Why Somalis have taken to piracy in the high seas
Sunday, 26 April 2009
Billy I Ahmed
With the explosion of Somali piracy, America is reaping what it has sown. In many ways, there is nobody to blame but Somalis' for the emergence of high seas crime threatening to disrupt important lanes of trade.
America's supports for a violent tyrant during Somalia's formative post-colonial years obstruct developing stable political institutions and oppressively messed its capacity for effective self-rule and sustainable growth.
The country's markets are also victims of foreign meddling, deaths of the backhanded 'charity' which has made Western actors-and especially the U.S.-distrusted throughout the Third World.
Made economically incapable through the abuse of aid and support by the U.S. government and various non-government organisations (NGOs), it is no surprise that Somalis have turned to desperado for sustenance.
These actions we are now witnessing are not crimes of maliciousness or greed, but of desperation. They are sins of last resort.
Modern Somalia was formed from the 1960 union of two European colonies, one British, the other Italian. What began as an exercise in constitutional democracy rapidly devolved into a dictatorship under the command of Maxamed Siyaad Barre.
Although Barre originally strengthened his nation with the then USSR, the relationship became pungent in 1977-79. Moscow eventually abandoned Somalia altogether, throwing its weight behind neighbouring Ethiopia in a conflict over the disputed Ogaden region.
Tottering from the Soviet betrayal, Barre appealed to America for military support to fight foreign invasion and suppressing internal resistance.
However, under the consummate Cold Warrior Ronald Reagan, America suddenly renewed its interest in the Horn of Africa. Henry Kissinger met personally with Barre, and in 1981, the U.S. began supplying the dictator with arms and some $100 million per year.
In exchange, America was granted control of the deep-sea port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden. Berbera was deemed of notable strategic significance in countering Soviet designs in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. It had the added advantage of overlooking a key oil route.
Armed with American weapons and treasure, Barre managed to survive the Cold War. His nation was not so lucky.
Like most Third World pawns, Barre's regime was insecure, calling for ever greater levels of financial aid. At ending the Cold War, American politicians downgraded Somalia's importance, believing it an unnecessary spending.
As American patronage waned, unrest turned to full-fledged civil war. Barre was ousted in 1991 and died of heart attack in 1995. In the intervening years, America tried a 'humanitarian invasion' of Somalia.
It ended in humiliating the 'Black Hawk Down' fiasco. By then, Somalia was prostrated by the anarchy with which its name is now synonymous.
Despite America's loud talk of championing democracy and human rights abroad, none lifted a finger during Somalia's crucial post-colonial years. Although the sponsorship of Barre offered opportunities aplenty for promoting responsible governance, it instead enabled a tradition of illiberal rule-by-force.
Somalia entered the 1990s with an economy as nonexistent as its political institutions. This too was the fault of American and Western planners.
Over the years, its markets gradually degenerated as its people grew familiar to the foreign dole. Somalia's agricultural industry was undermined by shipment after shipment of crops, which were sold at lampooned low prices to the detriment of local farmers, who simply could not compete.
Without an organic market of indigenous producers, Somalis were forced into a cycle of dependency. In the hopes of cutting out starvation in Somalia, it in fact erased the country's ability to feed, making starvation all but fated.
The situation was worsened by a legacy of man-made famines and refugee crises. These humanitarian emergencies were engineered by Barre with the tacit approval of the United States, which steadily stoked a regime driving its country into the ground.
Barre was notorious for hording food aid, lavishing it on an ever-tightening circle of ethnic supporters and veiling it from the nation's other clans, which were increasingly at odds with his regime.
Ending of large-scale food aid from the U.S., Barre was robbed of a major power-preserving tool. With next to no support among the populace, he was forced from office.
However, Somali clans continue to extract significant food aid from foreign agents, especially NGOs like Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere and Save the Children.
Food in Somalia is point-blank political, used to reward allegiance and punish resistance. In this way, Westerners are fuelling a conflict that might already have run its course without outside interference.
As mentioned that America is reaping what it has sown. That statement stands, as piracy is a symptom of a land made lawless by the lasting damage of cruel, the U.S. supported regime that seeded dysfunction and violence.
However, seen in another light, America is reaping what it did not sow. For more than a decade, Barre existed at the mercy of the U.S. funding. He depended on our calculated 'kindness' in every way.
One could have used such total reliance to seed democracy; to make easy to develop sustainable economic structures and stable political institutions; to nourish Somali agriculture, build its industrial capacity, and protect its waters from the overpowering foreign fishing operations which have led many seagoing Somalis to piracy.
Instead, it allowed Barre to brutalize his people, never exerting the slightest pressure for reform.
Americans are in frenzy over the advance of Somali thugs on American merchants. What they do not understand is the country's role in undoing the fabric of Somali society- to create a power vacuum that allows criminals free rein-over the past twenty-five years.
The US must recognise that short-term Machiavellian tactics are no substitute for long-term developmental strategies. The latter will help produce a more just and equitable world; the former will surely come back to haunt.
Somalia is a case study in unintended outcomes, in good intents gone awry, in the bad 'karma' of realpolitik.
