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WTO FIP re-emerges in Nairobi

Asjadul Kibria | Sunday, 27 December 2015


So, it is the Five Interested Parties (FIP) that have re-emerged in Nairobi, though not comprising the same five parties as was the case earlier. The United States, European Union, China, India and Brazil are the FIP this time. One can remember that it was 11 years ago, when FIPs were 'chosen' to overcome initial deadlocks in negotiation after the Cancun Ministerial Conference took place in 2003. In the run-up to the Hong Kong Ministerial in 2005, FIP came with a package in the month of July, 2004. The package was known as 'July Package' or 'July Framework' negotiated by the United States, European Union, Australia, Brazil and India.
Eleven years on, the members of the multilateral trade body observed the repetition of a history - this time in a wider extend.  The July Package was not a ministerial decision while the Nairobi package is.  July package worked as a platform to reach a deal at the Hong Kong Ministerial where the domination of the FIP was overwhelming.  Nevertheless, in the greenroom, closed door negotiation by selected members, representatives of the poor countries were allowed. Unfortunately in Nairobi, they were excluded, as though, in a calculated manner. There was no representation from either the group of African countries, or the group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the greenroom negotiations. Kenya, though the host country, didn't get access. Bangladesh, despite being the LDC coordinator, was not included.  Thus the greenroom negotiation turned into a complete 'non-inclusive' talk.
CALCULATED GAME: The ministerial conference started on December 15 in the Kenyan capital Nairobi with a lot of differences among the developed and developing countries members. There were two major areas of divergences. First, whether to continue the Doha round negotiation, initiated in 2001 or not; and second, whether to reach a deal on drastic reduction in agriculture subsidies by the developed countries.
Developed nations, led by the United States (US) and European Union (EU), took a firm stand on discontinuing the 14-year-long prolonged Doha Round which is yet to yield the desired outcome. On the other hand, developing countries, mostly led by India, pressed for permanent solution on public stockholding of food grains along with reduction of export subsidises on agriculture by the developed nations and ensure special safeguard mechanism (SSM) for the developing countries. Both the group of countries, however, were in consensus to consider the issues of the LDCs but not without linking with the settlement of the broader issues.
The US and EU came in Nairobi very well prepared to fight for discontinuing the Doha Round. They successfully mounted pressure on both the developing and least developed countries and it was impossible for most of the countries to go beyond the desire of US or EU. The process started few months before the ministerial conference and it only consolidated in Nairobi.
One month before the MC10, the EU supported a joint proposal, forwarded by Brazil, Argentina, New Zealand, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay, to eliminate export subsidies of developed countries by 2018 and developing countries by 2021. It, however, asked to allow developing countries to provide export subsidies covering transport and marketing costs until 2026. Extension of EU support to these agriculture exporting countries clearly indicated that a major force of the developing country group, Brazil, was aligned with the developed nations.
In the LDC group, Lesotho and Haiti continued to oppose the demand for 100 per cent duty-free, quota-free (DFQF) market access to all the LDCs. These countries actually put their reservation against Bangladesh and Cambodia as these two countries are leading exporters of clothing in the US market.  In June this year, the US government renewed the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Haiti HELP/HOPE programme for 10 years up to 2025. Under these schemes, AGOA countries and Haiti will continue to enjoy duty-free market access to the US for apparel products. But their combined export of apparel is below 2.0 per cent of the US's total import of apparel. Nevertheless, strong reservation of these countries ultimately led the LDC group, to be precise Bangladesh, to drop the effort of including DFQF issue in the Nairobi ministerial declaration. Bangladesh tried hard to include DFQF in the declaration but didn't get required support from both the Asian and African LDCs as many of them were under 'indirect pressure' from the US.   
At the closing day of the conference, scheduled on December 18, there was a clear indication that members failed to bridge the gaps on contentious issues. But, both the conference chairperson Amina Mohamed, also the Kenyan cabinet secretary of trade and foreign affairs, and director general of the WTO Roberto Azevedo, expressed their determination for reaching the 'Nairobi declaration without extending the conference'. To bring a declaration, they requested the FIP to sit together and the conference was extended for one more day
In the game, the US and the EU ultimately called the shot. They had Brazil already on their side. Thus, only China and India were needed to be subdued. India took up the challenge and it seemed that it was 'over-confident' having China with it. But due to the exclusion of other active developing countries, prominent African ones and leading LDCs in the greenroom process, India and China ultimately gave wider space to the US and EU while Brazil remained silent.
India's shaky position was reflected in several ways at the Kenyatta International Convention Centre (KICC), the venue of the conference.  On Friday afternoon, a press briefing of Indian trade minister Nirmala Sitharaman was hurriedly organised. But as the journalists waited to attend the press briefing, Indian officials informed them about the postponement of the briefing which didn't took place later.   
Before moving to the greenroom, India also failed to gather required support for its much dubbed 'permanent solution' of public stockholding of food grains. Pakistan, supported by Paraguay, Uruguay, Thailand and Malaysia, lobbied against such move claiming that India didn't share the data on use of interim solution with WTO members in its Committee on Agriculture. Moreover, the Indian subsidies had an implicit impact on export of poor developing countries. Canada and the EU backed the move.  
COMPROMISED OUTOCOME: When the FIP completed their negotiation, they came out with a 'compromised' deal where most of the issues of the developing countries were either ignored or marginalised. The declaration contained no precise provision for permanent solution on the public stockholding issue and only promised to negotiate an unspecified safeguard mechanism for developing countries.
The Nairobi declaration, however, asked to eliminate export subsidies and limit other forms of export promotion by rich countries (food aid and subsidised export financing, extensively practised by the US) immediately. Developing countries were also asked to eliminate their export subsidies by the end of 2018 but with an exception until 2022 for some countries which have notified to the WTO. An extended 2023 deadline has also been provided for developing countries to use export subsidies for transport and marketing.
Cotton-growing LDCs (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali or C-4) will get DFQF for cotton exports to the developed countries market. But, there is no mention on commercially meaningful DFQF market access for all the products of the LDCs in the declaration. A relaxed rule of origin is the best part of the deal for LDCs which is a binding commitment.  Extension of waiver in services trade for 2030 is also commendable.
Finally, it is the fate of the Doha Round that will be on test in the days ahead-to say the least.  
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