Security threats facing country
Enayet Rasul Bhuiyan | Thursday, 5 March 2009
The scenes of apparent calm in front of BDR's Peelkhana headquarters is deceptive. An ordinary passerby may find the prevailing normal traffic movement on the road in front of the headquarters as a sign of normalcy. But more informed people are under no such illusion. For they should have a better understanding by now that this nerve centre of the first layer of defence of the country remains in a dangerously weakened state. The Peelkhana headquarters normally have about twelve thousand men in it. Today, only hundreds are there and in interned position. It will take time before they can be given proper security clearance for resuming duty. Other BDR men who returned after fleeing, are also remaining similarly suspended from service and some of them could be facing charges fairly soon. So, there is nothing but ad hoc physical management of the headquarters by small groups of army people.
The command structure from this headquarters stands all but shattered . The entire command structure including the Director General (DG) was liquidated by the rebel BDR men. A new DG has been appointed but he remains virtually ineffective without filling the positions below him and without supporting men to be able to send his directives and have the same carried out. The communication system and other structures inside the headquarters are in shambles. The vital armoury is in a mess; a large number of arms and ammunitions from it are missing. The remaining are not to be used before a tally is taken.
The BDR regional staging area or their sector camps outside Dhaka, specially in the border areas, are not in neat conditions either. The officers in them fled soon after knowing about the mutiny in Dhaka and have not returned in most cases. According to latest information, the men have resumed their patrol duty in the border areas but on their own and not with the orders of their officers who are still not feeling confident to return or have not received instruction to return.
Thus, this vital first line of defence for the country remains virtually in a crippled and very enfeebled state. The effectiveness of a force like the BDR depends, first all, on its chain of command functioning efficiently and also the communications system. But there is hardly now a command structure and so little need for communications or the relaying of orders. If sudden untoward incidents occur in the borders such as mobilisation and provocation by the Indian Border Security Force (BSF), which are frequent happenings in the borders between the two countries, then hardly an able response can be expected from the BDR in their present state. The army cannot be dispatched soon either and this is also not desirable because it amounts to escalating of the level of tensions if members of the armed forces are sent out directly to borders to do duty of the sort usually entrusted to a force like the BDR. The same then can be construed as upping the tension by the neighbouring country inviting its own army in the borders and the dangers of a direct showdown.
Thus, Bangladesh is passing an insecure period with the Indo-Bangladesh borders being poorly defended or not defended as these should be. This situation provides a heyday not only for smugglers but for all kinds of trespassers of the international frontiers with ill motives and designs. Reportedly, the Indian BSF is mobilising heavily in the common borders with black cat commandos. Let us hope that the Indo-Bangladesh borders will continue to remain calm until the BDR makes some significant recovery from its present badly battered conditions. But in addressing security threats to the country one cannot rely only on hopes. The Bangladesh army should have a plan ready, immediately, with or without the BDR, to carry out routine vigilance activities. The army need not appear directly on the border areas but should remain some distance away while leaving the patrolling and related duties near the no man's lands to available reliable units of the BDR and even police or ansars under a temporary command system.
The fleeing mutineers have carried away with them some quantities of arms and ammunitions or the same may have fallen into wrong hands after lying uncared for a while. Some drug addicts were also shown in cable TV carrying bullet strings and arms from the littered arms and ammunition in the Peelkhana compound. The arms carried out by the mutineers could include grenades, sub-machine guns (SMGs) and light machine guns (LMGs) including their magazines. Even mortar chutes and their shells could be missing. The unaccounted for arms, specially of the lethal varieties, until these are found and seized, will continue to pose serious security risks. The ones from the BDR who remain in unauthorized possession of these weapons who might not surrender, they would be a constant security hazard. The missing weapons can be used in robberies and standing up to security forces in all kinds of circumstances. Thus, the hunt for these weapons and ammunitions should be considered as important as hunting for the mutineers.
