How will BNP meet the challenges of the changing times?
Tuesday, 25 August 2009
N.M. Harun
The present government is extraordinarily strong. The more than three-fourths majority it commands in the parliament will enable it to unilaterally carry out its political and constitutional reforms, besides the routine governmental programmes. This does not, however, guarantee smooth political sailing or political stability and continuity.
In fact, a mismatch between a strong government and the absence of 'a formidable opposition' has been a perennial problem in the practice of democratic politics in the country. As a result, political instability and uncertainties and periodic disruption of the political process are endemic. Even during the so-called democracy period, from 1991 to 2007, when the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Awami League alternated each other in power, the parliament practically remained dysfunctional and the period ended with the military-imposed two-year emergency government.
It will be a particular headache for Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her government to ensure the continuity of the political process and uninterrupted constitutional progress beyond the Ninth Parliament. This is in the future.
For the present, there is a more pressing issue. The two props of the extant political matrix are the Awami League and the BNP. The vitality of this political arrangement depends much on the viability of the BNP as the constitutional alternative to the Awami League. This question looms large mainly for two reasons. First, the BNP is in the midst of serious organisational crises. Secondly, the BNP is required to revisit its ideological and political positions as the government is poised to undertake the implementation of its three top-priority programmes, viz., the execution of High Court sentences in the Bangabandhu Murder Case, the trial of the war criminals and the restoration of the 1972 Constitution.
Organisational problem: In its 2008 election manifesto the BNP said that it had faced 'an existential crisis' during the 2007-2008 emergency period [paragraph 7 of the manifesto]. The BNP has apparently failed to overcome yet the shock of the emergency and it is still in a disarray, organisationally.
Khaleda Zia, as the chairperson of the BNP, took harsh punitive measures against the emergency-inspired reformist party leaders and expelled them from the party. The BNP split, vertically as well as horizontally. The dissidents in the BNP, however, lost all ground as the emergency rulers failed in their nefarious game of political engineering. The BNP returned to one fold and has since been solidly under the leadership of Khaleda. But the reorganisation of the party remains a challenging task.
For about a decade prior to the emergency, Khaleda had left the organisational details of the BNP with Mannan Bhuiyan, the then secretary-general, and Tarique Rahman, her eldest son and senior joint secretary-general. Mannan Bhuiyan has been expelled from the party as a 'reformist' and Tarique has been in political hibernation since the emergency. No replacement of them -- with Mannan Bhuiyan's experience in national politics and organisational skill and Tarique's charisma and organisational zeal -- is yet in sight. Even if Tarique resumes political work, he is unlikely to be his old self, traumatised as he is by the emergency and still haunted by multiple cases. It is anybody's guess what new leadership will come up and how the party will be reorganised when the BNP holds its national council in December next.
Support bases lost: The BNP has emerged from the emergency much weaker than before as it has apparently lost two crucial support bases. The BNP was born in the cantonment but the military-controlled emergency government dealt crushing blows to the BNP and the Zia family in particular. BNP's umbilical cord with the cantonment seems to have been severed. With this has ended the public perception that the BNP is the 'power party'.
The BNP also enjoyed the reputation of being favoured by America and the West over the Awami League. This no longer seems to be the case as Washington and the West were apparently happy to do business with Hasina and the Awami League in the aftermath of the emergency. Their relationship seems to have flourished further since Hasina returned to power.
The Jamaat factor: The BNP, under Khaleda Zia, made a strategic alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami in 1999 and unreservedly sided with Islam-pasand politics. The alliance paid good dividends in the parliamentary election of 2001. This also helped create a general Islam-based political environment in the country, so much so that many AL leaders found it politically expedient to use the honorific of 'Al-Haj' before their names.
