Serajul I Bhuiyan in the second of his two-part article | January 13, 2025 00:00:00
In the previous article (Part I), we have discussed how Bangladesh’s emerging economic relationship with China can lead to new developments in its bilateral negotiations with India, which are required for resolving some of the crucial issues like Ganges and Teesta water-sharing disputes, trade imbalances, and economic dependency. We emphasized how China’s expanding influence in South Asia, particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), presents Bangladesh with unique opportunities to strengthen its bargaining power with India. By diversifying its economic ties, attracting Chinese investments, and enhancing water resource management through Chinese-backed infrastructure projects, Bangladesh can push India toward more cooperative and equitable agreements.
Building on these strategic insights, Part II explores in greater detail how Bangladesh’s defense, security, infrastructure, and diplomatic partnerships with China might continue to reshape India’s engagement of the region. We discuss how security cooperation with China might encourage India to upgrade its military relations with Bangladesh toward more regional stability and robust bilateral dialogues. We also examine how Bangladesh’s increasing infrastructure development under China’s BRI might force India to accelerate its cross-border connectivity projects in order to maintain regional competitiveness.
Finally, we discuss how Bangladesh’s improved diplomatic standing in key regional organizations such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor can strengthen its influence on India regarding unresolved issues like trade agreements, transit arrangements, and water-sharing negotiations. As former U.S. As the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wisely said, “In crises, the most daring decision is often the safest.” By using its strategic relationship with China, Bangladesh can turn the tables and change its regional position so that India will have to approach bilateral negotiations with greater urgency, flexibility, and mutual respect.
This second part comprehensively analyzes how Bangladesh can convert its geo-economic vulnerabilities into strategic assets by balancing its relations with both regional giants. A well-calibrated foreign policy driven by national interest may transform Bangladesh from a passive regional player to an assertive diplomatic force capable of shaping the geopolitical landscape of South Asia.
Security and Defense Balance: China’s expanding role as a defense supplier to Bangladesh has fundamentally altered the regional security dynamics of South Asia. By supplying submarines, naval vessels, missile systems, and advanced military technologies, China has positioned itself as a critical defense partner for Bangladesh. India views this growing military cooperation with unease, realizing that its traditional strategic dominance in the region is under threat.
Security Dialogues and Cooperation. Bangladesh’s growing defense relationship with China may influence India to seek deeper security arrangements with Dhaka. India may further strengthen maritime security cooperation, counterterrorism operations, and intelligence-sharing mechanisms to retain its leverage in Bangladesh’s security calculus.
This may be done by expanding the scope of bilateral security dialogues on: (a) Maritime Stability: Joint naval exercises and coordinated patrols in the Bay of Bengal to counter China’s growing naval presence. (b) Counterterrorism and Border Management: Expanding cross-border security protocols to combat smuggling, trafficking, and insurgency-related threats. (c) Defense Technology and Training: Increasing military training programs and defense technology transfers to Bangladesh’s armed forces.
As aptly noted by former U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.” Proactive security cooperation with Bangladesh would reduce India’s anxiety over China’s strategic military foothold in South Asia.
Broader Regional Security and Strategic Stability. A greater regional framework involving Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and Myanmar on security issues in order to balance China’s fast-developing defense relations in the Bay of Bengal would not be out of place either. The cooperation in disaster management, peacekeeping operations, and maritime security, meanwhile, will further reinforce the regional stability against China’s strategic depth in South Asia.
As former Indian National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon once said, “Regional cooperation in security is not a luxury but a necessity for maintaining peace and development in South Asia.” India’s recalibrated security policy toward Bangladesh could exemplify this philosophy.
Negotiation on Infrastructure and Connectivity: The BRI has shaped Bangladesh’s infrastructure landscape, wherein projects such as the Payra Deep-Sea Port, Karnaphuli Tunnel, and Padma Bridge have enhanced economic connectivity. India needs to fast-track its cross-border transit agreements and connectivity projects so that China does not monopolize critical infrastructure development in Bangladesh.
