Populism and policymaking

In recent years populism has emerged as a powerful social and economic factor influencing politics, governance and policymaking across a broad swath of the world. Its appeal lies in a rhetorical division of society into ‘the people’ versus the ‘elite’ and it promises to give the people a direct voice in national politics and governance. But even when populism’s formulations across countries show a common core of beliefs and consents, its effects on policy making are far from uniform. Taking the whole gamut of the political spectrum there are shades of populism distinct enough to vary from one to the other. Depending on political orientations of countries and ideology of the regimes it may lead to substantive policy shifts, institutional disruptions and global repercussions or mere symbolic politics of short term nature, keeping status quo ante in domestic affairs and global relations more or less intact. This article explores how populism has shaped and is shaping policy making, focusing on two major world powers at two ends of the political matrix: the United States (a liberal democracy) and China (an authoritarian single-party regime). The goal is to analyse how populist discourse and political logic have influenced policy formulations, agenda- setting, institutional mechanisms and international policy orientations in the contexts of these two countries in recent years. The comparison should be illuminating because it juxtaposes very different political systems, allowing one to ask: how does populism affect policymaking in a democracy versus an authoritarian state? What are the mechanisms, constraints and outcomes associated with this phenomenon? What implications follow from its remit for governance and global politics?
The analysis has been arranged as follows: First, a working definition of populism is sketched out and linked with policy making. Then the American case study is taken up, referring to the rise of populism under president Donald Trump and the resultant policy making dynamics (immigration, trade and foreign policy shifts) during his first and second term in office. Next, the case study of People’s Republic of China is taken up, showing the ways in which populist discourse (or quasi -populist aspirations) has manifested in the one- party rule under the Xi Jinping era, and how policymaking has responded to those manifestations. Following this discussion a comparative analysis is made drawing out implications for policymaking in general terms, and finally conclusion is made on the basis of the analysis. But before the general discussion on populism and the two case studies are taken up it has to be pointed out that there is populism of the left as against populism of the right (as in America) which is not represented either by the American or the Chinese examples. Populism of the left with Marxist orientation is the first instance of populism gaining formal recognition and it became manifest in some Latin American countries in the ‘60s and ‘70s following the Cuban revolution, often led by libertarian clergy. At the heart of this populism was land reform and social justice and it fell short of full fledged revolutionary change. This article does not include a case study on this variant of populism for the simple reason that at present there is no country other than Venezuela where populism of the left is in practice. But Venezuela under president Maduro is a far cry from the Venezuela under the Sandinista rule that followed their victory over the dictatorial regime. In the absence of a text book case of a populist regime of the leftist vintage, China has been selected as a populist leftist regime even though it lacks in the degree of liberalism associated with populism of the left. With this explanation the presentation of the article can be made.
Populism and policymaking – the framework: Populism, however popularly used it may have been, is a contested concept. Nevertheless, scholars and analysts have sought to identify its core elements with the following description: a thin-centred ideology that juxtaposes ‘a virtuous and homogeneous people’ with a ‘corrupt elite’ claiming that politics should express the general will of the people. Populism often emphasises a crisis situation, anti-elitism and a moralistic war-frame of politics. In policymaking terms, populism can influence agenda-setting (issues prioritised for attention), framing policy problems ( betrayal of working class by elite) opening windows of policy change, challenging institutions, promoting simplification of complex issues, and shift policy instruments toward more direct majoritarian action. Populism, thus conceived, generally consists of three elements: (1) A moral opposition between ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’ (Mudde and Kaltwasser, Populism: A Short Introduction, 2017); (2) A claim to represent the ‘general will’ of the people; and (3) A rhetoric of crisis or betrayal that demands a strong leader’s intervention.
In liberal democracies, populism often emerges from electoral competition and political disillusionment. In authoritarian systems, it is engineered from above to reinforce legitimacy and national unity.
Policymaking. From a policymaking view point, key questions of populism include: How do populist actors influence what becomes policy? How do institutions respond to populist pressures? What are the effects on policy content (decisions made) and on process (how decisions are made?).
