New diplomacy: Challenges for foreign policy
Tuesday, 7 August 2007
David Miliband, MP
BRITAIN should respond to the real insecurities and opportunities that exist in the world not by retreating from international engagement, but by using our strengths so that we are a force for good for Britain by being a force for good in the world. The old distinction, between foreign policy that affected foreigners and domestic policy that affected our citizens, has collapsed. So foreign policy is about values and interests together.
Britain brings to this task real strengths. A new Prime Minister with a clear view of how the national interest is best served by international engagement. An economy that is increasingly the banker to the world. Culture that is globally admired. Ditto military forces. And alliances that stretch North, East, South and West.
But foreign policy goals and methods must adapt to a series of shifts in the distribution of power: a world where the security threat is not just from excessive state power, but increasingly from terrorism and conflict within failed states; a world where economic prosperity depends on new bargains between industrialised and developing countries; a world where social change is fostered not just through government-to-government relationships but between businesses, NGOs, and faith groups.
In this new context, we need to think how we can deploy Britain's assets - both the soft power of ideas and influence, and the harder power of our economic and military incentives and interventions - to promote the international security and prosperity on which we all depend.
The new government's project is focused on three core elements, each of which require an active foreign policy.
First, our prosperity relies on a more open Britain - open to new investment and trade, to new people and ideas. In the 21st century, the successful countries of the world will be those that are more open in their social structures, more open in their political structures, more open above all to the talent of individual citizens whatever their background.
Second, our security relies on tackling instability and injustice at home and abroad. It requires co-operation with countries on terrorism, migration and organised crime. It requires collective action on the great existential threats, from nuclear proliferation to climate change.
Third, our mission to give power to people to shape their lives depends not just on local accountability but also global institutions, global agreements and global links.
The vision is a Britain that is a global hub. Just as the City of London acts as the centre of the global financial market, British cities and institutions and ideas can become the hubs for scientific, cultural and political collaboration. But the vision needs to be delivered in new circumstances with new tools.
The environment for diplomacy has been affected by a series of shifts in the distribution of power at international level. 'Balance of power' is no longer a basis for diplomacy. Today, the new diplomacy needs to reflect the new distribution of power.
First, for much of the last century our security concerns were primarily about excessive and expansionist state power, threatening their own citizens or neighbouring countries. Today, some of the greatest threats are likely to emerge in countries where state power is too weak not too strong - too weak to clamp down on the creeping threat of global terrorism. The implication is clear: building the capacity of states must go hand in hand with building democratic accountability. While we have actually seen a substantial reduction in the size of conventional and nuclear arsenals since the end of the cold war, the sense of insecurity felt by our citizens may actually have increased. Across the world, people are demanding more power for themselves. Our task is to make this a force for progress not destruction.
Second, over the next two decades, with the growing strength of China and India, we are likely to see political, economic and military power more geographically dispersed than it has been since the rise to global dominance of the European Empires in the 19th Century. This makes our most important bilateral relationship - with the United States - more not less important. It makes the case for our leading role within the European Union and NATO more obvious than ever. It makes our membership of the Security Council and therefore our work with Russia and China more vital than ever. It makes our determination to champion UN reform - with Security Council membership for a larger group of countries - more relevant than ever. And it actually offers a new basis for a vibrant Commonwealth as a unique network of nations.
Third, there is a mismatch between national power and global problems. The risk of financial crises, climate change, and health pandemics cannot be mitigated by individual countries; they require collective action on a global scale. Managing the risks from globalisation and maximising the benefits requires institutional innovation and the development of the EU reflects this.
Fourth, the power to co-ordinate at scale can be done without the hierarchies of bureaucracies or the price mechanism of markets - either the helping hand of the state or the invisible hand of the market. Technology is enabling networks to challenge the power of traditional incumbents, economically and politically.
The new distribution of power changes the way we need to analyse threats and exploit opportunities. Our security is threatened by terrorist networks using the freedom of an open society, but can be enhanced by the spread of democracy and good governance. Our prosperity is threatened by climate change but can be enhanced by free trade. Our sense of powerlessness is exacerbated by the weakness of international institutions, but can be diminished by the potential of new networks. In other words, there are new sources of insecurity, but also new resources for prosperity.
