writes Jamaluddin Ahmed in the concluding instalment of the three-part series

The fifth version of the bureaucrat vs. bureaucrat type of politics is when reform disrupts the balance of power within the organisation or within the sphere of power in policy-making. This could be the competition between old bureaucrats and new bureaucrats, who are usually politically appointed. It could also be competition when the power of insiders to select their agency head may be taken away by outsiders under the new rules of public management reform through business ideas such as the CEO model. Such as in the case of Australia after 1972, the reformists decided to add different groups to give policy advice, in order to open up ideas from outside the civil service, including: task forces and committees of enquiries using external experts, commissions, a priorities review staff, think tanks for long-term advice, and ministerial advisers. This removed the important role of old bureaucrats to be in the hands of new bureaucrats, thus causing contestation between the groups.
In the case of Thailand, until OPDC was established in 2003, the OCSC was taking the lead in formulating and advocating public sector reform policies. When the OPDC was set up, it used a part of OCSC's building complex as its office and all of its officials were made up of former OCSC officials, except for the top positions. Interestingly, because the top positions were political appointees from outside of OCSC, it had upset some senior level officials in OCSC that were hoping for the positions. Thus it became the case of old-timers against newly appointed heads of central agencies.
The third type of power relations that is affected by the bureaucratic politics of administrative reform is the power balance among politicians, mainly the Prime Minister and cabinet ministers. Chosen administrative reform measures can change the relative power of the Prime Minister vis-à-vis cabinet ministers. For example, in Thailand, Thaksin's administrative reform policies had strengthened the Prime Minister's power position over the rest. In Italy, former PM Silvio Berlusconni had tried to introduce constitutional reform measures that would increase his power (Bowornwathana, 2005).
There are other forms of power relationships among politicians such as the relationships between the political executive and members of parliament that can be altered through the introduction of administrative reform measures. For example, the proliferation of executive agencies in the U.K. has put into doubt the question whether a minister should be responsible for the wrongdoings of executive agency CEOs. The Thai case is used to illustrate how power relationships among politicians can change as a result of administrative reform. Traditionally, governments in Thailand have been characterised by coalitions of several political parties and cliques that weakened the Prime Minister's power (Bowornwathana, 2001). The longer a coalition government lasts, the more the power of the ministers. However, reforms introduced by Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra made him a stronger premier and ministers weaker.
BANGLADESH SCENARIO: The Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) can be divided into four categories: first, those who participated in the War of Liberation and the second, those who did not participate in the War of Liberation and had worked for the wartime Pakistan government; the third group comprises the Bengali officers who were stranded in the then West Pakistan, some of whom fled during the war and joined it; and the others who later opted for Bangladesh and returned to the country after its independence. The new government of Bangladesh tried to induct all the heterogeneous groups into the fold of one umbrella even knowing their difference of opinions and grievances among them. There was a dire need for putting a new government into place and proving the ability of the government, obviously, for getting international recognition of the new-born country.
Within the three years of independence, the 'Pakistani' group consolidated its position and organised civil and military officers to orchestrate the brutal killing of the Father of the Nation and his family members. The 'Pakistani-minded' civil and military bureaucrats took over the prime positions which had continued up to 1981 under President Ziaur Rahman as military dictator, and he created another group of bureaucrats during his rule.
General H.M. Ershad from 1982 to 1990 ruled the country and created another group of civil and military bureaucrats through short interviews and then the regular process. Twenty-one years after the killing of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, in 1996 his daughter Sheikh Hasina came to power and the balancing between pro- and anti-liberation bureaucrats had started reducing. Experiences indicate that whenever any new government takes over, the bureaucrats compete with each other to be closer to power politicians citing different references (political and personal relations and locality-based ones etc) to please them and get lucrative positing in government suppressing their competent colleagues. At the middle stage of the government's tenure, some of them climb to the centre-point of power.
In the last leg of a government, the bureaucrats change their position depending on the possibility of re-election of the ruling party. History provides evidence that whenever bureaucracy becomes more powerful than the politicians in administrative policy decisions, it ultimately shows the symptoms of weak political institutions; and a wider distance is created between the voters and the politicians. This situation is mostly very risky for the political institutions and the ruling governments. Many argue this becomes one of the powerful adverse factors causing hindrance to the spreading and institutionalisation of democratic system in Bangladesh.
In the recently announced government pay scale, the Finance Minister and the retired bureaucrat as advisers to the Prime Minister seem to have degraded the teaching professionals to a status below their former students --- who had later turned into bureaucratic decision makers. This resulted in an increased dissatisfaction among the teaching community. As many have observed, this bureaucracy-based politics would result in taking the ruling government and the party in power to a confrontational position with the teaching community. This will leave an adverse effect on the ongoing bureaucratic reform in Bangladesh. Bureaucrats, enjoying an upper hand over the politicians in the last 45 years of independence, have kept increasing.
The government officials and employees have leapt from the size of approximately 475,000 to a 2.2 million workforce in 2015, with a sharp increase in the number of ministries. Political economists consider that a five-time increase in the size of the government from that during 1973 is the root-cause, which has led to the country's GDP growth being stuck at 6 per cent plus during the last 20 years.
The political leadership has pledged to make Bangladesh a middle income country (MIC). They should consider the ground reality regarding the negative impact on growth by increasing the size of the government. The government may form a task force to discuss the issue with multi-disciplinary professionals.
Many political economists feel that the roots of the current pay scale-related problems have stemmed from the small nucleus of the admin-cadre bureaucrats. The government of Bangladesh, under the new pay scale, has doubled its employees' financial packages. However, it has failed to satisfy the beneficiaries as they feel their status has been degraded, and also for some other reasons. Protests have been voiced by different cadres. Usually, these grievances should be tackled constructively by a political government. Instead, those have been met with abusive responses from politician-ministers at the centre of the government. Naturally, the protests kept being fuelled on psychological grounds also. Moreover, the number of the admin-cadre employees is very small compared to all other professional cadres. It has been learned that the other professional cadres believe that the admin-cadre people have got the maximum positional and financial benefits.
The Prime Minister, from the top political level, has ordered identifying the issues and resolving them. A committee of government secretaries has been formed to address the problem. Newspaper reports say that the committee has not followed the law ministry's vetting and proposed a decision that has fuelled dissatisfaction further. Both the Bangladesh Bank (BB) and the state owned bank (SoB) employees, and the professional cadre service personnel consider the new pay scale as something formulated for the admin-cadre officials and by the admin-cadre officials.  This can be solved by constituting an independent cross-professionals committee which would be responsible for working out a pragmatic solution to the grievances.
History provides evidence of questionable roles played by a section of the bureaucracy in Bangladesh politics. The political government should take care of all variables to address the problems keeping in view the spirit of the Bangladesh Liberation War and democratic values.  We must remember that at the end of the day it is the politicians who face the people, not the bureaucrats. So a political government must listen to the voters. Bureaucrats do not seek votes. They are employed to serve the political government in its implementation of various development programmes.          
(Concluded)
The writer is General Secretary, Bangladesh Economic Association, and Chairman, Emerging Credit Rating Limited.
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