Populism may thus lead to : (1) More executive-centred decision- making , avoiding institutional checks; (2) Policy shifts towards the concerns of constituencies framed as ‘the people’ (working class, farmers); (3) Adversarial foreign policy or trade relations, especially if populist leaders blame external forces for domestic problems; (4) Simplifications of problems and short term solutions rather than long term structural and technocratic policymaking; (5) potential instability or reversal of policies if institutional backlash occurs.
In democracies, populism can disrupt established policy networks, insider policy communities, and expertise-based governance. In authoritarian regimes, populism may take different forms: it may be co-opted by the ruling party to mobilise legitimacy or the regime may adopt populist rhetoric to justify the shifts (even if not genuinely bottom-up). Thus, comparing the American and Chinese case studies may allow tracing distinct pathways of populist influence in policymaking.
The American case study: America under president Trump’s two tenures (the second nearing a year’s completion) provides a paradigmatic case of populism’s influence on policymaking in a democratic setting (albeit of illiberal variant). The election of Donald Trump in 2016 signalled a turning point in which a populist nationalist rhetoric, framed around ‘the people’ (especially the disaffected working class) versus ‘the elite’ (political, economic, media) gained dominance. The slogan ‘Make America Great Again’ that became the battle cry of Donald Trump’s election campaign, embodied populist themes of national decline, elite betrayal of common man and external threat.
Agenda and framing effects. Under president Trump, policy making exhibited clear populist markers: trade policy shifted sharply away from liberalisation towards protectionism. The official narrative blamed globalisation and unfair foreign competition (particularly from China) for job losses in the American manufacturing sector. Immigration policy also became strongly framed as a threat to ‘the people’ (jobs, culture, security etc) and the elite media/political class as indifferent to the woes of common man or complicit with the conspiracy against them. Foreign policy also adopted an ‘America First’ slant: less multilateralism, more bilateral pressure and a suspicion of global institutions.
Institutional effects. In terms of policymaking processes, the first term of Trump saw a relative weakening of traditional policy making processes and institutions (diminishing role of Congressional Committees and expert agencies for instance) and an increase in executive discretion (executive orders) and sweeping tariff measures. A notable study argues that the institutional logic of trade policy changed: anti-trade groups (working class, Rust Belt states) overcame the collective action problems that had previously kept them from mobilising effectively, facilitated by the populist narrative (Wilson Carter, Trumpism: Race, Class, Populism and Public Choice, 2021). The shift also meant that trade policy became more discretionary, politically driven, and less constrained by the standard pro-trade lobb/ elite consensus.

Policy outcomes. One of the clearest outcomes of Trump’s ‘America First’ policy during his first term (2016-2020) was the beginning of the America-China trade war. The second consequence was the unravelling of multilateral trading system under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. The third, strained trade relations with allies in north and south America and European countries because of higher tariff imposed by America on their exports, particularly automobiles, aluminium and steel. China experienced much worse under the new American tariff regime than others with a whole raft of its goods coming under the American tariff radar: manufactured goods, solar panels, electric vehicles and semi-conductors. The populist framing of China by Trump administration as an unfair actor threatening American workers and economic sovereignty underpinned the policy shift towards the country. Populism under Trump presidency reframed the external ‘other’ (China) as intimately tied to domestic grievances.
In the area of immigration, another source of populist anger, presidential orders during Trump’s first term adopted robust policy changes (like border wall, and travel ban on the Muslims from certain countries) emphasising ‘protection of people’ as the justification. In foreign policy, the populist frame questioned long standing alliances and global commitments, demanding that allies pay their due share for defence and security arrangements ( NATO) and that foreign policy reflect popular will rather than elite consensus.
Legacy of Trump. Even after Trump left office in 2020 his populist programmes persisted, though in a diminished form : tariffs against China remained a hot button issue, immigration was tightened, American involvement in war zones were curtailed ( withdrawal of American soldiers from Afghanistan and Syria), echoing Trump’s quip ‘it is not our war’. The continuation of some of the populist measures of Trump after his first term was over implies the difficulty of a complete reversal of a policy based on a heightened sense of populism.
