Some thoughts on caretaker government
Thursday, 12 May 2011
Abdullah A Dewan
The national discourses on reforming the caretaker government system have resurfaced on the fore in political forums, talk shows and roundtables as well as news reports and editorial pages in recent weeks. These discourses are a welcome development given that the 2013 general election is still more than two years away - allowing enough time to iron out issues of agreement and disagreements across political parties and intellectual circles. It is time to seriously consider a mechanism alternative to the current design of the caretaker government (CTG). The concept of CTG although home-grown, is a unique feature in our evolving democracy innovated to overcome the seemingly questionable integrity of the incumbent government for holding a credible election for orderly transfer of power. Although the concept is unique and well-conceived - it is nonetheless a calumny on our politicians - revealing their inability to display moral high ground, integrity, and people's trust in conducting a free and fair election. Like it or not - this is an affront to our democracy and an indictment on the character of our politicians. The caretaker government's legitimacy to govern is rooted in the trust and confidence of major political parties. Otherwise, holding a free and fair election would be a far cry. Unfortunately, the system did not fare well in the past. We have witnessed both in 2001 and 2007 that the system divided the nation politically more than united it - leaving many irreparable scars on various aspects. The system began to sprout its ugly head with the overstepped activism under Chief Justice Latifur Rahman prior to the 2001 election. The waves of controversy culminating from those well-intentioned activisms made it obvious how mixing judiciary and politics can be counter-productive. Further, the CTG provision has contributed to a growing notion that judges of seemingly lesser integrity are tiptoeing into higher judiciary on the basis of political lineage and loyalty to the incumbent government. Prior to the 2007 election, the political climate became so acrimonious that even the designated Chief Justice to be the Chief Advisor (CA) became enmeshed with controversy and was rejected by the Awami League-led grand alliance. The Chief Election Commissioner Justice M A Aziz turned into a litigious entity of scorn and daily ridicule. The country was fast leapfrogging into turmoil only to be averted by the emergence of a military backed CTG. To spare the higher judiciary from the growing discomfiture, the AL-led alliance, prior to the 2007 election, proposed that the CA be selected from a wider pool through dialogue and consensus. While incorporating the CTG provision in the Constitution in 1996, the BNP lawmakers also foresaw the potential for Supreme Court (SC) Justices becoming controversial and unacceptable to political parties at some point in the future. Therefore, the provision of appointing the CA by the President after consultation with major political parties was also incorporated in the constitution. Thus, the AL-led alliances' 2007 pre-election demand for forming the CTG from a wider pool was consistent with what BNP lawmakers envisioned in 1996. Conducting the election is the sole responsibility of the Election Commission (EC) and the CTG is mandated to deal with routine governance issues in the interim period including aiding the EC with whatever resources necessary to conduct a free and fair election. This article, therefore, promotes the idea that the system in its present form be dismantled; instead empower the EC with whatever resources, rules, and regulations necessary to conduct a free and fair general election, following all other functioning democracies. In this regard, two ideas are proposed about the mechanism to run the country's affairs during the interim period until the next elected government is installed. Firstly, Use the constitutional provision whereby the President will exercise the dual role of Chief Adviser in addition to being the President. He will appoint 10 advisers through a simple but fair mechanism. Secondly, The prime minister and all the cabinet ministers (no state or deputy ministers) will continue running the routine operations of the state as interim government while forfeiting their right to contest in the election, participating in campaigns and all other election-related activities except helping the EC with whatever monetary, manpower, and law and order maintaining resources that the EC would ask for. Obviously, the second option will not be acceptable to politicians regardless of their party affiliations. Why would they give up their chances of enjoying perks and perquisites for another five-year term? However, the first option may be appealing, workable, and would possibly be acceptable to all concerned if the selection of advisers is made in a non-partisan manner. A fair process requires choosing politically neutral people who are qualified, capable, and forthcoming to serve the interim government as advisers. But where will you find apolitical people in Bangladesh - one in which we start participating in street protests, political movements, and become opinionated well before graduating from high school. We may, therefore, have to look up to the President for a salvation from the increasingly impassable present CTG design. The President after taking the oath of office is considered to be a neutral and non-partisan head of the state. But can he really play a non-partisan role in selecting the advisers given that he spent his entire adult life as being a politician of a certain ideological indoctrination? The country still remembers how President Iajuddin Ahmed was marginalised by BNP contentiously and contemptuously while pushing the country to the brink of a murderous political bedlam and anarchy. May be those humiliating and dreadful experiences that led to the emergence of the 2007 military-backed CTG, have had some lessons for the ruling and the opposition parties -allowing the President to play the