The Jamaat and Islam-pasand politics are now on the defensive and stand discredited. The wanton use of terrorism, including suicide bombing, by the JMB, Harkatul Jihad and other Islamist outfits has disillusioned and scared the people in general about Islam-pasand politics. Secondly, the movement of the Sector Commanders' Forum has brought to the fore the issue of the trial of the war criminals. Last but not the least, the movement of the Sector Commanders' Forum and a widespread and sustained campaign in the media, print as well as electronic, has revived the Spirit of the Liberation War. What will the BNP now do with its strategic alliance with the Jamaat which is an unrepented collaborator of the Pakistan occupation forces during the War of Independence and many top leaders of which are alleged to be war criminals?
Bangladeshi nationalism: The BNP has, however, successfully created over the decades a large following of its 'Bangladeshi nationalism' among the common people, the intelligentsia and the elites. Bangladeshi nationalism is a euphemism for Bengali Muslim nationalism, an offshoot of the Two-nation Theory on the basis of which the politics of the Subcontinent got divided on the communal Hindu-Muslim lines.
How will the BNP reconcile its Muslim-biased Bangladeshi nationalism with the resurgent secular Spirit of the Liberation War? Alternately, will the BNP attempt to forge a new political alignment of rightist political parties and forces which uphold the legacies of the Liberation War and simultaneously cherish Islamic values and are opposed to the Awami League, both in politics and power game?
Looming crisis: Meanwhile, the BNP will be called upon to join issues with the government on three sensitive matters of August 15, 1975 coup and killing of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the trial of the war criminals and the restoration of the 1972 Constitution. Once this package of programmes and reforms are carried out, the political and constitutional configuration of the country will change and the post-1975 Islam-pasand polity will cease to have constitutional legitimacy. The BNP, with its present political and ideological orientation, will also then automatically cease to be a constitutional alternative to the Awami League.
Will the BNP try to pre-empt the government, politically or otherwise, before that eventuality takes place? Or, will the BNP take a proactive approach to reorient itself, politically and ideologically, to meet the challenges of the changing times? Or, will the BNP count on the mistakes and failures of the Hasina government and leave it to the fate to decide its future place in the country's politics? Nobody seems to know the answers. But one thing is certain. The 'existential crisis' of which the BNP spoke in its 2008 election manifesto has now deepened with its defeat in the last general election and return to power of the Awami League and Hasina.
harun1943@gmail.com
The present government is extraordinarily strong. The more than three-fourths majority it commands in the parliament will enable it to unilaterally carry out its political and constitutional reforms, besides the routine governmental programmes. This does not, however, guarantee smooth political sailing or political stability and continuity.
In fact, a mismatch between a strong government and the absence of 'a formidable opposition' has been a perennial problem in the practice of democratic politics in the country. As a result, political instability and uncertainties and periodic disruption of the political process are endemic. Even during the so-called democracy period, from 1991 to 2007, when the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Awami League alternated each other in power, the parliament practically remained dysfunctional and the period ended with the military-imposed two-year emergency government.
It will be a particular headache for Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her government to ensure the continuity of the political process and uninterrupted constitutional progress beyond the Ninth Parliament. This is in the future.
For the present, there is a more pressing issue. The two props of the extant political matrix are the Awami League and the BNP. The vitality of this political arrangement depends much on the viability of the BNP as the constitutional alternative to the Awami League. This question looms large mainly for two reasons. First, the BNP is in the midst of serious organisational crises. Secondly, the BNP is required to revisit its ideological and political positions as the government is poised to undertake the implementation of its three top-priority programmes, viz., the execution of High Court sentences in the Bangabandhu Murder Case, the trial of the war criminals and the restoration of the 1972 Constitution.
Organisational problem: In its 2008 election manifesto the BNP said that it had faced 'an existential crisis' during the 2007-2008 emergency period [paragraph 7 of the manifesto]. The BNP has apparently failed to overcome yet the shock of the emergency and it is still in a disarray, organisationally.
Khaleda Zia, as the chairperson of the BNP, took harsh punitive measures against the emergency-inspired reformist party leaders and expelled them from the party. The BNP split, vertically as well as horizontally. The dissidents in the BNP, however, lost all ground as the emergency rulers failed in their nefarious game of political engineering. The BNP returned to one fold and has since been solidly under the leadership of Khaleda. But the reorganisation of the party remains a challenging task.