But the legacy of Trumpian populism reverted back with a vengeance after his election in 2024 for the second term. The speed at which various populist policies were introduced through executive orders indicates the ‘Team Trump’ had been working on his agenda and election promises well before his oath taking in January 2025. Trump’s tariff measures were wide ranging, higher than before and did not distinguish between allies and adversaries. But he was particularly harsh in imposing high tariffs on Chinese goods, slapping 50 to 100 per cent on Chinese exports to USA. In the month of October, when final negotiations were in progress an angry Trump slapped 100 per cent additional tax on all Chinese goods. [He, however, agreed to reduce tariffs on some products after meeting with Xi Jinping in the Republic of Korea late in October]. Among the other measures taken by president Trump to ‘Make America Great Again’, he has targeted American multinationals from countries of cheaper labour (mainly China) he has used both incentives (tax concessions) and punitive measures.
President Trump has been ruthless this time around in his crackdown on illegal migrants in America. Under his orders federal enforcement agency (ICE) has arrested thousands on the ground of their being undocumented and have either deported them to foreign countries or placed them in detention centres in America, awaiting future deportation. He has attached so much importance to these arrests that for the first time in American history federal force (National Guards) has been employed to help ICE in various states.
In conformity with populist demand for a smaller bureaucracy president Trump early in his second term has drastically retrenched staff from many federal agencies, abolishing some agencies altogether ( USAID, Education, etc) and asking employees to justify their employment.
Donald Trump’s populism, emerging during and after the 2016 and 2024 elections, have been characterised by: (a) Anti-establishment rhetoric: Targeting Washington elites, the media and global institutions; (b) Economic nationalism: ‘America First’ policies aimed at protecting domestic industries and restricting immigration; (c) Charismatic leadership : Trump positioned himself as the sole authentic voice of the forgotten men and woman, the Average Joes and Plain Janes of America. (d) Cultural populism: Defence of traditional American identity against multi-culturalism and woke ideology (gender, racial preference) promoted by liberal elites.
In Trump’s case, populism has functioned within a democratic context, exploiting institutional freedoms – media, elections, and social network – to mobilise disaffected voters. However, his populism also has eroded democratic norms, attacking judicial independence and electoral integrity.
Summing up, Trump’s populism is individualistic, anti-institutional and polarising, often framing politics as a zero-sum battle between ‘real Americans’ and outsiders (immigrants, globalists, and minorities).
Policy formulation for implantation of Trump’s populism has largely been made by a handpicked group of experts who share Trump’s ideology and priorities. Once approved by the president these have been issued as official programmes and actions through executive orders. The Congress and the various ministries in charge of the subjects have been completely ignored or bypassed. Trump’s sidelining of Congress has been overlooked or given indulgence by the Republican majority in the two houses because they think their majority in Congress owes to his popularity. There is no judicial checks and balance either. If any court challenges Trump’s decisions the judge is harassed and punished under trumped up charges by Trump’s acolytes. The media is regularly threatened with cancellation of registration or legal suit for alleged defamation. President Trump personally abuses media as a matter of routine for alleged fake news.
Under president Trump rightwing populism has been patronised and reflected in executive actions to the total neglect of other interest groups and requirements of evolving the global order in finance, trade and security rather than giving it a sudden jolt. Domestically, his so called populist decisions have swung back the progress made in respect of inclusive development of all classes and gender. Soon after assuming office for the second term, president Trump issued a series of executive orders targeting diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) programmes, transgender issues and AI policy. Such actions can be interpreted as populist in that they appeal to a notion of ordinary Americans against the elite or ‘woke’ (liberal) institutions.
