The consequences of politics of retaliation

Over time, a democratic regime can turn into an autocratic one. The change of the democratic regime into the autocratic regime depends on several factors. Among them, the foremost is the political game of retaliation - a characteristic feature of politics in our country. The major political parties in our country have been into the game for some time and they play it in an unbridled manner. The ruling party retaliates on the opposition; and the opposition, when the cycle shifts in its favour, retaliates on the former ruling party. This cat and mouse game continues and will continue unless we became aware of the consequence of the game.
The game of retaliation is used as one effective instrument to change the political plot in favour of one party. This game can also explain quite why one party cannot rule for two consecutive terms in our country. We have been observing one very apparent and predictable outcome: the leading role alternates between two major parties in our country. If a fair and smooth election takes place, no party - whether Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) or Bangladesh Awami League (AL) - will be able to win election for two consecutive terms. Why is this outcome inevitable?
To get the answer, we have to resort to the analysis of the political game of retaliation. First of all, we have to derive the answer for the question: Why can't any party win election for two consecutive terms in our country? To find the answer to this question, we have to seek the answer for this question: why do political parties play the game of retaliation? The political game of retaliation can easily answer the questions raised above. But we are not concerned about why political parties play the game of retaliation, but about the consequence of such game, if played by the political parties. The consequential analysis will help us get answers why we are trapped in the present political deadlock and what kind of instruments we need to overcome the deadlock. For this reason, let us first delve into the political game of retaliation.
Let's assume that there are two parties called A and B who play the game of retaliation. They play the game in this way. When A takes over, A retaliates on B, the opposition, when B takes over, B retaliates on A, the opposition. We also assume when A is in the opposition and B in power, both simultaneously play the game of retaliation though the ruling party dominates. So is true when B is in power and A is in the opposition. We further assume that ruling and opposition roles alternate between A and B; if A leads at time t then B will lead at time t+1 where the duration of time is 5 years. With such preliminaries, we can set out the following analysis for the game of retaliation that A and B play (Graph-1 & Figure-1).
In Figure-I, retaliation level of A on B (RA) is measured on the horizontal axis and retaliation of B on A (RB) is measured on the vertical axis. The graph shows that as the level of retaliation A at time t-1 time increases, retaliation level of B at time t increases. When the level of retaliation of A is RA, the level of retaliation of B is RB. Since B will retaliate on A at time t observing A's retaliation on B at time t-1 when B was the opposition and A was the ruling party, so will do A at time t+1 when A will be the ruling party as power alternates between them. Therefore, at time t+1, A will retaliate on B up to RA1. Observing A's retaliation RA1 at time t+1, B will retaliate up to RB1 at time t+2. This will continue until both reach a maximum boundary for retaliation beyond which they can't play the mutual game of retaliation. In the graph, the maximum level of retaliation that A can impose on B is RA*, and the maximum level of retaliation that B can impose on A is RB*. What would happen if A retaliates on B more than RA*? A will retaliate on B more than if A acts or behaves like an autocrat. That means retaliation above the maximum level RA* indicates the presence of autocracy in democracy. When autocracy comes into play, the retaliation of A moves horizontally increasing from RA* to RA4 which indicates that A retaliates on B in an autocratic manner. So is true for B. If B retaliates on A more than RB*, B will act like an autocrat. Then retaliation of B on A will move only vertically increasing from RB* to RB3, and such vertical shift confirms the autocratic behaviour of B.  The presence of autocratic regime is more clearly shown in  Figure-II and Figure-III.
In Figures-II and III, we see when B behaves like an autocrat, the level of retaliation of B on A increases vertically while the level of retaliation of A remains fixed at RA* since A is the opposition. Similarly, when A acts like an autocrat, retaliation of A moves horizontally while retaliation of  B remains fixed at RB* since B is the opposition. The question arises why do both parties act like autocrats when they cross the maximum level of retaliation (RA*, RB*)? The reason is when A retaliates on B up to RA*, it will rationally think that if B takes over next time, B will retaliate on A more than RB*. In A's assessment, if B retaliates on A more than RB*, the political existence of A will be threatened. Out of this fear and threat, A starts acting like an autocrat to protect its political existence. A acts like an autocrat to keep its in power so that B can't take over and retaliate on B. This is so far a rational strategy by A as A is shielding its political existence acting like an autocrat. In the same manner, if B retaliates on A up to RB*, B will start behaving like an autocrat to protect its political existence since A may retaliate on B to such degree that B's political existence may be exterminated. This type of autocracy in democracy is quite puzzling. The reason is that we can't say autocratic behaviour of both is unjustified since they are just protecting themselves against potential onslaught. On the other hand, we can't support this autocratic behaviour even if they are defending themselves against potential hazard. We can't support their autocratic behaviour from another perspective; both have become autocrats due to playing the game of retaliation which is quite undesirable. So, the solution is stopping the game of retaliation.
DOES CURRENT POLITICAL DEADLOCK SIGNIFIY AUTOCRACY? Yes, the current political deadlock has brewed out of the autocratic behaviour. But such autocracy, as we have said, is neither unjustified nor justified. The incumbent government's behaviour can be interpreted as autocratic behaviour following the game of retaliation. But for the autocratic behaviour of the incumbent government, we can't blame solely the present government. The reason is -- what it is doing can be interpreted as the self-defending mechanism. If somebody says that AL is acting like an autocrat at the present time, his or her assertion can't be said to be misleading since the game of retaliation confirms the presence of such behaviour. Now who is to blame for the present deadlock? In fact, we can neither blame BNP nor AL solely. Rather both are equally blameworthy since they are the principal players in the game. If they don't stop playing the game, political situation will move towards more unstable direction. At the same time, instead of concentrating solely on the fresh polls BNP should take it into consideration that the game of retaliation will not bring any better result for it.
The government must stop the game of retaliation by reducing the degree of autocratic retaliation on the opposition. If they think that they can do better by playing the game of retaliation, then such thinking would end up in nothing but chaos. The leading opposition BNP should assure the government that it will not start playing the game of retaliation if it takes over. Such assurance will create some confidence in the incumbent party and will induce them to go for fresh polls without the fear of political revenge. The ruling party will not agree for fresh polls until they are assured that the future ruling party will not be a significant threat for it. In fact, the threat of political revenge is one of the principal reasons why the government is very much adamant in sticking to power given the fact that no fair election was held in 2014. If the leading opposition continues to give the signal of future revenge by their political behaviour, the ruling party will not concede to the demand of fresh polls and it is quite a natural outcome because it will try to defend its political existence from dangers of all sorts. Therefore, it seems that the only feasible way-out of the current political deadlock is to stop playing the game of retaliation. Otherwise, neither of the parties will concede to each other's demand, and the autocratic behaviour will persist.

The writer is faculty member, School of Business, North South University, Dhaka.
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