Industrial police force
Thursday, 27 August 2009
THE ministry of finance (MoF), reportedly, has poured cold water on the home ministry's enthusiasm to form an industrial police force to help tackle the growing acts of violence in some industrial belts, particularly those dominated by the export-oriented readymade garment (RMG) units. In a meeting held in the middle part of the current month, the MoF turned down a proposal to constitute a 1580-member industrial police force. The home ministry had sent this proposal to the MoF following an announcement made by the Prime Minister in the national parliament about formation of a separate industrial police force to help maintain law and order in industrial belts. The MoF, according to a newspaper report, had earlier turned down two similar proposals, saying that raising such a specialised unit would cost a lot of money. It also suggested for continued and efficient use of Ansar personnel and VDP (village defence party) members and strengthening of police stations in the industrial areas, noting that such measures would be enough to handle workers' unrest, if there was any.
The MoF does otherwise deserve kudos for being courageous enough to say 'no' to a proposal that it considers not meeting the value for money criterion. However, the question now may also be raised about the soundness of the MoF's logic for saying 'no' to the proposal that was prepared to meet the repeated demands from the owners of RMG units. Such owners have been bearing the main brunt of frequent incidents of violence in industrial belts, namely, Savar, Ashulia, Gazipur and Narayanganj. A good number of RMG units in these places were either vandalised or set on fire by angry mob of workers and outsiders during the last few years, causing large amounts of financial losses to their owners. Besides, the incidents have created a negative image of Bangladesh in the outside world.
In this context, it is also to be noted that tackling violence in country's industrial areas using the normal police force has, time and again, proved to be ineffective. The agitating workers are found to cause substantial damage to properties, including their own factory buildings, well before the arrival of the law enforcers. The high police officials have admitted the fact that it takes some amount of time to 'collect' police personnel stationed in different areas of the country before their deployment in the troubled spots. Moreover, such forces cannot operate freely in places that are not known to them. The presence of a specialised force in a particular area does carry the advantage because of their prompt deployment and effective use. Moreover, intelligence work by such units would also help them to have some advanced information about the brewing troubles and take mitigating steps by arranging discussions between the workers and the management of a particular factory. The operational problems in matters of maintenance of industrial peace in places where factories and mills are largely concentrated, do, thus, provide some strong reasons to consider the need for facilitating uninterrupted production particularly in export-oriented sectors in today's highly competitive world, as one of the pressing priorities. The value-for-money approach to using public resources should not ignore this need.
In this context, there are reasons to consider the MoF's emphasis on making use of Ansar personnel and the VDP members for tackling the problems of violence and vandalism in industrial areas, as somewhat misplaced under the circumstances that now prevail in the country. On a number of occasions in the recent past, even the superior forces, including elite Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), found it difficult to contain violence in industrial areas. This is precisely the reason why the MoF should reassess the comparative advantages of a specialised industrial police force. Even in terms of financial expenditures, the raising of a special industrial police is unlikely to cost much to the public exchequer, in view of wastage and pilferage of public resources in many different areas. The raising of an industrial police force deserves special consideration for ensuring a relatively peaceful environment in the country's main industrial areas.
The MoF does otherwise deserve kudos for being courageous enough to say 'no' to a proposal that it considers not meeting the value for money criterion. However, the question now may also be raised about the soundness of the MoF's logic for saying 'no' to the proposal that was prepared to meet the repeated demands from the owners of RMG units. Such owners have been bearing the main brunt of frequent incidents of violence in industrial belts, namely, Savar, Ashulia, Gazipur and Narayanganj. A good number of RMG units in these places were either vandalised or set on fire by angry mob of workers and outsiders during the last few years, causing large amounts of financial losses to their owners. Besides, the incidents have created a negative image of Bangladesh in the outside world.
In this context, it is also to be noted that tackling violence in country's industrial areas using the normal police force has, time and again, proved to be ineffective. The agitating workers are found to cause substantial damage to properties, including their own factory buildings, well before the arrival of the law enforcers. The high police officials have admitted the fact that it takes some amount of time to 'collect' police personnel stationed in different areas of the country before their deployment in the troubled spots. Moreover, such forces cannot operate freely in places that are not known to them. The presence of a specialised force in a particular area does carry the advantage because of their prompt deployment and effective use. Moreover, intelligence work by such units would also help them to have some advanced information about the brewing troubles and take mitigating steps by arranging discussions between the workers and the management of a particular factory. The operational problems in matters of maintenance of industrial peace in places where factories and mills are largely concentrated, do, thus, provide some strong reasons to consider the need for facilitating uninterrupted production particularly in export-oriented sectors in today's highly competitive world, as one of the pressing priorities. The value-for-money approach to using public resources should not ignore this need.
In this context, there are reasons to consider the MoF's emphasis on making use of Ansar personnel and the VDP members for tackling the problems of violence and vandalism in industrial areas, as somewhat misplaced under the circumstances that now prevail in the country. On a number of occasions in the recent past, even the superior forces, including elite Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), found it difficult to contain violence in industrial areas. This is precisely the reason why the MoF should reassess the comparative advantages of a specialised industrial police force. Even in terms of financial expenditures, the raising of a special industrial police is unlikely to cost much to the public exchequer, in view of wastage and pilferage of public resources in many different areas. The raising of an industrial police force deserves special consideration for ensuring a relatively peaceful environment in the country's main industrial areas.