role of the country's president instead of the incumbent party's president. Assuming that the President is solemnly committed to be non-partisan and acceptable to all parties as the Chief Adviser (in fact, no Chief Adviser is needed except to meet the constitutional provision), the next step is selecting the 10 advisers to run the interim administration. Assuming that the two main political alliances (AL-led 14 party grand alliances and BNP-led 4 party alliances) remain in effect until the 2013 election, each alliance will send 10 nominations to the President with detail qualifications, experiences and backgrounds of each nominee. After scrupulous reviews, the president will choose five advisers from each group and two additional ones to remain as standby. The CTG is thus formed without any chaos and contentions. In this formula, there is no room to accommodate the idea of selecting CTG advisers based on a party's representation (seats won) in the parliament or per cent of popular votes won in the last election. The AL-led alliance must not propose or pass any bills to reform the CTG provisions which they will not approve if they are in the opposition bench. There is no reason why would this formula not be acceptable to the parties concerned. The process is simple, least time consuming, least complicated, and little or nothing to be contentious about -- and most of all- - as evenhanded as one can conceive of. It is important that the total elimination of the CTG system - - allowing the ruling party to conduct the general election must proceed gradually after enough confidence and trust is built in the EC and President's handling of the state affairs as interim government. This formula or any other modus operandi to be used in forming the CTG would not work if the AL alliance rehearses the same play and ploy for winning the national election at all costs reminiscent of the BNP-alliance's 2007 connivance to politicise the entire election machineries, the CTG and the President. The AL-led parliament can pass any number of bills to outlaw the emergence of military usurpers and martial law. But history tells us that there may be situations in the future which would invoke the military interference in civil administration for the country's greater cause. As we have seen in 2007 that the BNP-led alliance created such a situation -- a military-backed CTG was formed much to the appeal of the then opposition AL-led alliance, which was also welcomed by the people at large. But can the country really withstand that to repeat? The democratic process and the country will fall back in every election cycle if the ruling party pursues the mockery of winning elections at all costs. The AL-led alliance has the opportunity now to set an example of preventing the disparaging history from repeating. (This article was written before the Supreme Court verdict on the Caretaker Government issue delivered on May 10 last) The writer, formerly a Physicist and Nuclear Engineer, is a Professor of Economics at Eastern Michigan University. He can be reached at E-mail: adewan@emich.edu
The national discourses on reforming the caretaker government system have resurfaced on the fore in political forums, talk shows and roundtables as well as news reports and editorial pages in recent weeks. These discourses are a welcome development given that the 2013 general election is still more than two years away - allowing enough time to iron out issues of agreement and disagreements across political parties and intellectual circles. It is time to seriously consider a mechanism alternative to the current design of the caretaker government (CTG). The concept of CTG although home-grown, is a unique feature in our evolving democracy innovated to overcome the seemingly questionable integrity of the incumbent government for holding a credible election for orderly transfer of power. Although the concept is unique and well-conceived - it is nonetheless a calumny on our politicians - revealing their inability to display moral high ground, integrity, and people's trust in conducting a free and fair election. Like it or not - this is an affront to our democracy and an indictment on the character of our politicians. The caretaker government's legitimacy to govern is rooted in the trust and confidence of major political parties. Otherwise, holding a free and fair election would be a far cry. Unfortunately, the system did not fare well in the past. We have witnessed both in 2001 and 2007 that the system divided the nation politically more than united it - leaving many irreparable scars on various aspects. The system began to sprout its ugly head with the overstepped activism under Chief Justice Latifur Rahman prior to the 2001 election. The waves of controversy culminating from those well-intentioned activisms made it obvious how mixing judiciary and politics can be counter-productive. Further, the CTG provision has contributed to a growing notion that judges of seemingly lesser integrity are tiptoeing into higher judiciary on the basis of political lineage and loyalty to the incumbent government. Prior to the 2007 election, the political climate became so acrimonious that even the designated Chief Justice to be the Chief Advisor (CA) became enmeshed with controversy and was rejected by the Awami League-led grand alliance. The Chief Election Commissioner Justice M A Aziz turned into a litigious entity of scorn and daily ridicule. The country was fast leapfrogging into turmoil only to be averted by the emergence of a military backed CTG. To spare the higher judiciary from the growing discomfiture, the AL-led alliance, prior to the 2007 election, proposed that the CA be selected from a wider pool through dialogue and consensus. While incorporating the CTG provision in the Constitution in 1996, the BNP lawmakers also foresaw the potential for Supreme Court (SC) Justices becoming controversial and unacceptable to political parties at some point in the future. Therefore, the provision of appointing the CA by the President after consultation with major political parties was also incorporated