But Trump’s method of policy making and implementation are fraught with risks. Firstly, his executive orders may be challenged in courts or require legislation for full effect. Secondly, his populist policies steamrolling into action without due process by experts in concerned departments and government agencies may provoke strong push backs from affected groups and established institutions. Because of hasty executive decisions many of his executive orders may last for the short term i.e. till his term runs out. From this point of view, many of his populist measures appear to be transitory and symbolic in nature. Finally, states may resist or refuse to implement federal initiatives taken on partisan grounds. This has been seen in reactions by state authorities (governors, mayors) in the Democrat majority states of California and Illinois after president Trump ordered National Guards to move there in help of federal law enforcement agencies like ICE.
Policymaking in China: In China policymaking is embedded in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) leadership and centralised state mechanism. Accordingly, policymaking goes through a well established procedure which is discussed below:
(1) The CCP’s Central Committee and Politburo determine priorities in policymaking. (2) The State Council and relevant ministries draw up implementation plans and allocate resources. (3) Provincial and local governments execute the plan based on directives received from above and are evaluated for performance. (4) Mass campaigns and propaganda create atmosphere and incentives for implementation of populist decisions taken by the CCP and Politburo in Beijing .
Xi Jinping’s ‘common prosperity’ strategy is a key illustration of formulation and implementation of state-sponsored bottom up populist programmes. After Xi declared that ‘common prosperity’ is a populist goal to prevent polarisation among people and to promote inclusive prosperity for ensuring a harmonious and stable society the following steps were taken:
The 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) integrated common prosperity goals in the plan. This provided for narrowing the gap between a citizen’s income and consumption.
Targets included increasing fiscal support for underdeveloped regions, reforms of monopolised industries, boosting education, health care and housing for backward regions and rural areas and regulating high incomes through taxes. The top down populist programmes use grassroots party organisations to mobilise resources, support and monitor performance. It is contended that the procedure for policy making and implementation ensure local participation and tailor-made programmes based on local conditions.
The constraints to policymaking and implementation in China are: (a) The CCP controls policy from inception to implementation. (b) Populist policies are often rolled out ad campaigns with quotas and performance targets for local officials. There is no sense of ownership at local levels. (c) That the rhetoric of serving ‘the people’ is shorthand for Party legitimacy is understood by local officials and people. (d) Centrally directed programmes may face problems when regional and local situations vary.
Comparison of policymaking. Populist programmes are translated into policy through very different mechanisms depending on the political system. In the United States, populist policymaking is embedded in an adversarial, institutionalised structure; in China, it is embedded in a hierarchical, party-driven system. While both invoke ‘the people’ the nature of the policy, the tools of implementation and the dynamics of control differ markedly. Understanding these differences helps explain why populist programmes in each country take the forms they do and what implications they hold for policy outcomes, governance and legitimacy.
Chinese case study. The Chinese Communist Party under Xi has cultivated a form of populism that merges nationalism, anti- corruption and appeals to common people with the Party’s Leninist governance model. This variant of ‘state populism’ strengthens rather than challenges, elite authority. Understanding China’s version of populism versus Trump’s helps reveal how political regimes mould populist strategies to serve divergent ends.
Under Xi Jinping, Chinese populism has taken a top-down form, rooted in the Party’s claim to embody ‘the peoples’ interests’. Xi’s slogan of ‘common prosperity’ and the emphasis on fighting corruption are presented as efforts to protect ordinary citizens from bureaucratic excesses and capitalist exploitation.
Key features of Chinese populism include:
(a) National rejuvenation rhetoric. The ‘Chinese dream’ evokes a collective return to greatness, tapping into historical grievance and national pride.
(b) Anti-elitism within the Party. Xi’s anti-corruption campaign portrays him as defending the people against corrupt officials, even as it consolidates his power.
(c) Cultural Populism. Appeals to traditional values (Confucianism, patriotism) serve to unite diverse population under a common moral order.
