President Musharraf dons civilian robe
Saturday, 1 December 2007
Syed Fattahul Alim
THIS history of Pakistani politics is one of military rules interspersed with civilian rules. Democracy, however, always remained the watchword of all types of rulers whether in khaki or civilian garb, dictatorial or democratic. Once in power the military rulers had always justified its takeover on various pleas. The first military dictator General Ayub Khan said Pakistan was unfit for the traditional form of democracy and in its place proposed one that that was claimed to be basic. So there was never the dearth of excuses to topple the civilian governments. This time around with military strongman general Pervez Musharraf at the helm of affairs, there was also no shortage of theories. But it is also sometimes necessary to change the rules and along with it the turf after having played the old game for too long. .
Pakistan president General Pervez Musharraf has finally taken off his military mantle. He has now stepped on the slippery floor of the most perilous Pakistani political theatre without the protection of military pad. Will Musharraf, who came to power eight years ago through a bloodless coup, survive this makeover? The earlier instances of military coup d'état, which were always bloodless like the last one, demonstrated that the military did never take serious interest in taking power again once their erstwhile boss had abandoned the uniform and taken a civilian stance. However, that does not also mean that they had remained strictly loyal to the former bosses even after they became civilian presidents. This time, too, it cannot be guaranteed that General Ashraf Kayani, who has replaced Musharraf as the Pakistan's new army chief, will continue to remain equally at the beck and call of his immediate past boss.
General Pervez Musharraf upon assuming power made his political house trouble-free by driving way both the sitting elected premier Nawaz Sharif and the former premier Benazir Bhutto. With these two main challenges to power out of the scene it was an easy sail for him to move ahead with his mission. Then was the windfall of 9/11. President Bush then needed Musharraf's cooperation in the Afghan front of his war on terrorism. The honeymoon has gone on for too long. The two ousted and deported former prime ministers as well as the leaders of the two main political parties of Pakistan cannot be expected to wait indefinitely in foreign parts and watch the gimmicks of power play. Meanwhile, the fallout of the anti-Taliban campaign is spilling over also into Pakistan. The number and frequency of suicide bombings have increased alarmingly. The Pakistan military had also to digest disgraceful reversals in the al-Qaeda infested frontiers as in Waziristan. So, the rules of the game was necessarily in need of a change. Benazir Bhutto was the first to join hands in the tango as Washington wanted it to be so. Now another claimant to civilian power has also joined in. What has future in store for president Musharraf, or for the state of Pakistan, for that matter is now the moot point.
Shahan Mufti of Christian Science Monitor writes on Musharraf's civilian posture below:
"After 46 years in uniform - including eight as head of state - President Pervez Musharraf has retired from the Pakistani Army. The official step marks a major transformation not only for Mr. Musharraf personally, but for the country's political and military establishments. At the fulcrum between the two powerful institutions will be the new chief of the Army, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani.
Just as Musharraf blurred the line between Pakistan's civil and military life, observers say General Kayani will now be expected to reverse that dynamic. By withdrawing to the wings but maintaining ultimate authority, Kayani is likely to recast the Army's role as a less political actor. Some former generals expect him to devise new strategies for dealing with the Taliban fighters who control swaths of western Pakistan.
The success with which Kayani is able to achieve this and the manner in which he supports Musharraf in his new civilian role will be scrutinized from Washington to Waziristan.
"Will the Army be willing to give Musharraf all the political backing he will want? There is a big question mark over this," says Talat Masood, a retired general in the Army, who suggests that Kayani will now try to wash the force clean of the heavy political baggage Musharraf accumulated throughout his eight years of military rule. In recent months, popular frustration with the Army's role in civil life has grown, as have the militants' relentless attacks.
"Kayani has no baggage, he's starting with a clean slate," says Mr. Masood. "That will help him in dealing with what he faces as the new chief, independent of anyone's expectations."
Musharraf is now ready to take an oath of office as a civilian president for the next five-year term on Friday, after being cleared of all legal obstacles by his handpicked Supreme Court last week.