Strengthening Transit and Connectivity Arrangements
India could fast-track key infrastructure projects such as: (a) India-Bangladesh Coastal Shipping Agreement: developing sea-borne trade through ports at Chattogram and Mongla, among others. (b) Expanding cargo routes through Indian northeastern states via the so-called BBIN corridor for transshipment. (c) Reinforcing cross-border rail lines, such as the Agartala-Akhaura and Kolkata-Chattogram routes.
By developing connectivity projects, India can decrease the dependence of Bangladesh on China-funded infrastructure, thus ensuring far greater regional integration.
Strategic Impact on Regional Trade. Improved transit arrangements would place Bangladesh as a strategic trade hub, connecting South Asia and Southeast Asia. More regional trade corridors would also lead to the diversification of Bangladesh’s economic partners and greater economic independence from China.
As former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh aptly said, “Connectivity is the lifeline of the economy in the modern world.” In chasing mutual infrastructure objectives, Bangladesh and India could achieve higher efficiency in trade and greater regional integration.
Diplomatic Maneuvering in Regional Organizations. Bangladesh’s improved relations with China have given the country a higher status in powerful regional platforms such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor. This increased diplomatic profile provides substantial strategic leverage vis-à-vis India.
Enhancement of Bangladesh’s Strategic Leverage
China’s international reach in multilateral organizations provides yet another platform to Bangladesh for putting pressure on India on critical issues relating to water-sharing and trade integration. China, an important player in water management and economic projects, is likely to convince India through its involvement towards a more cooperative attitude.
Strategic Influence on Bilateral Engagements. It might push India to offer better trade, water-sharing, and investment deals as a counterbalance to the fast-expanding role of China in Bangladesh’s strategic affairs: faster resolution of the long-stalled Teesta Water Treaty, reduced trade tariffs, and more development aid packages.
As former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wisely said, “In crises, the most daring decision is often the safest.” The more Bangladesh could establish its strategic worth through Sino-Bangladeshi cooperation, the better the deals it could negotiate with India.
Conclusion: A Strategic Balancing Act for Bangladesh: Bangladesh’s deepening ties with China present a critical opportunity to reshape its regional diplomacy by balancing India’s dominance while advancing its national development goals. Strengthening its economic partnership, expanding military cooperation, and securing diplomatic support from China can help Bangladesh address long-standing bilateral challenges with India—particularly in water-sharing agreements, trade negotiations, security dialogues, and cross-border infrastructure projects.
All of that, however, requires tremendous skill in diplomacy, political foresight, and strategic patience. This art of balance between China and India is a delicate balance for Bangladesh, in which neither should be given disproportionate influence while fostering cooperation where there is a benefit to her national interests. As once famously said by Singapore’s founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, “In the end, geopolitics is about balance of power. You align where your interests lie.”
By leveraging China’s strategic investments while enjoying constructive relations with India, Bangladesh has an opportunity to evolve from a regional underdog into a significant powerbroker in South Asia. How well the country negotiates concessions, secures fair treaties, and further strengthens its economy depends on this tightrope walk. As former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger aptly said, “In crises, the most daring decision is often the safest.”
Bangladesh now stands on the threshold of redefining its geopolitical future-turning geographic vulnerabilities into strategic assets under a robust foreign policy framework. It is capable of transforming regional challenges into platforms for lasting stability, prosperity, and global recognition with prudent, visionary leadership and a well-defined national vision. As the Chinese proverb goes: “When the wind of change blows, some build walls, others build windmills.”
It is time for Bangladesh to build its windmills, harnessing the changing geopolitical winds to secure a brighter, more resilient future.
Dr. Serajul I Bhuiyan is Professor and Former Chair, Department of Journalism and Mass Communications, Savannah State University, Georgia, USA. [email protected]
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