Geopolitics lesson China, already a global power, Russia to remain a regional player
Saturday, 23 February 2008
Philip Stephens
Small tremors sometimes foreshadow bigger shocks. Few people will have known before this week that Steven Spielberg - he of Jaws, Jurassic Park, E.T. and other Hollywood epics - was to lend his creative talents to the Beijing Olympics. Of itself, his withdrawal on grounds of conscience scarcely registers on the Richter scale. Mr Spielberg's protest, though, is not without significance. It maps out uncomfortable terrain for China that reaches well beyond the choreography of this summer's Olympic ceremonies.
Mr Spielberg concluded that Beijing had not deployed sufficient influence to help bring a halt to the killing in the Sudanese province of Darfur. China is Sudan's most important economic partner. It has invested heavily in its energy industry and buys most of its oil. In Mr Spielberg's view - one shared, incidentally, at the United Nations - it could apply much more pressure on Khartoum.
The Sudanese regime has obstructed all efforts by the international community to bring an end to the terror wrought in Darfur by the so-called Janjaweed militias. Only last week fighting spilled over into neighbouring Chad. Sudan has blocked the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. China is the only big power with real leverage.
Mr Spielberg is far from alone in his disquiet. The actress Mia Farrow has led a celebrity campaign labelling this summer's event the "genocide Olympics". A clutch of Nobel peace laureates have added their voices to the protest, writing to Hu Jintao, the Chinese president.
These gestures are keenly felt. The Olympics have been planned meticulously to showcase China's rise. Beijing expects the games to confer the prestige and respect it considers its due as a fast-emerging global power. Boycotts and protests over Darfur - alongside separate calls for China to loosen its grip on Tibet - provoke a mixture of anger and angst.
They also point up China's long-term strategic dilemma: how to balance its rapid integration into the international economic system with its determination to preserve its autonomy in domestic and foreign affairs. Hugely important though it is in its own right - we should not forget some 200,000 people have been slaughtered and millions more displaced - China's prevarication about Darfur cuts to the heart of this dilemma. The reluctance to lean on Sudan speaks to a powerful commitment to a Westphalian world governed by the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference. Yet the new China also craves recognition and respect in an international order that speaks up for the rights of citizens as well as states.
Geopolitics, like the rest of life, has its fashions. It was not so long ago that an American political scientist declared the end of history and George H. W. Bush proclaimed a new era of peace and prosperity. More recently, when George W. Bush was infamously pictured in front of that "Mission Accomplished" banner after the fall of Baghdad, many looked forward to the new American imperium. This unipolar moment seems to have passed as quickly as it arrived. Now some envisage a world divided between two competing blocs: the liberal democracies on one side, and China and Russia waving the flag for authoritarian capitalism on the other. It is a neat construct, seemingly underpinned by Moscow and Beijing's leadership of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation.
Neat is not the same as convincing. Both countries will resist western interference in their domestic affairs. Neither is prepared to be lectured on the supposed superiority of liberal values. But at a deeper level, China and Russia have essentially divergent interests. They need different things from the present international system.
Russia's assertiveness under Vladimir Putin is rooted in its energy wealth and a psychology born of its supposed humiliation after the collapse of communism. Intimidation is the chosen instrument of the Kremlin's efforts to regain respect - witness Mr Putin's wild warnings this week that Russia could target its nuclear missiles on Ukraine.
In so far as Mr Putin's regime sees an interest in the international order, it is one driven by the delusion that Russia can regain its place as the superpower competitor to the US. The emblem of its power is its nuclear arsenal. As long as it can sell its oil and gas - and there is a captive European market - Moscow feels little need to act as a serious partner in the global system.
China's long-term interests are otherwise. In most respects it is more repressive than Russia and equally mistrusting of US-led efforts to spread democracy. It is more self-confident about its (non-democratic) values. For all Mr Putin's bluster, Russia is destined to remain a regional player. China has already emerged as a global power, with influence and interests on every continent. In the timeless manner of the bully, the Kremlin walks with a swagger. Beijing prefers to tread lightly on the world stage.
The big difference, though, lies in the nature of China's economic rise. Russia sells energy. China's prosperity depends both on vast imports of raw materials and on open markets in which to sell manufactures. Even if it can source oil and other commodities from pariah states such as Sudan, it depends on a stable international order to turn imports into exports.
As its interests advance into Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, China cannot avoid becoming entangled in political controversy. As the American scholar John Ikenberry writes in a thoughtful essay published in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs, China not only needs access to the global capitalist system, it also wants the protections provided by the system's rules and institutions.
Economic integration cannot be separated from geopolitics. It would be foolish to imagine that China is ready to temper its fierce resistance to interference in its own affairs. The abiding preoccupation of the country's leadership is to preserve authority and order amid immense social upheaval. Nor can we expect Beijing to pay homage to western values or abandon its view that states should be free from interference. But it has already felt it necessary sometimes to bend. Pressure from Beijing forced North Korea to negotiate seriously with the US about its nuclear weapons programme. China has backed two rounds of UN sanctions on Iran.
The pressures - focused now on Sudan but sure to extend to Beijing's ties with other pariah states - are destined to grow. Its national interest in preserving the present system will oblige Beijing to respond. Ultimately, China cannot continue to prosper in one dimension of the global order if it seeks to opt out of the other.
