Setting up institutional barriers to corruption
Sunday, 10 June 2007
Anwar Ahmed
WHAT the Chief Adviser (CA) has underlined in his recent address to the conference of deputy commissioners (DCs), is very significant particularly in the backdrop of the on-going drive against corruption. The CA has proposed creating conditions within institutions as deterrents to corruption. This would be a very sensible approach to fighting or discouraging corruption successfully in the longer run. This should not be interpreted to mean either that the present hard drive against notoriously corrupt individuals should be relaxed. The actions against such individuals, justifiably sensed to be corrupt within the government, outside the government, in businesses and political parties, could be welcomed to continue. But this can only be a part of a process. This drive at the level of individuals cannot be a long-term solution to fighting the scourge of corruption. The motivation to corruption, the very working of institutions that create the scope for engaging in corrupt activities, these will have to be practically treated at the source for corrupt instincts of individuals to be automatically frustrated and tamed.
For example, the government bureaucracy spawns a great deal of corruption. What would be the institutional checks to the same? No doubt, some individuals in the civil services are to blame for taking bribes and other immoralities. But had there been institutional barriers facing them while indulging in corruption, then surely they would feel restrained and considerations of their taking high risks would be a powerful demotivator keeping them away from corruption. Thus, institutional mechanisms need to be thought of and devised at every level of the government's functioning so that corruption impulses can be naturally controlled. The same will require monitoring mechanisms to watch over civil servants, departmental procedures for swift and surgical actions against them as well as an accountability structure. But all of these things must be accomplished to set up an effective anti-corruption system within the civil administration without creating more bureaucracy in trying to set up this system.
Besides, simplification of bureaucratic procedures themselves will lead to less corruption. For example, the present procedure of taking permission from too many desks gives rise to red tapism, delays and paying of bribes to push the files. Shortening bureaucracy in these matters can lead to curbs on corruption. Lack of computerisation in land offices and others also create great opportunities for corruption. Therefore, computerisation and other reforms in the government offices, will similarly add to the capacities of government run bodies to operate with much less corruption.
The country's political parties in recent times have been responsible for the most corruption. The political parties are at the top for breeding institutional corruption. Therefore, the cure lies in deep cleansing the political parties for these to emerge as well reformed institutions to discharge their due role in the politics and administration of the country on going to power.
WHAT the Chief Adviser (CA) has underlined in his recent address to the conference of deputy commissioners (DCs), is very significant particularly in the backdrop of the on-going drive against corruption. The CA has proposed creating conditions within institutions as deterrents to corruption. This would be a very sensible approach to fighting or discouraging corruption successfully in the longer run. This should not be interpreted to mean either that the present hard drive against notoriously corrupt individuals should be relaxed. The actions against such individuals, justifiably sensed to be corrupt within the government, outside the government, in businesses and political parties, could be welcomed to continue. But this can only be a part of a process. This drive at the level of individuals cannot be a long-term solution to fighting the scourge of corruption. The motivation to corruption, the very working of institutions that create the scope for engaging in corrupt activities, these will have to be practically treated at the source for corrupt instincts of individuals to be automatically frustrated and tamed.
For example, the government bureaucracy spawns a great deal of corruption. What would be the institutional checks to the same? No doubt, some individuals in the civil services are to blame for taking bribes and other immoralities. But had there been institutional barriers facing them while indulging in corruption, then surely they would feel restrained and considerations of their taking high risks would be a powerful demotivator keeping them away from corruption. Thus, institutional mechanisms need to be thought of and devised at every level of the government's functioning so that corruption impulses can be naturally controlled. The same will require monitoring mechanisms to watch over civil servants, departmental procedures for swift and surgical actions against them as well as an accountability structure. But all of these things must be accomplished to set up an effective anti-corruption system within the civil administration without creating more bureaucracy in trying to set up this system.
Besides, simplification of bureaucratic procedures themselves will lead to less corruption. For example, the present procedure of taking permission from too many desks gives rise to red tapism, delays and paying of bribes to push the files. Shortening bureaucracy in these matters can lead to curbs on corruption. Lack of computerisation in land offices and others also create great opportunities for corruption. Therefore, computerisation and other reforms in the government offices, will similarly add to the capacities of government run bodies to operate with much less corruption.
The country's political parties in recent times have been responsible for the most corruption. The political parties are at the top for breeding institutional corruption. Therefore, the cure lies in deep cleansing the political parties for these to emerge as well reformed institutions to discharge their due role in the politics and administration of the country on going to power.