Observers say that Kayani is a wise choice for Musharraf's successor. He is the senior most officer eligible for the post, and he has demonstrated a unique loyalty to the president. But it is a choice laden with consequence: Three civilian rulers have been deposed by their hand-picked Army chiefs in the past, including Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif whom Musharraf overthrew in 1999.
The Army, however, can be expected to remain loyal to the uniform.
But his mettle may be tested now as he finds himself at the epicentre of a power struggle. The military had always been the source of Musharraf's real power throughout his rule, say analysts. Now, cut off from it and thrown into the ring of civilian politics, history suggests that he will need the military to remain loyal if he is to remain as president.
One risk for Musharraf is that other Pakistani politicians may now be able to influence the new Army chief. Pakistani political leaders, especially when caught outside the ruling group, have a history of approaching the chief of the Army to intervene. Such power plays have led to past Army takeovers.
The Pakistani Army, note former officers, now has the opportunity to focus on the task at hand: fighting an insurgency that is creeping closer to the major cities outside of Pakistan's tribal regions.
Kayani, who met John Negroponte at length during the US deputy secretary of state's visit this month, will now be in charge of the war against Taliban militants, as well as instrumental in combating the guerrillas who are now attacking the cities with suicide bombers.
"Musharraf inherited the situation," says Mr. Sehgal, referring to Pakistan's involvement in the US-backed war on terrorism that followed America's invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001. "But Kayani can't afford to toe anyone's line unconditionally," he says. The expectation from within the Army and popular opinion will require the general to restore order in the frontier region - to succeed where Musharraf effectively failed.
Kayani may reconfigure the counter-terrorism strategy, which has produced mixed results under Musharraf. "From some of the statements he's made," says Masood, "it seems he's inclined to using economic and political strategy in the tribal areas," instead of force.
But in a country where the Army's discussion of strategy seldom leaves the confines of the war rooms, the new dynamic between Muhsarraf and his successor, as well as its impact on the popular opposition movement and war against militants, will only become clear with time.
Howard LaFranchi, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor on November 13 wrote about the power game unfolding in Pakistan through the US perspective:
"President Bush continues to praise Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf as a valued ally in the war on terror. At the same time, US officials are pressuring the military leader over his declaration of emergency law - though some Pakistanis call it pressure with kid gloves - as if he were the only acceptable game in Islamabad.
Yet even as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice argues for patience toward General Musharraf, some US officials and South Asia experts are doing what they say the US has failed to do: envision and prepare for a post-Musharraf Pakistan.
"Washington's approach to Pakistan has always been that the devil we know is better than the devil we don't know. But there is every reason to believe that with Musharraf and Pakistan, that is not the case," says Selig Harrison, director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy in Washington. "Musharraf has blinded Washington over and over again with a mastery of blackmail, but in the two areas we worry most about - nuclear proliferation and Islamist extremism - there are alternatives that are just as good, if not better."
Captivated by Pakistan's status as a nuclear power, linchpin in the US-led war on terror, and the presumed home of Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, the US has treated the military leader as if he were the last stand before nuclear Armageddon or a new triumph for Islamist extremism, many experts say. Musharraf came to power in a coup in 1999.
A Pakistan with Gen. Ashfak Kayani as military chief, for example, and a civilian government elected by the Pakistani people, would be at least as effective in opposing the extremists' rise and perhaps better at safeguarding Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Many observers believe General Kayani is Musharraf's likely successor as head of the armed forces.
Mr. Harrison says the US has enough leverage over Musharraf to effect a desirable political transition if it wanted - through at least a threatened cut-off of the huge monthly military assistance the country receives for fighting Islamist extremists. But he sees little prospect of that happening, given the Bush administration's continued public support for Musharraf and "more than 54 years of US policy of blindly supporting Pakistan's dictators."
But envisioning a Pakistan that is just as reliable a US ally without Musharraf is not the hard part, it's more the pitfalls of a short-term transition period that are troubling, says Daniel Markey, a recent State Department Policy Planning Staff official who is now at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington.
"Most people agree there are a number of ways this could work out where in six months we are in no worse shape, and perhaps even in better conditions, than we are now," says Mr. Markey, a South Asia expert. One reason it's possible to envision better conditions from the US perspective: A Pakistan free of political turmoil, and with the public satisfied that democratrization is proceeding, is more likely to support US policies in the region.