For about a decade prior to the emergency, Khaleda had left the organisational details of the BNP with Mannan Bhuiyan, the then secretary-general, and Tarique Rahman, her eldest son and senior joint secretary-general. Mannan Bhuiyan has been expelled from the party as a 'reformist' and Tarique has been in political hibernation since the emergency. No replacement of them -- with Mannan Bhuiyan's experience in national politics and organisational skill and Tarique's charisma and organisational zeal -- is yet in sight. Even if Tarique resumes political work, he is unlikely to be his old self, traumatised as he is by the emergency and still haunted by multiple cases. It is anybody's guess what new leadership will come up and how the party will be reorganised when the BNP holds its national council in December next.
Support bases lost: The BNP has emerged from the emergency much weaker than before as it has apparently lost two crucial support bases. The BNP was born in the cantonment but the military-controlled emergency government dealt crushing blows to the BNP and the Zia family in particular. BNP's umbilical cord with the cantonment seems to have been severed. With this has ended the public perception that the BNP is the 'power party'.
The BNP also enjoyed the reputation of being favoured by America and the West over the Awami League. This no longer seems to be the case as Washington and the West were apparently happy to do business with Hasina and the Awami League in the aftermath of the emergency. Their relationship seems to have flourished further since Hasina returned to power.
The Jamaat factor: The BNP, under Khaleda Zia, made a strategic alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami in 1999 and unreservedly sided with Islam-pasand politics. The alliance paid good dividends in the parliamentary election of 2001. This also helped create a general Islam-based political environment in the country, so much so that many AL leaders found it politically expedient to use the honorific of 'Al-Haj' before their names.
The Jamaat and Islam-pasand politics are now on the defensive and stand discredited. The wanton use of terrorism, including suicide bombing, by the JMB, Harkatul Jihad and other Islamist outfits has disillusioned and scared the people in general about Islam-pasand politics. Secondly, the movement of the Sector Commanders' Forum has brought to the fore the issue of the trial of the war criminals. Last but not the least, the movement of the Sector Commanders' Forum and a widespread and sustained campaign in the media, print as well as electronic, has revived the Spirit of the Liberation War. What will the BNP now do with its strategic alliance with the Jamaat which is an unrepented collaborator of the Pakistan occupation forces during the War of Independence and many top leaders of which are alleged to be war criminals?
Bangladeshi nationalism: The BNP has, however, successfully created over the decades a large following of its 'Bangladeshi nationalism' among the common people, the intelligentsia and the elites. Bangladeshi nationalism is a euphemism for Bengali Muslim nationalism, an offshoot of the Two-nation Theory on the basis of which the politics of the Subcontinent got divided on the communal Hindu-Muslim lines.
How will the BNP reconcile its Muslim-biased Bangladeshi nationalism with the resurgent secular Spirit of the Liberation War? Alternately, will the BNP attempt to forge a new political alignment of rightist political parties and forces which uphold the legacies of the Liberation War and simultaneously cherish Islamic values and are opposed to the Awami League, both in politics and power game?
Looming crisis: Meanwhile, the BNP will be called upon to join issues with the government on three sensitive matters of August 15, 1975 coup and killing of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the trial of the war criminals and the restoration of the 1972 Constitution. Once this package of programmes and reforms are carried out, the political and constitutional configuration of the country will change and the post-1975 Islam-pasand polity will cease to have constitutional legitimacy. The BNP, with its present political and ideological orientation, will also then automatically cease to be a constitutional alternative to the Awami League.
Will the BNP try to pre-empt the government, politically or otherwise, before that eventuality takes place? Or, will the BNP take a proactive approach to reorient itself, politically and ideologically, to meet the challenges of the changing times? Or, will the BNP count on the mistakes and failures of the Hasina government and leave it to the fate to decide its future place in the country's politics? Nobody seems to know the answers. But one thing is certain. The 'existential crisis' of which the BNP spoke in its 2008 election manifesto has now deepened with its defeat in the last general election and return to power of the Awami League and Hasina.
harun1943@gmail.com