Small tremors sometimes foreshadow bigger shocks. Few people will have known before this week that Steven Spielberg - he of Jaws, Jurassic Park, E.T. and other Hollywood epics - was to lend his creative talents to the Beijing Olympics. Of itself, his withdrawal on grounds of conscience scarcely registers on the Richter scale. Mr Spielberg's protest, though, is not without significance. It maps out uncomfortable terrain for China that reaches well beyond the choreography of this summer's Olympic ceremonies.
Mr Spielberg concluded that Beijing had not deployed sufficient influence to help bring a halt to the killing in the Sudanese province of Darfur. China is Sudan's most important economic partner. It has invested heavily in its energy industry and buys most of its oil. In Mr Spielberg's view - one shared, incidentally, at the United Nations - it could apply much more pressure on Khartoum.
The Sudanese regime has obstructed all efforts by the international community to bring an end to the terror wrought in Darfur by the so-called Janjaweed militias. Only last week fighting spilled over into neighbouring Chad. Sudan has blocked the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. China is the only big power with real leverage.
Mr Spielberg is far from alone in his disquiet. The actress Mia Farrow has led a celebrity campaign labelling this summer's event the "genocide Olympics". A clutch of Nobel peace laureates have added their voices to the protest, writing to Hu Jintao, the Chinese president.
These gestures are keenly felt. The Olympics have been planned meticulously to showcase China's rise. Beijing expects the games to confer the prestige and respect it considers its due as a fast-emerging global power. Boycotts and protests over Darfur - alongside separate calls for China to loosen its grip on Tibet - provoke a mixture of anger and angst.
They also point up China's long-term strategic dilemma: how to balance its rapid integration into the international economic system with its determination to preserve its autonomy in domestic and foreign affairs. Hugely important though it is in its own right - we should not forget some 200,000 people have been slaughtered and millions more displaced - China's prevarication about Darfur cuts to the heart of this dilemma. The reluctance to lean on Sudan speaks to a powerful commitment to a Westphalian world governed by the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference. Yet the new China also craves recognition and respect in an international order that speaks up for the rights of citizens as well as states.
Geopolitics, like the rest of life, has its fashions. It was not so long ago that an American political scientist declared the end of history and George H. W. Bush proclaimed a new era of peace and prosperity. More recently, when George W. Bush was infamously pictured in front of that "Mission Accomplished" banner after the fall of Baghdad, many looked forward to the new American imperium. This unipolar moment seems to have passed as quickly as it arrived. Now some envisage a world divided between two competing blocs: the liberal democracies on one side, and China and Russia waving the flag for authoritarian capitalism on the other. It is a neat construct, seemingly underpinned by Moscow and Beijing's leadership of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation.
Neat is not the same as convincing. Both countries will resist western interference in their domestic affairs. Neither is prepared to be lectured on the supposed superiority of liberal values. But at a deeper level, China and Russia have essentially divergent interests. They need different things from the present international system.
Russia's assertiveness under Vladimir Putin is rooted in its energy wealth and a psychology born of its supposed humiliation after the collapse of communism. Intimidation is the chosen instrument of the Kremlin's efforts to regain respect - witness Mr Putin's wild warnings this week that Russia could target its nuclear missiles on Ukraine.
In so far as Mr Putin's regime sees an interest in the international order, it is one driven by the delusion that Russia can regain its place as the superpower competitor to the US. The emblem of its power is its nuclear arsenal. As long as it can sell its oil and gas - and there is a captive European market - Moscow feels little need to act as a serious partner in the global system.
China's long-term interests are otherwise. In most respects it is more repressive than Russia and equally mistrusting of US-led efforts to spread democracy. It is more self-confident about its (non-democratic) values. For all Mr Putin's bluster, Russia is destined to remain a regional player. China has already emerged as a global power, with influence and interests on every continent. In the timeless manner of the bully, the Kremlin walks with a swagger. Beijing prefers to tread lightly on the world stage.
The big difference, though, lies in the nature of China's economic rise. Russia sells energy. China's prosperity depends both on vast imports of raw materials and on open markets in which to sell manufactures. Even if it can source oil and other commodities from pariah states such as Sudan, it depends on a stable international order to turn imports into exports.
As its interests advance into Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, China cannot avoid becoming entangled in political controversy. As the American scholar John Ikenberry writes in a thoughtful essay published in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs, China not only needs access to the global capitalist system, it also wants the protections provided by the system's rules and institutions.
Economic integration cannot be separated from geopolitics. It would be foolish to imagine that China is ready to temper its fierce resistance to interference in its own affairs. The abiding preoccupation of the country's leadership is to preserve authority and order amid immense social upheaval. Nor can we expect Beijing to pay homage to western values or abandon its view that states should be free from interference. But it has already felt it necessary sometimes to bend. Pressure from Beijing forced North Korea to negotiate seriously with the US about its nuclear weapons programme. China has backed two rounds of UN sanctions on Iran.
The pressures - focused now on Sudan but sure to extend to Beijing's ties with other pariah states - are destined to grow. Its national interest in preserving the present system will oblige Beijing to respond. Ultimately, China cannot continue to prosper in one dimension of the global order if it seeks to opt out of the other.