This has implications not just for foreign policy priorities, but how we go about pursuing them. If we are to continue to be a force for good, we need to be smart about how and when we combine the soft power of ideas and influence and the hard power of economic and military incentives and interventions.
The first source of power, set out by the Prime Minister, is winning the battle of ideas.
This means being clear about objectives. Our objective is not domination. It is not to force others to live as we do. In a world as diverse and complex as ours, it is to establish, on however thin a basis, a set of rights and responsibilities, by which we can live side by side. Our aim must be to galvanise all the resources of moderation to block the path of radical extremism. Nowhere is this more the case than in the Middle East, and in the drive for a two-state solution.
We need to be clear about values. For example, the declaration at the World Summit in 2005 that the international community has a 'Responsibility to Protect' populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity marks a vital new stage in the debate about the relationship between human rights and national sovereignty.
The battle of ideas also means being clear about facts and evidence - such as whether it is in our financial self-interest to tackle climate change. The Stern Review showed that the UK can have a major impact on debates across the globe by reframing climate change as an economic as well as an environmental challenge.
We need to find similar ways of leading thought on other areas, whether this is concrete and immediate challenges such as nuclear disarmament and proliferation or longer term challenges such as the future of global institutions.
The second source of power is influence within institutions. Britain acting alone does not possess the power or legitimacy to directly effect change on the scale required. Acting with others we can make a difference. Multilateral action is not a soft option.
Multilateralism does not replace the need for bilateral relationships. If we want Britain to be a global hub we need a strong relationship with the leading global power. The US is our single most important bilateral partnership because of shared values but also because of political reality. The US is the world's largest economy. Engaged - whether on the Middle East Peace Process or climate change or international development - it has the greatest capacity to do good of any country in the world. That is why we welcome the commitment of President Bush to give priority to long term political negotiation on a two-state solution side-by side with short-term humanitarian support for the Palestinian Government, led by President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad.
Some people try to compare our relationship with the US with our position in the European Union. But the EU is not a bilateral relationship -- we are members of the EU. That membership is an asset in economic terms -- guaranteeing open markets and setting common standards where needed. It is an asset in tackling crime. And it needs to be a greater asset in foreign policy - not substituting for nation states but giving better expression to the common commitments of nation states. That is why we support the proposal to amend the EU Treaties so that we have at our disposal a single Representative to take forward our Common Foreign and Security Policy where all 27 Member States wish to act together and give authority to do so. It just makes sense.
All multilateral institutions need a strong sense of purpose. The EU was founded to tackle a threat that no longer exists: conflict within western Europe. If it is to renew its mandate, it needs to find a new raison' d'etre, including, I believe, a focus on addressing one of the greatest threats to our future prosperity and security: climate change. Creating an Environmental Union is as big a challenge in the 21st century as peace in Europe was in the 1950s.
Our longer term challenge is to adapt and strengthen other multilateral institutions and networks to renew their mandates, reform the way they work, and adapt more quickly to new threats and new opportunities.
If ideas and influence are examples of so called 'soft power', then the third source of power - incentives and sanctions - represent harder power. We should use them to maximum effect. History suggests that the attraction of becoming members of 'clubs' such as the WTO, NATO, or most profoundly the EU, is a powerful one. The benefits of free-trade or military protection when linked to states playing by the rules can incentives reform and establish norms of behaviour. For example, I am a strong supporter of Turkish accession talks with the EU. The prospect of EU membership has built a bridge to a key Muslim country. But it has also in recent years helped contribute to the abolition of the death penalty and improved the rights of women and minorities.
A balanced package of incentives and sanctions are also required to apply pressure. Iran has every right to be a secure, rich country. But it doesn't have a right to undermine the stability of its neighbours. That is why we are taking a dual track approach.
Fourth, there will be cases where direct intervention will be right.
This can take a range of forms: aid convoys, police training of security forces or deploying peace keepers. In some areas, however, military intervention will be necessary. It was right in Kosovo in 1999 to deal with the terrible ethnic cleansing going on there. Almost a decade later, it is right that the UN and African Union are working together to put a strengthened force into Darfur to protect vulnerable civilians there, and right too that under French leadership the EU is working on deploying a small military force along the Chad/Darfur border. In Iraq, the Prime Minister has made clear that we will fulfil our international obligations and our obligations to the Iraqi people.