THIS history of Pakistani politics is one of military rules interspersed with civilian rules. Democracy, however, always remained the watchword of all types of rulers whether in khaki or civilian garb, dictatorial or democratic. Once in power the military rulers had always justified its takeover on various pleas. The first military dictator General Ayub Khan said Pakistan was unfit for the traditional form of democracy and in its place proposed one that that was claimed to be basic. So there was never the dearth of excuses to topple the civilian governments. This time around with military strongman general Pervez Musharraf at the helm of affairs, there was also no shortage of theories. But it is also sometimes necessary to change the rules and along with it the turf after having played the old game for too long. .
Pakistan president General Pervez Musharraf has finally taken off his military mantle. He has now stepped on the slippery floor of the most perilous Pakistani political theatre without the protection of military pad. Will Musharraf, who came to power eight years ago through a bloodless coup, survive this makeover? The earlier instances of military coup d'état, which were always bloodless like the last one, demonstrated that the military did never take serious interest in taking power again once their erstwhile boss had abandoned the uniform and taken a civilian stance. However, that does not also mean that they had remained strictly loyal to the former bosses even after they became civilian presidents. This time, too, it cannot be guaranteed that General Ashraf Kayani, who has replaced Musharraf as the Pakistan's new army chief, will continue to remain equally at the beck and call of his immediate past boss.
General Pervez Musharraf upon assuming power made his political house trouble-free by driving way both the sitting elected premier Nawaz Sharif and the former premier Benazir Bhutto. With these two main challenges to power out of the scene it was an easy sail for him to move ahead with his mission. Then was the windfall of 9/11. President Bush then needed Musharraf's cooperation in the Afghan front of his war on terrorism. The honeymoon has gone on for too long. The two ousted and deported former prime ministers as well as the leaders of the two main political parties of Pakistan cannot be expected to wait indefinitely in foreign parts and watch the gimmicks of power play. Meanwhile, the fallout of the anti-Taliban campaign is spilling over also into Pakistan. The number and frequency of suicide bombings have increased alarmingly. The Pakistan military had also to digest disgraceful reversals in the al-Qaeda infested frontiers as in Waziristan. So, the rules of the game was necessarily in need of a change. Benazir Bhutto was the first to join hands in the tango as Washington wanted it to be so. Now another claimant to civilian power has also joined in. What has future in store for president Musharraf, or for the state of Pakistan, for that matter is now the moot point.
Shahan Mufti of Christian Science Monitor writes on Musharraf's civilian posture below:
"After 46 years in uniform - including eight as head of state - President Pervez Musharraf has retired from the Pakistani Army. The official step marks a major transformation not only for Mr. Musharraf personally, but for the country's political and military establishments. At the fulcrum between the two powerful institutions will be the new chief of the Army, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani.
Just as Musharraf blurred the line between Pakistan's civil and military life, observers say General Kayani will now be expected to reverse that dynamic. By withdrawing to the wings but maintaining ultimate authority, Kayani is likely to recast the Army's role as a less political actor. Some former generals expect him to devise new strategies for dealing with the Taliban fighters who control swaths of western Pakistan.
The success with which Kayani is able to achieve this and the manner in which he supports Musharraf in his new civilian role will be scrutinized from Washington to Waziristan.
"Will the Army be willing to give Musharraf all the political backing he will want? There is a big question mark over this," says Talat Masood, a retired general in the Army, who suggests that Kayani will now try to wash the force clean of the heavy political baggage Musharraf accumulated throughout his eight years of military rule. In recent months, popular frustration with the Army's role in civil life has grown, as have the militants' relentless attacks.
"Kayani has no baggage, he's starting with a clean slate," says Mr. Masood. "That will help him in dealing with what he faces as the new chief, independent of anyone's expectations."
Musharraf is now ready to take an oath of office as a civilian president for the next five-year term on Friday, after being cleared of all legal obstacles by his handpicked Supreme Court last week.
Observers say that Kayani is a wise choice for Musharraf's successor. He is the senior most officer eligible for the post, and he has demonstrated a unique loyalty to the president. But it is a choice laden with consequence: Three civilian rulers have been deposed by their hand-picked Army chiefs in the past, including Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif whom Musharraf overthrew in 1999.
