Relating to 2007 flood
Saturday, 20 October 2007
Dr K. M. Nabiul Islam
The country has been hit by flood for the second time this year largely due to heavy downpour both within and outside the country. A few lakh people were newly marooned while some took shelter on high lands and roads. The first event affected 39 districts while the second event affected 29 districts, some of them afresh. The second flood, for which the country was not prepared, hit at such a time when the government was trying their best in terms of rehabilitation efforts for the first flood. The areas under T. Aman and vegetables re-planted through purchasing seedlings at high prices have again gone under flood water.
The 2007 flood has affected around 13.3 million people, causing enormous damage to infrastructure, homesteads, seedlings, vegetables and fisheries. The flood has damaged 82,000 houses completely and 961,000 others partially. Although the government has proceeded with a disaster management plan in which the tasks and responsibilities are normally laid out, the effectiveness is debatable for various reasons, such as lack of advocacy, mobilisation and participation of the community.
The paper was initially prepared when apparently the flood was over, reflecting on general issues on flood loss management and mitigation options at medium and long terms. Following that the flood has prolonged with the occurrence for the second time, it is important to discuss the immediate challenges and policy priorities in order to face the current emergency situations.
Relief operation: Any relief and rehabilitation plan first requires a proper assessment of flood damages caused to various sectors so that well informed decision making is possible. The relief and rehabilitation work has to be further intensified, based on needs assessment. Standing orders for disaster management are available; the only need is their enforcement. It is learned that there had been discrimination in per head allocation as the allocation is based on each household, not the household size. The larger households appear to be more vulnerable in this context. The mobilisation at grass-roots levels and effective coordination of all stakeholders-GOB, LGIs, NGOs and CBOs-have no option.
In the past, around one-fourth of the relief operation used to be carried out by the government machinery with the remaining three-fourths carried out by non-governmental organisations and private agencies. This year, the main responsibility has been vested in the government, which is absolutely not feasible; currently, the major difficulty relates to the distribution of reliefs given the huge disruption to roads network.
The armed forces have already extensively participated in the relief efforts but the whole community has to be involved in the process. The production of seedlings alone would not be enough; the farmers have to be supported with credits and inputs at subsidised prices. The distribution of fertilisers has been defective for quite some time. The farmers should be provided with cash subsidy under the supervision of the local government without delay.
The people were already in crisis in terms of price hikes of essentials when the flood took place. The government has to further defer any decision as regards upward revision of prices of fuel, gas, fertiliser and electricity. It is important that reliefs are distributed following appropriate rules and regulations, by a special committee comprising local government intuitions, NGOs and CBOs. It is also essential to take necessary steps to regulate prices and prevent food crisis through drastic initiative by the local administration. Nevertheless, the relief programme needs to be linked with improving the coping capacities of the individuals and the community, as a whole.
Food security: The work of flood loss assessment is currently in progress. It is imperative that the food market is kept stable. The government has to play a major role in this respect. A three to four months emergency stock of public foodgrain is generally deemed as safe. As can be recalled, the 1998 flood caused damage to 2.4 million tons of Aman rice. A preliminary estimate of damage to rice crop this year indicates that there may be a shortfall of 0.8 million-1.0 million (8-10 lakh) tons against production target.
The government is said to have around 0.7 million (7.0 lakh) tons of food stock. The ongoing relief operations and OMS is likely to reduce the stock to 0.5 million (5.o lakh) tons, which may be risky. It may be recalled that following the disastrous flood of 1998, private sector imports of rice and wheat contributed significantly to national foodgrain supply. There was hardly any need for government intervention in the market to ensure stable food supplies and prices at that time. This year, rice price stabilisation through imports from neighbouring countries has been seriously considered, however; with apparently limited success so far. It may be recommended that the cross-border trades are encouraged for a temporary period, in order to balance the demand-supply position and thereby enhance the stability of the foodgrain market.
Food insecure households are constrained by purchasing power. At this moment, material relief or food relief rather than cash is more important. The required level of minimum foodgrain stock should be constantly reviewed to take account of changing conditions in domestic and international markets. At the same time, the Public Food Distribution System (PFDS) has to be geared up further through open market sales and targeted distribution channels, including Food for Work, VGD, VGF and Test Relief.
The damage to roads and infrastructure has constrained the distribution of foodgrain to flood-affected households while at this point of time food availability at remote places is important. Floods have not yet ended. The country has to be ready for possible more floods. It is encouraging that the government has already revised the annual budget in the wake of this year's flood. As the flood has prolonged, it should make further budgetary allocation for this.
Medical care for flood affected people: Adequate medical care for the flood victims has to be ensured. The Union Health Complex may work as the local-level headquarters, which may be bestowed with the responsibility of mobilising local people, volunteer groups and youths in relation to the emergency health service under the overall supervision of the civil surgeon's office of the respective district. The Army Medical Corps and their field Ambulance Units can be deployed. The medical students can also be involved as important support to the team. The provision of safe drinking water is a top priority. The immediate repair of damaged tube-wells has to be undertaken. Emergency treatment (like delivery, water-borne disease) with the supply of emergency medicines and oral salines during disaster and post-disaster period should be ensured. The community clinics that had been previously closed should now be reopened.