Our objective is to support the democratically elected government. Our roles are defined by UN resolutions. Our current efforts are directed towards the development of a strong Iraqi security capacity and the political reconciliation which we know must be at the heart of progress.
We have a range of tools at our command. The changing distribution of power in the world means we must be a force for good by virtue not of choosing hard or soft power, but combining both. In a world of conflicts within states, national sovereignty is no answer to complaints about the systematic abuse of human rights. In a world where challenges cut across country borders, we need more than ever to build regional and global institutions that are more effective and more legitimate. In a world where the 'power to destroy' is greater, we need both economic incentives and guarantees of security combined with a continued role for hard power interventions.
So Britain under Gordon Brown's leadership has the strength to make a difference in the world, and thereby make a difference to Britain. My job is to ensure that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) makes the most effective contribution possible to that drive.
The FCO currently has ten 'strategic priorities'. All are important. But can any organisation really have ten priorities? There are important public services that support British nationals and British business overseas, from our consular and visa services to UKTI. But policy priorities need rigour and clarity.
My starter for 10 is that in the coming months, we must focus on helping to tackle the causes and consequences of extremism, radicalisation and conflict; we must shape a sustainable global response to the challenge of climate change and the need for low carbon economic development; and we must build a more effective EU to help build prosperity and security within European borders and beyond.
Second, co-operation across UK government. The Foreign Office is a unique global asset. But diplomacy has to be allied to other assets across government, in particular, aid, trade, investment and military intervention.
Third, how can we engage beyond Whitehall, with faith groups, NGOs, business and universities. The old diplomacy was defined by a world of limited information. It was a veritable secret garden of negotiations. And secret negotiation still matters.
The new diplomacy is public as well as private, mass as well as elite, real-time as well as deliberative. And that needs to be reflected in the way we do our business.
This is an abridged version of recent speech by the British Foreign Secretary, delivered at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chattam House, in association with the global activist site Aveaz -- global citizen community mobilising for the world's major conflicts by courtesy: the British High Commission Dhaka
BRITAIN should respond to the real insecurities and opportunities that exist in the world not by retreating from international engagement, but by using our strengths so that we are a force for good for Britain by being a force for good in the world. The old distinction, between foreign policy that affected foreigners and domestic policy that affected our citizens, has collapsed. So foreign policy is about values and interests together.
Britain brings to this task real strengths. A new Prime Minister with a clear view of how the national interest is best served by international engagement. An economy that is increasingly the banker to the world. Culture that is globally admired. Ditto military forces. And alliances that stretch North, East, South and West.
But foreign policy goals and methods must adapt to a series of shifts in the distribution of power: a world where the security threat is not just from excessive state power, but increasingly from terrorism and conflict within failed states; a world where economic prosperity depends on new bargains between industrialised and developing countries; a world where social change is fostered not just through government-to-government relationships but between businesses, NGOs, and faith groups.
In this new context, we need to think how we can deploy Britain's assets - both the soft power of ideas and influence, and the harder power of our economic and military incentives and interventions - to promote the international security and prosperity on which we all depend.
The new government's project is focused on three core elements, each of which require an active foreign policy.
First, our prosperity relies on a more open Britain - open to new investment and trade, to new people and ideas. In the 21st century, the successful countries of the world will be those that are more open in their social structures, more open in their political structures, more open above all to the talent of individual citizens whatever their background.
Second, our security relies on tackling instability and injustice at home and abroad. It requires co-operation with countries on terrorism, migration and organised crime. It requires collective action on the great existential threats, from nuclear proliferation to climate change.
Third, our mission to give power to people to shape their lives depends not just on local accountability but also global institutions, global agreements and global links.
The vision is a Britain that is a global hub. Just as the City of London acts as the centre of the global financial market, British cities and institutions and ideas can become the hubs for scientific, cultural and political collaboration. But the vision needs to be delivered in new circumstances with new tools.
The environment for diplomacy has been affected by a series of shifts in the distribution of power at international level. 'Balance of power' is no longer a basis for diplomacy. Today, the new diplomacy needs to reflect the new distribution of power.
