To whom did Musharraf surrender?
M Abdul Kabir | Tuesday, 26 August 2008
Pervez Musharraf may be gone, and it is tempting to conclude that his downfall will now help Pakistan galvanize democracy. But a certain degree of misgivings still exists among political thinkers who say Musharraf's departure will not solve Pakistan's problems. Neither can it guarantee a course of unbroken functioning democracy for the country. Indeed, the direction Pakistan takes is determined hardly by the Pakistanis and civil politicians. It was since 1958, and has once again been, the top man in khaki who decides the path.
Musharraf's exit might have been the people's choice because, according to a recent poll by the International Republican Institute, eighty-three per cent of Pakistanis wanted him gone.
It was perhaps ultimately a decision of neither the Pakistanis nor the Yousuf Raza Gilani's coalition in power today.
The ousted Pervez Musharraf was the representative of a military institution which had governed Pakistan for much of its history.
It was as head of that institution that Musharraf ruled. It was only when the military leadership, taken up now by the new army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani opted to retreat from backing him, that he was forced to resign.
That means Pervez Musharraf did not surrender to the will of the Pakistanis rather than the dictate of his own institution--the military.
How did Mr. Musharraf come to a differing term with that institution that helped him rise to power? Regrettably for him, he made the army unpopular for fighting what most Pakistanis view as "America's war on terror."
It is probably this damaged image of the army that has prompted Gen. Ashfaq Kayani not to support his former boss. Unwilling to make the situation worse by trying to keep an unpopular president in office, Kayani took the opportunity of overwhelming public opposition to Musharraf and showed him the back door.
Meanwhile, the military may have already signaled the limits on acceptable civilian authority.
This time Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency serves a good example.
Without being under civilian control, ISI was controversial. Much more so when three weeks ago the U.S. government presented the Pakistani government evidence that members of the ISI were involved in the Taliban bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul on July 7 that killed about 60 people.
President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan has long accused the ISI of supporting Taliban operations in his country.
Under pressure from the United States, Pakistan's government planned to put the controversial Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) organization under direct civilian oversight via the Interior Ministry.
Prior to Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani's July visit to Washington, his coalition announced that the ISI would "henceforward report to the home ministry rather than to the army or the president".
Their decision stood for less than a day when Yousuf Raza Gilani was forced to hastily scrap the plan.
If his coalition really enjoys an absolute public mandate, without being dictated from within or without, why did he fear to execute the decision of bringing the ISI under civilian control?
The symptom is still there-the symptom of Pakistan's malaise. Indeed, General Pervez Musharraf's journey from military command to the presidency was one such symptom.
He may depart from the scene, but the conflicts and contradictions that elevated him and then caused his demise remain far from resolved.
The writer is with the Department of CSE, North South University. He may be reached at e-mail:
[email protected]
Musharraf's exit might have been the people's choice because, according to a recent poll by the International Republican Institute, eighty-three per cent of Pakistanis wanted him gone.
It was perhaps ultimately a decision of neither the Pakistanis nor the Yousuf Raza Gilani's coalition in power today.
The ousted Pervez Musharraf was the representative of a military institution which had governed Pakistan for much of its history.
It was as head of that institution that Musharraf ruled. It was only when the military leadership, taken up now by the new army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani opted to retreat from backing him, that he was forced to resign.
That means Pervez Musharraf did not surrender to the will of the Pakistanis rather than the dictate of his own institution--the military.
How did Mr. Musharraf come to a differing term with that institution that helped him rise to power? Regrettably for him, he made the army unpopular for fighting what most Pakistanis view as "America's war on terror."
It is probably this damaged image of the army that has prompted Gen. Ashfaq Kayani not to support his former boss. Unwilling to make the situation worse by trying to keep an unpopular president in office, Kayani took the opportunity of overwhelming public opposition to Musharraf and showed him the back door.
Meanwhile, the military may have already signaled the limits on acceptable civilian authority.
This time Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency serves a good example.
Without being under civilian control, ISI was controversial. Much more so when three weeks ago the U.S. government presented the Pakistani government evidence that members of the ISI were involved in the Taliban bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul on July 7 that killed about 60 people.
President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan has long accused the ISI of supporting Taliban operations in his country.
Under pressure from the United States, Pakistan's government planned to put the controversial Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) organization under direct civilian oversight via the Interior Ministry.
Prior to Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani's July visit to Washington, his coalition announced that the ISI would "henceforward report to the home ministry rather than to the army or the president".
Their decision stood for less than a day when Yousuf Raza Gilani was forced to hastily scrap the plan.
If his coalition really enjoys an absolute public mandate, without being dictated from within or without, why did he fear to execute the decision of bringing the ISI under civilian control?
The symptom is still there-the symptom of Pakistan's malaise. Indeed, General Pervez Musharraf's journey from military command to the presidency was one such symptom.
He may depart from the scene, but the conflicts and contradictions that elevated him and then caused his demise remain far from resolved.
The writer is with the Department of CSE, North South University. He may be reached at e-mail:
[email protected]