Dhaka-Delhi relations, long characterised by periodic flare-ups and uneasy cooperation, have entered a sudden and potentially dangerous downturn. In recent weeks, violent protests in Bangladesh, the suspension of visa services, and threats directed at Bangladeshi diplomats in New Delhi have shaken the foundations of bilateral trust. This deterioration is not merely a diplomatic inconvenience; if mishandled, it carries the risk of cascading into outcomes that could destabilise both societies and reverberate across the wider region.
The most immediate danger lies in the politicisation of Hindu-Muslim relations. In India, narratives portraying Hindus as victims in Bangladesh risk fuelling domestic polarisation. In Bangladesh, anti-India protests carry the danger of morphing into broader anti-Hindu mobilisations. Equally troubling is the emerging diplomatic paralysis. The suspension of visa and consular services disrupts the everyday foundations of bilateral engagement-students, traders, families, and cultural exchanges. When such linkages are severed, mistrust begins to take root at the societal level, making reconciliation far more difficult.
What may appear as a series of discrete incidents is, in fact, symptomatic of a deeper malaise. Political actors on both sides increasingly instrumentalise religious identity to advance short-term agendas, transforming otherwise manageable disputes into existential confrontations and eroding decades of hard-won regional stability. Dhaka-Delhi relations stand at a perilous crossroads: mishandled tensions could spiral into instability, but careful diplomacy-anchored in structural management and insulated from identity politics-could turn crisis into cooperation.
The trajectory of Dhaka-Delhi relations is inseparable from the legacy of 1971. India's decisive role in Bangladesh's Liberation War forged a foundation of shared history but also embedded a structural asymmetry. For many in Bangladesh, India has been seen both as liberator and dominant neighbour-an ambivalence that continues to shape expectations and sensitivities.
In the decades that followed, ties fluctuated between cooperation and suspicion, often reflecting domestic political shifts in Dhaka. Under Sheikh Hasina, the Awami League aligned Bangladesh closely with India's strategic priorities. Collaboration on counterterrorism, connectivity, and regional integration reassured New Delhi and lent predictability to the relationship. Yet this proximity also provoked unease, as critics argued that India's influence constrained Bangladesh's autonomy.
The recent political transition has unsettled this equilibrium. New leadership under Muhammad Yunus and Dhaka's diversification of external partnerships-engaging China and Pakistan alongside India-have been interpreted in New Delhi as signs of strategic drift. More fundamentally, the transition exposed the fragility of a relationship built on personalised trust rather than institutional depth. This dependence limited the development of durable institutional channels capable of absorbing political change.
The present rupture in Dhaka-Delhi relations has emerged from the convergence of multiple stress points rather than a single catalytic event. The killing of Sharif Osman Bin Hadi acted as the immediate trigger, sparking nationwide protests in Bangladesh that quickly adopted overtly anti-India themes. Indian symbols were targeted, and street-level hostility soon spilled into the diplomatic arena, signalling how domestic political grievances were being externalised onto the bilateral relationship.
Diplomatic measures followed in rapid succession. Bangladesh suspended consular and visa services in New Delhi, while Indian visa centres in Dhaka and Chattogram were temporarily closed. Although administrative in form, these actions carried disproportionate symbolic weight. By disrupting everyday people-to-people linkages, they transformed political tension into social disconnection, eroding the informal buffers that often absorb diplomatic shocks.
The crisis deepened further with the breach of the diplomatic zone in New Delhi by Hindu nationalist activists and threats directed at the Bangladeshi High Commissioner. This episode raised serious concerns about the protection of foreign missions and reinforced perceptions in Dhaka that communal actors were shaping the bilateral climate. Simultaneously, parliamentary rhetoric in India characterising Bangladesh as the country's most serious strategic challenge since 1971 hardened the view in Dhaka that it was being treated less as a sovereign partner in transition and more as a security problem to be managed.
What transformed these incidents into a full diplomatic rupture was not their individual severity, but their rapid accumulation within an environment already primed by mistrust, political transition, and identity-based mobilisation. In the absence of institutional shock absorbers, each episode amplified the next, transforming otherwise manageable disputes into a cascading diplomatic rupture.