First, for much of the last century our security concerns were primarily about excessive and expansionist state power, threatening their own citizens or neighbouring countries. Today, some of the greatest threats are likely to emerge in countries where state power is too weak not too strong - too weak to clamp down on the creeping threat of global terrorism. The implication is clear: building the capacity of states must go hand in hand with building democratic accountability. While we have actually seen a substantial reduction in the size of conventional and nuclear arsenals since the end of the cold war, the sense of insecurity felt by our citizens may actually have increased. Across the world, people are demanding more power for themselves. Our task is to make this a force for progress not destruction.
Second, over the next two decades, with the growing strength of China and India, we are likely to see political, economic and military power more geographically dispersed than it has been since the rise to global dominance of the European Empires in the 19th Century. This makes our most important bilateral relationship - with the United States - more not less important. It makes the case for our leading role within the European Union and NATO more obvious than ever. It makes our membership of the Security Council and therefore our work with Russia and China more vital than ever. It makes our determination to champion UN reform - with Security Council membership for a larger group of countries - more relevant than ever. And it actually offers a new basis for a vibrant Commonwealth as a unique network of nations.
Third, there is a mismatch between national power and global problems. The risk of financial crises, climate change, and health pandemics cannot be mitigated by individual countries; they require collective action on a global scale. Managing the risks from globalisation and maximising the benefits requires institutional innovation and the development of the EU reflects this.
Fourth, the power to co-ordinate at scale can be done without the hierarchies of bureaucracies or the price mechanism of markets - either the helping hand of the state or the invisible hand of the market. Technology is enabling networks to challenge the power of traditional incumbents, economically and politically.
The new distribution of power changes the way we need to analyse threats and exploit opportunities. Our security is threatened by terrorist networks using the freedom of an open society, but can be enhanced by the spread of democracy and good governance. Our prosperity is threatened by climate change but can be enhanced by free trade. Our sense of powerlessness is exacerbated by the weakness of international institutions, but can be diminished by the potential of new networks. In other words, there are new sources of insecurity, but also new resources for prosperity.
This has implications not just for foreign policy priorities, but how we go about pursuing them. If we are to continue to be a force for good, we need to be smart about how and when we combine the soft power of ideas and influence and the hard power of economic and military incentives and interventions.
The first source of power, set out by the Prime Minister, is winning the battle of ideas.
This means being clear about objectives. Our objective is not domination. It is not to force others to live as we do. In a world as diverse and complex as ours, it is to establish, on however thin a basis, a set of rights and responsibilities, by which we can live side by side. Our aim must be to galvanise all the resources of moderation to block the path of radical extremism. Nowhere is this more the case than in the Middle East, and in the drive for a two-state solution.
We need to be clear about values. For example, the declaration at the World Summit in 2005 that the international community has a 'Responsibility to Protect' populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity marks a vital new stage in the debate about the relationship between human rights and national sovereignty.
The battle of ideas also means being clear about facts and evidence - such as whether it is in our financial self-interest to tackle climate change. The Stern Review showed that the UK can have a major impact on debates across the globe by reframing climate change as an economic as well as an environmental challenge.
We need to find similar ways of leading thought on other areas, whether this is concrete and immediate challenges such as nuclear disarmament and proliferation or longer term challenges such as the future of global institutions.
The second source of power is influence within institutions. Britain acting alone does not possess the power or legitimacy to directly effect change on the scale required. Acting with others we can make a difference. Multilateral action is not a soft option.
Multilateralism does not replace the need for bilateral relationships. If we want Britain to be a global hub we need a strong relationship with the leading global power. The US is our single most important bilateral partnership because of shared values but also because of political reality. The US is the world's largest economy. Engaged - whether on the Middle East Peace Process or climate change or international development - it has the greatest capacity to do good of any country in the world. That is why we welcome the commitment of President Bush to give priority to long term political negotiation on a two-state solution side-by side with short-term humanitarian support for the Palestinian Government, led by President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad.