Participation of all stakeholders: In the past, the political parties played a major role in mobilising relief efforts following floods. The government may further encourage them to take initiatives purely on humanitarian grounds. The NGOs, CBOs and civil society that were initially in passive mood should now be geared, like in the past disasters, to take utmost efforts in rehabilitating activities. The highest level of GO-NGO, public-private coordination is necessary to manage the task of relief distribution. The exchange of information among all the stakeholders about the immediate actions and regular updates will substantially contribute to the efficient relief distribution efforts.
Rehabilitation activities: Post-flood management is mostly focused on rehabilitation activities. The potential cost of rehabilitation activities is huge compared to the financial capacity of the government. There should be various options for employment generation through which the purchasing power of the victims can be increased.
Immediate post-flood rehabilitation measures should be targeted to four groups of victims. The first group, the ultra poor should be brought under the programme through safety-net programmes (e.g., VGD, VGF and test relief). The second group, the productive forces (farmers) need to be brought under a programme with the provision of inputs, such as fertilisers, seeds, seedlings possibly at subsidised prices. The third group of victims are the wage labourers who needs immediate employment (e.g., through restoration of roads network) to enhance purchasing power. The fourth group of households is the one living on small and cottage industrial activities, who have to be extended with credits and other supports.
The government policy has to target population groups, regions and seasons where food stress is most acute through income transfers, targeted food distribution and public works programme, with a particular attention to the ultra poor. This will generate temporary income options and allow them to cope with the vulnerability. These IGA options may include fish cultures, earthworks, homestead gardening, social forestation etc. Following a huge damage to houses, the rehabilitation activities must focus on aiding the victims in reconstructing their houses, buying house materials etc.
Boro cultivation: While extending all-out efforts for late Aman plantation, it is important also to vigorously design agricultural rehabilitation beyond Aman cultivation. The government has to give subsidies in inputs to the farmers for the upcoming Boro and vegetables cultivation. Quality seeds, fertilisers, irrigation and diesel have to be made available to the farmers in appropriate time. There have to be enough supply of Boro seeds. If the demand cannot be met locally, then the government has to take immediate steps to import quality seeds under public and private arrangements; or may encourage trans-border seeds trade for a limited time. Adequate interest-free credits need to be extended to farmers repayable at the end of the Boro harvest.
The author is a senior Research Fellow, Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies.
To be continued
The country has been hit by flood for the second time this year largely due to heavy downpour both within and outside the country. A few lakh people were newly marooned while some took shelter on high lands and roads. The first event affected 39 districts while the second event affected 29 districts, some of them afresh. The second flood, for which the country was not prepared, hit at such a time when the government was trying their best in terms of rehabilitation efforts for the first flood. The areas under T. Aman and vegetables re-planted through purchasing seedlings at high prices have again gone under flood water.
The 2007 flood has affected around 13.3 million people, causing enormous damage to infrastructure, homesteads, seedlings, vegetables and fisheries. The flood has damaged 82,000 houses completely and 961,000 others partially. Although the government has proceeded with a disaster management plan in which the tasks and responsibilities are normally laid out, the effectiveness is debatable for various reasons, such as lack of advocacy, mobilisation and participation of the community.
The paper was initially prepared when apparently the flood was over, reflecting on general issues on flood loss management and mitigation options at medium and long terms. Following that the flood has prolonged with the occurrence for the second time, it is important to discuss the immediate challenges and policy priorities in order to face the current emergency situations.
Relief operation: Any relief and rehabilitation plan first requires a proper assessment of flood damages caused to various sectors so that well informed decision making is possible. The relief and rehabilitation work has to be further intensified, based on needs assessment. Standing orders for disaster management are available; the only need is their enforcement. It is learned that there had been discrimination in per head allocation as the allocation is based on each household, not the household size. The larger households appear to be more vulnerable in this context. The mobilisation at grass-roots levels and effective coordination of all stakeholders-GOB, LGIs, NGOs and CBOs-have no option.
In the past, around one-fourth of the relief operation used to be carried out by the government machinery with the remaining three-fourths carried out by non-governmental organisations and private agencies. This year, the main responsibility has been vested in the government, which is absolutely not feasible; currently, the major difficulty relates to the distribution of reliefs given the huge disruption to roads network.
The armed forces have already extensively participated in the relief efforts but the whole community has to be involved in the process. The production of seedlings alone would not be enough; the farmers have to be supported with credits and inputs at subsidised prices. The distribution of fertilisers has been defective for quite some time. The farmers should be provided with cash subsidy under the supervision of the local government without delay.