One positive side to the otherwise very sad Peelkhana tragedy is that all quarters are now aware of what the mutineers and their backers wanted : pitting brother against brother, army against the BDR, officers against men in the security forces. If they could have their way, they would start strife in different vital segments of Bangladesh society with all the devastating effects. Now that the core aspect of their sinister design is known, everybody, specially the security forces should get down immediately to the tasks of stopping any attempt to spark off disunity in their ranks or between the forces. This must be considered as supreme duty to be carried out with utmost efficiency in the highest security interests of the nation. All of the intelligence agencies in the service of the state should be shaken up and invigorated to do a specially good job with no further lapses on their part.
The command structure from this headquarters stands all but shattered . The entire command structure including the Director General (DG) was liquidated by the rebel BDR men. A new DG has been appointed but he remains virtually ineffective without filling the positions below him and without supporting men to be able to send his directives and have the same carried out. The communication system and other structures inside the headquarters are in shambles. The vital armoury is in a mess; a large number of arms and ammunitions from it are missing. The remaining are not to be used before a tally is taken.
The BDR regional staging area or their sector camps outside Dhaka, specially in the border areas, are not in neat conditions either. The officers in them fled soon after knowing about the mutiny in Dhaka and have not returned in most cases. According to latest information, the men have resumed their patrol duty in the border areas but on their own and not with the orders of their officers who are still not feeling confident to return or have not received instruction to return.
Thus, this vital first line of defence for the country remains virtually in a crippled and very enfeebled state. The effectiveness of a force like the BDR depends, first all, on its chain of command functioning efficiently and also the communications system. But there is hardly now a command structure and so little need for communications or the relaying of orders. If sudden untoward incidents occur in the borders such as mobilisation and provocation by the Indian Border Security Force (BSF), which are frequent happenings in the borders between the two countries, then hardly an able response can be expected from the BDR in their present state. The army cannot be dispatched soon either and this is also not desirable because it amounts to escalating of the level of tensions if members of the armed forces are sent out directly to borders to do duty of the sort usually entrusted to a force like the BDR. The same then can be construed as upping the tension by the neighbouring country inviting its own army in the borders and the dangers of a direct showdown.
Thus, Bangladesh is passing an insecure period with the Indo-Bangladesh borders being poorly defended or not defended as these should be. This situation provides a heyday not only for smugglers but for all kinds of trespassers of the international frontiers with ill motives and designs. Reportedly, the Indian BSF is mobilising heavily in the common borders with black cat commandos. Let us hope that the Indo-Bangladesh borders will continue to remain calm until the BDR makes some significant recovery from its present badly battered conditions. But in addressing security threats to the country one cannot rely only on hopes. The Bangladesh army should have a plan ready, immediately, with or without the BDR, to carry out routine vigilance activities. The army need not appear directly on the border areas but should remain some distance away while leaving the patrolling and related duties near the no man's lands to available reliable units of the BDR and even police or ansars under a temporary command system.
The fleeing mutineers have carried away with them some quantities of arms and ammunitions or the same may have fallen into wrong hands after lying uncared for a while. Some drug addicts were also shown in cable TV carrying bullet strings and arms from the littered arms and ammunition in the Peelkhana compound. The arms carried out by the mutineers could include grenades, sub-machine guns (SMGs) and light machine guns (LMGs) including their magazines. Even mortar chutes and their shells could be missing. The unaccounted for arms, specially of the lethal varieties, until these are found and seized, will continue to pose serious security risks. The ones from the BDR who remain in unauthorized possession of these weapons who might not surrender, they would be a constant security hazard. The missing weapons can be used in robberies and standing up to security forces in all kinds of circumstances. Thus, the hunt for these weapons and ammunitions should be considered as important as hunting for the mutineers.
One positive side to the otherwise very sad Peelkhana tragedy is that all quarters are now aware of what the mutineers and their backers wanted : pitting brother against brother, army against the BDR, officers against men in the security forces. If they could have their way, they would start strife in different vital segments of Bangladesh society with all the devastating effects. Now that the core aspect of their sinister design is known, everybody, specially the security forces should get down immediately to the tasks of stopping any attempt to spark off disunity in their ranks or between the forces. This must be considered as supreme duty to be carried out with utmost efficiency in the highest security interests of the nation. All of the intelligence agencies in the service of the state should be shaken up and invigorated to do a specially good job with no further lapses on their part.