Some people try to compare our relationship with the US with our position in the European Union. But the EU is not a bilateral relationship -- we are members of the EU. That membership is an asset in economic terms -- guaranteeing open markets and setting common standards where needed. It is an asset in tackling crime. And it needs to be a greater asset in foreign policy - not substituting for nation states but giving better expression to the common commitments of nation states. That is why we support the proposal to amend the EU Treaties so that we have at our disposal a single Representative to take forward our Common Foreign and Security Policy where all 27 Member States wish to act together and give authority to do so. It just makes sense.
All multilateral institutions need a strong sense of purpose. The EU was founded to tackle a threat that no longer exists: conflict within western Europe. If it is to renew its mandate, it needs to find a new raison' d'etre, including, I believe, a focus on addressing one of the greatest threats to our future prosperity and security: climate change. Creating an Environmental Union is as big a challenge in the 21st century as peace in Europe was in the 1950s.
Our longer term challenge is to adapt and strengthen other multilateral institutions and networks to renew their mandates, reform the way they work, and adapt more quickly to new threats and new opportunities.
If ideas and influence are examples of so called 'soft power', then the third source of power - incentives and sanctions - represent harder power. We should use them to maximum effect. History suggests that the attraction of becoming members of 'clubs' such as the WTO, NATO, or most profoundly the EU, is a powerful one. The benefits of free-trade or military protection when linked to states playing by the rules can incentives reform and establish norms of behaviour. For example, I am a strong supporter of Turkish accession talks with the EU. The prospect of EU membership has built a bridge to a key Muslim country. But it has also in recent years helped contribute to the abolition of the death penalty and improved the rights of women and minorities.
A balanced package of incentives and sanctions are also required to apply pressure. Iran has every right to be a secure, rich country. But it doesn't have a right to undermine the stability of its neighbours. That is why we are taking a dual track approach.
Fourth, there will be cases where direct intervention will be right.
This can take a range of forms: aid convoys, police training of security forces or deploying peace keepers. In some areas, however, military intervention will be necessary. It was right in Kosovo in 1999 to deal with the terrible ethnic cleansing going on there. Almost a decade later, it is right that the UN and African Union are working together to put a strengthened force into Darfur to protect vulnerable civilians there, and right too that under French leadership the EU is working on deploying a small military force along the Chad/Darfur border. In Iraq, the Prime Minister has made clear that we will fulfil our international obligations and our obligations to the Iraqi people.
Our objective is to support the democratically elected government. Our roles are defined by UN resolutions. Our current efforts are directed towards the development of a strong Iraqi security capacity and the political reconciliation which we know must be at the heart of progress.
We have a range of tools at our command. The changing distribution of power in the world means we must be a force for good by virtue not of choosing hard or soft power, but combining both. In a world of conflicts within states, national sovereignty is no answer to complaints about the systematic abuse of human rights. In a world where challenges cut across country borders, we need more than ever to build regional and global institutions that are more effective and more legitimate. In a world where the 'power to destroy' is greater, we need both economic incentives and guarantees of security combined with a continued role for hard power interventions.
So Britain under Gordon Brown's leadership has the strength to make a difference in the world, and thereby make a difference to Britain. My job is to ensure that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) makes the most effective contribution possible to that drive.
The FCO currently has ten 'strategic priorities'. All are important. But can any organisation really have ten priorities? There are important public services that support British nationals and British business overseas, from our consular and visa services to UKTI. But policy priorities need rigour and clarity.
My starter for 10 is that in the coming months, we must focus on helping to tackle the causes and consequences of extremism, radicalisation and conflict; we must shape a sustainable global response to the challenge of climate change and the need for low carbon economic development; and we must build a more effective EU to help build prosperity and security within European borders and beyond.
Second, co-operation across UK government. The Foreign Office is a unique global asset. But diplomacy has to be allied to other assets across government, in particular, aid, trade, investment and military intervention.
Third, how can we engage beyond Whitehall, with faith groups, NGOs, business and universities. The old diplomacy was defined by a world of limited information. It was a veritable secret garden of negotiations. And secret negotiation still matters.
The new diplomacy is public as well as private, mass as well as elite, real-time as well as deliberative. And that needs to be reflected in the way we do our business.
This is an abridged version of recent speech by the British Foreign Secretary, delivered at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chattam House, in association with the global activist site Aveaz -- global citizen community mobilising for the world's major conflicts by courtesy: the British High Commission Dhaka