in the constitution. Thus, the AL-led alliances' 2007 pre-election demand for forming the CTG from a wider pool was consistent with what BNP lawmakers envisioned in 1996. Conducting the election is the sole responsibility of the Election Commission (EC) and the CTG is mandated to deal with routine governance issues in the interim period including aiding the EC with whatever resources necessary to conduct a free and fair election. This article, therefore, promotes the idea that the system in its present form be dismantled; instead empower the EC with whatever resources, rules, and regulations necessary to conduct a free and fair general election, following all other functioning democracies. In this regard, two ideas are proposed about the mechanism to run the country's affairs during the interim period until the next elected government is installed. Firstly, Use the constitutional provision whereby the President will exercise the dual role of Chief Adviser in addition to being the President. He will appoint 10 advisers through a simple but fair mechanism. Secondly, The prime minister and all the cabinet ministers (no state or deputy ministers) will continue running the routine operations of the state as interim government while forfeiting their right to contest in the election, participating in campaigns and all other election-related activities except helping the EC with whatever monetary, manpower, and law and order maintaining resources that the EC would ask for. Obviously, the second option will not be acceptable to politicians regardless of their party affiliations. Why would they give up their chances of enjoying perks and perquisites for another five-year term? However, the first option may be appealing, workable, and would possibly be acceptable to all concerned if the selection of advisers is made in a non-partisan manner. A fair process requires choosing politically neutral people who are qualified, capable, and forthcoming to serve the interim government as advisers. But where will you find apolitical people in Bangladesh - one in which we start participating in street protests, political movements, and become opinionated well before graduating from high school. We may, therefore, have to look up to the President for a salvation from the increasingly impassable present CTG design. The President after taking the oath of office is considered to be a neutral and non-partisan head of the state. But can he really play a non-partisan role in selecting the advisers given that he spent his entire adult life as being a politician of a certain ideological indoctrination? The country still remembers how President Iajuddin Ahmed was marginalised by BNP contentiously and contemptuously while pushing the country to the brink of a murderous political bedlam and anarchy. May be those humiliating and dreadful experiences that led to the emergence of the 2007 military-backed CTG, have had some lessons for the ruling and the opposition parties -allowing the President to play the role of the country's president instead of the incumbent party's president. Assuming that the President is solemnly committed to be non-partisan and acceptable to all parties as the Chief Adviser (in fact, no Chief Adviser is needed except to meet the constitutional provision), the next step is selecting the 10 advisers to run the interim administration. Assuming that the two main political alliances (AL-led 14 party grand alliances and BNP-led 4 party alliances) remain in effect until the 2013 election, each alliance will send 10 nominations to the President with detail qualifications, experiences and backgrounds of each nominee. After scrupulous reviews, the president will choose five advisers from each group and two additional ones to remain as standby. The CTG is thus formed without any chaos and contentions. In this formula, there is no room to accommodate the idea of selecting CTG advisers based on a party's representation (seats won) in the parliament or per cent of popular votes won in the last election. The AL-led alliance must not propose or pass any bills to reform the CTG provisions which they will not approve if they are in the opposition bench. There is no reason why would this formula not be acceptable to the parties concerned. The process is simple, least time consuming, least complicated, and little or nothing to be contentious about -- and most of all- - as evenhanded as one can conceive of. It is important that the total elimination of the CTG system - - allowing the ruling party to conduct the general election must proceed gradually after enough confidence and trust is built in the EC and President's handling of the state affairs as interim government. This formula or any other modus operandi to be used in forming the CTG would not work if the AL alliance rehearses the same play and ploy for winning the national election at all costs reminiscent of the BNP-alliance's 2007 connivance to politicise the entire election machineries, the CTG and the President. The AL-led parliament can pass any number of bills to outlaw the emergence of military usurpers and martial law. But history tells us that there may be situations in the future which would invoke the military interference in civil administration for the country's greater cause. As we have seen in 2007 that the BNP-led alliance created such a situation -- a military-backed CTG was formed much to the appeal of the then opposition AL-led alliance, which was also welcomed by the people at large. But can the country really withstand that to repeat? The democratic process and the country will fall back in every election cycle if the ruling party pursues the mockery of winning elections at all costs. The AL-led alliance has the opportunity now to set an example of preventing the disparaging history from repeating. (This article was written before the Supreme Court verdict on the Caretaker Government issue delivered on May 10 last) The writer, formerly a Physicist and Nuclear Engineer, is a Professor of Economics at Eastern Michigan University. He can be reached at E-mail: adewan@emich.edu