The Army, however, can be expected to remain loyal to the uniform.
But his mettle may be tested now as he finds himself at the epicentre of a power struggle. The military had always been the source of Musharraf's real power throughout his rule, say analysts. Now, cut off from it and thrown into the ring of civilian politics, history suggests that he will need the military to remain loyal if he is to remain as president.
One risk for Musharraf is that other Pakistani politicians may now be able to influence the new Army chief. Pakistani political leaders, especially when caught outside the ruling group, have a history of approaching the chief of the Army to intervene. Such power plays have led to past Army takeovers.
The Pakistani Army, note former officers, now has the opportunity to focus on the task at hand: fighting an insurgency that is creeping closer to the major cities outside of Pakistan's tribal regions.
Kayani, who met John Negroponte at length during the US deputy secretary of state's visit this month, will now be in charge of the war against Taliban militants, as well as instrumental in combating the guerrillas who are now attacking the cities with suicide bombers.
"Musharraf inherited the situation," says Mr. Sehgal, referring to Pakistan's involvement in the US-backed war on terrorism that followed America's invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001. "But Kayani can't afford to toe anyone's line unconditionally," he says. The expectation from within the Army and popular opinion will require the general to restore order in the frontier region - to succeed where Musharraf effectively failed.
Kayani may reconfigure the counter-terrorism strategy, which has produced mixed results under Musharraf. "From some of the statements he's made," says Masood, "it seems he's inclined to using economic and political strategy in the tribal areas," instead of force.
But in a country where the Army's discussion of strategy seldom leaves the confines of the war rooms, the new dynamic between Muhsarraf and his successor, as well as its impact on the popular opposition movement and war against militants, will only become clear with time.
Howard LaFranchi, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor on November 13 wrote about the power game unfolding in Pakistan through the US perspective:
"President Bush continues to praise Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf as a valued ally in the war on terror. At the same time, US officials are pressuring the military leader over his declaration of emergency law - though some Pakistanis call it pressure with kid gloves - as if he were the only acceptable game in Islamabad.
Yet even as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice argues for patience toward General Musharraf, some US officials and South Asia experts are doing what they say the US has failed to do: envision and prepare for a post-Musharraf Pakistan.
"Washington's approach to Pakistan has always been that the devil we know is better than the devil we don't know. But there is every reason to believe that with Musharraf and Pakistan, that is not the case," says Selig Harrison, director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy in Washington. "Musharraf has blinded Washington over and over again with a mastery of blackmail, but in the two areas we worry most about - nuclear proliferation and Islamist extremism - there are alternatives that are just as good, if not better."
Captivated by Pakistan's status as a nuclear power, linchpin in the US-led war on terror, and the presumed home of Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, the US has treated the military leader as if he were the last stand before nuclear Armageddon or a new triumph for Islamist extremism, many experts say. Musharraf came to power in a coup in 1999.
A Pakistan with Gen. Ashfak Kayani as military chief, for example, and a civilian government elected by the Pakistani people, would be at least as effective in opposing the extremists' rise and perhaps better at safeguarding Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Many observers believe General Kayani is Musharraf's likely successor as head of the armed forces.
Mr. Harrison says the US has enough leverage over Musharraf to effect a desirable political transition if it wanted - through at least a threatened cut-off of the huge monthly military assistance the country receives for fighting Islamist extremists. But he sees little prospect of that happening, given the Bush administration's continued public support for Musharraf and "more than 54 years of US policy of blindly supporting Pakistan's dictators."
But envisioning a Pakistan that is just as reliable a US ally without Musharraf is not the hard part, it's more the pitfalls of a short-term transition period that are troubling, says Daniel Markey, a recent State Department Policy Planning Staff official who is now at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington.
"Most people agree there are a number of ways this could work out where in six months we are in no worse shape, and perhaps even in better conditions, than we are now," says Mr. Markey, a South Asia expert. One reason it's possible to envision better conditions from the US perspective: A Pakistan free of political turmoil, and with the public satisfied that democratrization is proceeding, is more likely to support US policies in the region.