The current rupture in Dhaka-Delhi relations is sustained by political forces in both countries that derive advantage from religious polarisation. In India, Hindu nationalist actors have leveraged incidents of violence against Hindus in Bangladesh to construct a narrative of civilisational threat. Amplified through rallies, social media, and sympathetic outlets, this framing consolidates domestic political support while constraining diplomatic flexibility, as moderation risks being portrayed as weakness.
In Bangladesh, Islamist groups have responded by projecting India as Hindu hegemon intent on undermining Bangladeshi sovereignty. This counter-mobilisation serves a strategic purpose: it channels popular resentment into political capital, weakens secular actors, and delegitimises any leadership perceived as overly accommodating toward New Delhi. In both contexts, religion is not merely a mobilising symbol but a political instrument, transforming cross-border disagreements into contests of identity rather than policy.
These dynamics interact with deeper structural vulnerabilities. Across South Asia, heightened communal polarisation ensures that bilateral disputes are rapidly reframed as Hindu-Muslim confrontations rather than negotiable diplomatic issues. Political mobilisation thus feeds a self-reinforcing cycle: communal narratives intensify mistrust; mistrust amplifies perceptions of strategic drift; leadership uncertainty erodes predictability; and weak institutional mechanisms allow isolated incidents to escalate into systemic crises.
Despite current tensions, Bangladesh-India relations are defined not only by asymmetry but by deep interdependence; they are organic, deeply embedded, and structurally interdependent. Geography alone makes sustained cooperation unavoidable. The two countries share one of the world's longest borders, necessitating collaboration on water management, border security, migration, and environmental challenges. These interdependencies demand that Dhaka and Delhi embrace their role as natural allies.
Economic interdependence reinforces this reality. India is among Bangladesh's largest trading partners, and Bangladesh provides India with vital connectivity to its northeastern states. Energy grids, transport corridors, and supply chains bind their economies together. Disruption harms ordinary citizens far more than political elites.
Cultural ties run even deeper. Shared language, literature, music, and historical experience have long created social continuities that transcend political cycles. Millions of families straddle the border through kinship, migration, and memory. These organic connections distinguish Bangladesh-India relations from purely transactional partnerships and explain why disengagement is neither realistic nor sustainable; it would impose costs far greater than any short?term political gain.
History offers sobering lessons about relations between neighbours. France and Germany transformed historic enmity into partnership through institutionalised cooperation. South Africa stabilised its neighbourhood through dialogue and regional frameworks. Conversely, India-Pakistan relations demonstrate how communal framing can entrench hostility.
Bangladesh and India now face a similar crossroads. They can allow populism and identity politics to dictate their relationship, risking cycles of mistrust and escalation. Or, they can choose maturity: strengthening institutions, insulating diplomacy from communal mobilisation, and recognising that interdependence is a strategic asset, not a vulnerability.
Geography and history bind Dhaka and Delhi together. The challenge is not to deny tensions but to manage them with restraint, foresight, and respect. The implications of Dhaka-Delhi relations extend far beyond the bilateral sphere. As the two largest states in eastern South Asia, their cooperation-or confrontation-sets the tone for the region. Prolonged mistrust would undermine cross?border cooperation and connectivity, and embolden external actors to exploit divisions. Conversely, a cooperative trajectory could unlock regional energy grids, trade corridors, and climate resilience initiatives, positioning South Asia as a more integrated and stable bloc in a turbulent world.
The lesson is clear: bilateral stability cannot rest on political alignment or emotive narratives, but on institutional resilience and strategic restraint. Whether this crisis becomes a turning point toward cooperation or a descent into prolonged instability will depend on whether both sides choose institutional maturity over emotional politics.
Golam Rasul, PhD is Professor, Department of Economics, International University of Business Agriculture and Technology (IUBAT), Dhaka. golam.grasul@gmail.com
© 2026 - All Rights with The Financial Express