The writer is columnist and researcher
With the explosion of Somali piracy, America is reaping what it has sown. In many ways, there is nobody to blame but Somalis' for the emergence of high seas crime threatening to disrupt important lanes of trade.
America's supports for a violent tyrant during Somalia's formative post-colonial years obstruct developing stable political institutions and oppressively messed its capacity for effective self-rule and sustainable growth.
The country's markets are also victims of foreign meddling, deaths of the backhanded 'charity' which has made Western actors-and especially the U.S.-distrusted throughout the Third World.
Made economically incapable through the abuse of aid and support by the U.S. government and various non-government organisations (NGOs), it is no surprise that Somalis have turned to desperado for sustenance.
These actions we are now witnessing are not crimes of maliciousness or greed, but of desperation. They are sins of last resort.
Modern Somalia was formed from the 1960 union of two European colonies, one British, the other Italian. What began as an exercise in constitutional democracy rapidly devolved into a dictatorship under the command of Maxamed Siyaad Barre.
Although Barre originally strengthened his nation with the then USSR, the relationship became pungent in 1977-79. Moscow eventually abandoned Somalia altogether, throwing its weight behind neighbouring Ethiopia in a conflict over the disputed Ogaden region.
Tottering from the Soviet betrayal, Barre appealed to America for military support to fight foreign invasion and suppressing internal resistance.
However, under the consummate Cold Warrior Ronald Reagan, America suddenly renewed its interest in the Horn of Africa. Henry Kissinger met personally with Barre, and in 1981, the U.S. began supplying the dictator with arms and some $100 million per year.
In exchange, America was granted control of the deep-sea port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden. Berbera was deemed of notable strategic significance in countering Soviet designs in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. It had the added advantage of overlooking a key oil route.
Armed with American weapons and treasure, Barre managed to survive the Cold War. His nation was not so lucky.
Like most Third World pawns, Barre's regime was insecure, calling for ever greater levels of financial aid. At ending the Cold War, American politicians downgraded Somalia's importance, believing it an unnecessary spending.
As American patronage waned, unrest turned to full-fledged civil war. Barre was ousted in 1991 and died of heart attack in 1995. In the intervening years, America tried a 'humanitarian invasion' of Somalia.
It ended in humiliating the 'Black Hawk Down' fiasco. By then, Somalia was prostrated by the anarchy with which its name is now synonymous.
Despite America's loud talk of championing democracy and human rights abroad, none lifted a finger during Somalia's crucial post-colonial years. Although the sponsorship of Barre offered opportunities aplenty for promoting responsible governance, it instead enabled a tradition of illiberal rule-by-force.
Somalia entered the 1990s with an economy as nonexistent as its political institutions. This too was the fault of American and Western planners.
Over the years, its markets gradually degenerated as its people grew familiar to the foreign dole. Somalia's agricultural industry was undermined by shipment after shipment of crops, which were sold at lampooned low prices to the detriment of local farmers, who simply could not compete.
Without an organic market of indigenous producers, Somalis were forced into a cycle of dependency. In the hopes of cutting out starvation in Somalia, it in fact erased the country's ability to feed, making starvation all but fated.
The situation was worsened by a legacy of man-made famines and refugee crises. These humanitarian emergencies were engineered by Barre with the tacit approval of the United States, which steadily stoked a regime driving its country into the ground.
Barre was notorious for hording food aid, lavishing it on an ever-tightening circle of ethnic supporters and veiling it from the nation's other clans, which were increasingly at odds with his regime.
Ending of large-scale food aid from the U.S., Barre was robbed of a major power-preserving tool. With next to no support among the populace, he was forced from office.
However, Somali clans continue to extract significant food aid from foreign agents, especially NGOs like Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere and Save the Children.
Food in Somalia is point-blank political, used to reward allegiance and punish resistance. In this way, Westerners are fuelling a conflict that might already have run its course without outside interference.
As mentioned that America is reaping what it has sown. That statement stands, as piracy is a symptom of a land made lawless by the lasting damage of cruel, the U.S. supported regime that seeded dysfunction and violence.
However, seen in another light, America is reaping what it did not sow. For more than a decade, Barre existed at the mercy of the U.S. funding. He depended on our calculated 'kindness' in every way.
One could have used such total reliance to seed democracy; to make easy to develop sustainable economic structures and stable political institutions; to nourish Somali agriculture, build its industrial capacity, and protect its waters from the overpowering foreign fishing operations which have led many seagoing Somalis to piracy.
Instead, it allowed Barre to brutalize his people, never exerting the slightest pressure for reform.
Americans are in frenzy over the advance of Somali thugs on American merchants. What they do not understand is the country's role in undoing the fabric of Somali society- to create a power vacuum that allows criminals free rein-over the past twenty-five years.
The US must recognise that short-term Machiavellian tactics are no substitute for long-term developmental strategies. The latter will help produce a more just and equitable world; the former will surely come back to haunt.
Somalia is a case study in unintended outcomes, in good intents gone awry, in the bad 'karma' of realpolitik.
The writer is columnist and researcher