The people were already in crisis in terms of price hikes of essentials when the flood took place. The government has to further defer any decision as regards upward revision of prices of fuel, gas, fertiliser and electricity. It is important that reliefs are distributed following appropriate rules and regulations, by a special committee comprising local government intuitions, NGOs and CBOs. It is also essential to take necessary steps to regulate prices and prevent food crisis through drastic initiative by the local administration. Nevertheless, the relief programme needs to be linked with improving the coping capacities of the individuals and the community, as a whole.
Food security: The work of flood loss assessment is currently in progress. It is imperative that the food market is kept stable. The government has to play a major role in this respect. A three to four months emergency stock of public foodgrain is generally deemed as safe. As can be recalled, the 1998 flood caused damage to 2.4 million tons of Aman rice. A preliminary estimate of damage to rice crop this year indicates that there may be a shortfall of 0.8 million-1.0 million (8-10 lakh) tons against production target.
The government is said to have around 0.7 million (7.0 lakh) tons of food stock. The ongoing relief operations and OMS is likely to reduce the stock to 0.5 million (5.o lakh) tons, which may be risky. It may be recalled that following the disastrous flood of 1998, private sector imports of rice and wheat contributed significantly to national foodgrain supply. There was hardly any need for government intervention in the market to ensure stable food supplies and prices at that time. This year, rice price stabilisation through imports from neighbouring countries has been seriously considered, however; with apparently limited success so far. It may be recommended that the cross-border trades are encouraged for a temporary period, in order to balance the demand-supply position and thereby enhance the stability of the foodgrain market.
Food insecure households are constrained by purchasing power. At this moment, material relief or food relief rather than cash is more important. The required level of minimum foodgrain stock should be constantly reviewed to take account of changing conditions in domestic and international markets. At the same time, the Public Food Distribution System (PFDS) has to be geared up further through open market sales and targeted distribution channels, including Food for Work, VGD, VGF and Test Relief.
The damage to roads and infrastructure has constrained the distribution of foodgrain to flood-affected households while at this point of time food availability at remote places is important. Floods have not yet ended. The country has to be ready for possible more floods. It is encouraging that the government has already revised the annual budget in the wake of this year's flood. As the flood has prolonged, it should make further budgetary allocation for this.
Medical care for flood affected people: Adequate medical care for the flood victims has to be ensured. The Union Health Complex may work as the local-level headquarters, which may be bestowed with the responsibility of mobilising local people, volunteer groups and youths in relation to the emergency health service under the overall supervision of the civil surgeon's office of the respective district. The Army Medical Corps and their field Ambulance Units can be deployed. The medical students can also be involved as important support to the team. The provision of safe drinking water is a top priority. The immediate repair of damaged tube-wells has to be undertaken. Emergency treatment (like delivery, water-borne disease) with the supply of emergency medicines and oral salines during disaster and post-disaster period should be ensured. The community clinics that had been previously closed should now be reopened.
Participation of all stakeholders: In the past, the political parties played a major role in mobilising relief efforts following floods. The government may further encourage them to take initiatives purely on humanitarian grounds. The NGOs, CBOs and civil society that were initially in passive mood should now be geared, like in the past disasters, to take utmost efforts in rehabilitating activities. The highest level of GO-NGO, public-private coordination is necessary to manage the task of relief distribution. The exchange of information among all the stakeholders about the immediate actions and regular updates will substantially contribute to the efficient relief distribution efforts.
Rehabilitation activities: Post-flood management is mostly focused on rehabilitation activities. The potential cost of rehabilitation activities is huge compared to the financial capacity of the government. There should be various options for employment generation through which the purchasing power of the victims can be increased.
Immediate post-flood rehabilitation measures should be targeted to four groups of victims. The first group, the ultra poor should be brought under the programme through safety-net programmes (e.g., VGD, VGF and test relief). The second group, the productive forces (farmers) need to be brought under a programme with the provision of inputs, such as fertilisers, seeds, seedlings possibly at subsidised prices. The third group of victims are the wage labourers who needs immediate employment (e.g., through restoration of roads network) to enhance purchasing power. The fourth group of households is the one living on small and cottage industrial activities, who have to be extended with credits and other supports.
The government policy has to target population groups, regions and seasons where food stress is most acute through income transfers, targeted food distribution and public works programme, with a particular attention to the ultra poor. This will generate temporary income options and allow them to cope with the vulnerability. These IGA options may include fish cultures, earthworks, homestead gardening, social forestation etc. Following a huge damage to houses, the rehabilitation activities must focus on aiding the victims in reconstructing their houses, buying house materials etc.
Boro cultivation: While extending all-out efforts for late Aman plantation, it is important also to vigorously design agricultural rehabilitation beyond Aman cultivation. The government has to give subsidies in inputs to the farmers for the upcoming Boro and vegetables cultivation. Quality seeds, fertilisers, irrigation and diesel have to be made available to the farmers in appropriate time. There have to be enough supply of Boro seeds. If the demand cannot be met locally, then the government has to take immediate steps to import quality seeds under public and private arrangements; or may encourage trans-border seeds trade for a limited time. Adequate interest-free credits need to be extended to farmers repayable at the end of the Boro harvest.
The author is a senior Research Fellow, Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies.
To be continued