(d) Digital populism. The state uses social media (Weibo, Wechat) to promote nationalist sentiment and guide public opinion through official online discourse. Unlike democratic populism, Chinese populism does not challenge political establishment, rather it redefines it. Populism here is instrumental – it legitimises centralised authority and suppresses dissent under the guise of ‘representing the people’. Thus, Chinese populism is collectivist, state-owned and directed and ideologically conservative, emphasising harmony and national strength rather than individual empowerment .

While China’s policymaking system is centrally dominated, it is not monolithic. There is bottom up influence through: (1) Local experimentation; (2) Bureaucratic feedback; (3) Expert consultation; and (4) Limited public comment on draft programmes.
Xi Jinping often uses the phrase: ‘top level design, grassroots exploration’. China’s policy process often follows what scholars call ‘a fragmented authoritarianism’ model (K Libberthal and M Oksenberg, Policymaking in China,1988). According to them policymaking in China instead of being top down is fragmented among ministries, regional authorities, and bureaucrats belonging to various ministries and local bodies who bargain with central authorities on priorities, methods of implantation, coordination and monitoring to make and implement policies.
Conclusion: In any discussion on populism and policymaking in different political contexts the two important issues that deserve attention and highlighting are: (a) How or by whom are populist ideas formulated? (b) Through what procedures are populist ideas/programmes articulated in policy/ programmes and implemented? The discussion above has already, more or less, answered these two questions. For refreshing of memory the answers may be recapitulated and supplemented by other information. But first of all, the basic truth about populism and policymaking need to be stated which is that no government of any imaginable designation can afford to be indifferent to popular aspirations for long and so all governments are minimal populist by that metric. If a government continues to play roughshod over the wishes and desires of the people it will face instability, even great unrest in the country and so no country is anti-populist. Having said that it should be added that the type of grievances aired by people in general or a significant number of them vary from country to country and in the same country at different periods of time. So, populism for a country is a time-bound phenomenon which keeps on changing over periods of time.
The second conclusion about populism is that its strength lies in its ability to be reflected in policies of governments and programmes implemented on the basis of such reflection. Governments, whether of the right or the left, show their keenness to placate the public by adopting populist agenda. Generally speaking, it is on the issue of degree and not kind that governments differ from one another in formulating populist policies. But there are exceptions to this even under the same type of government (democracy or authoritarian). The populism of Donald Trump in America is far to the right embodying racist, sexist and xenophobic bias which has no parallel to any previous governments even under Republican Party. Similarly, populism of Xi Jinping is different from that of Kim Il Jung of North Korea even though both are Marxists communist countries.
The content of populism in a democracy or in a communist country, therefore, is determined by the ideological orientation of the party concerned and its leadership at a particular time. The manner of its articulation in a democracy is different from that in a communist country as has been shown earlier in the context of the case studies of America under Trump and China under Xi. With majority in parliament, the head of a populist government in a democracy may bypass legislative process and exercise executive powers in formulating populist policies and implementing the same. Brute majority in the parliament may lead to overlooking of judicial oversight and restraint which has been the case in America under Trump presidency. Since populism is brought to government from election campaign trail, the winner (president) may choose to formulate policies using party faithful and dogmatic populists from the campaign team. Experts, technocrats and bureaucrats belonging to ministries will then be given the role of implementing the policies/ programmes.
For the practice of populism in an authoritarian regime the case of China today can be taken as a general model and concluded on the basis of its record how populism is articulated as concepts and in policymaking. The Chinese model also provides the example about the manner of implanting populist policies in the top down manner. Given the contrasting origin of populism (grassroots vs top down), the manner of articulating it in policymaking and finally its implementation in a democracy and in an authoritarian country as seen in the case study of America and China it can be concluded that while populism is shared by all types of governments, it differs in respect of degrees between a democracy and an authoritarian country. There is lesser or little reflection of grassroots populist grievances in policymaking in an authoritarian country than in a democracy. Likewise, there is almost no accountability to people regarding the timing and content of populist programmes implemented in the former compared to the latter. Finally, populist programme may surge and wane in a democracy depending on leadership but it maintains an even keel, albeit at a lower level, in an authoritarian country.

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