the ACC, would keep the scope wide open for indulging in corruption by these people. All of these considerations should make the case very strong indeed for a reappraisal of the suggested amendments to the ACC Act. Furthermore, government should also take up seriously the task of cleaning the ACC of corrupt elements to make that body fitter for fighting corruption.