Leveraging ties with China to influence India

Bangladesh’s geopolitical location within South Asia is at the very heart of an unfolding intricate geopolitical competition between two regional giants, namely China and India. An emerging economy with vital sea routes, major river systems, and growing markets, Bangladesh has become a strategically important country far beyond its borders. Its ever-growing economic, political, and security links with China have opened new diplomatic avenues in recent years, hence providing a unique opportunity to reshape its bilateral negotiations with India.

From the issues of water-sharing agreements related to the Ganges and Teesta Rivers, passing through trade imbalances up to regional connectivity projects, Bangladesh would be in a more advantageous position towards pressing for equative solutions once strategically aligned with China. Stronger relations will enable Bangladesh to increase its bargaining leverage and persuade India to be more cooperative and flexible on unresolved bilateral issues.

As Henry Kissinger once said, “Control of geography means control of destiny.” In the case of Bangladesh, its geographical reality is a prized player in South Asia’s strategic landscape-a position that could, if used correctly, redefine its relations both with India and China. This article, presented in two parts, explores how Bangladesh can use its growing ties with China to secure its national interests while navigating the geopolitical complexities of South Asia.

Why Timing is Everything: The current global geopolitical environment provides a perfect opportunity for Bangladesh to establish itself as a regional powerbroker. With China’s BRI reaching out across Asia and India trying to hold its influence in South Asia, Bangladesh has become a key focal point in the strategic competition. This rivalry offers Dhaka a diplomatic window to strengthen its foreign policy through balanced engagement with both nations.

As the former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright once said, “What matters is how well we use the cards we’ve been dealt.” For Bangladesh, leveraging its geographic and economic significance can turn diplomatic challenges into actionable opportunities, setting a model for balanced international relations in a rapidly evolving world.

Setting the Stage: India has always looked upon the rise of Chinese influence in South Asia with a degree of skepticism and views its growing relationships with countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal as part of its “String of Pearls” strategy aimed at the encirclement of India. This perception has indeed been one of the drivers that have compelled India to increase its diplomatic outreach and economic engagements with Bangladesh, particularly in areas where Chinese influence has grown the most.

By aligning itself strategically with China, Bangladesh’s bargaining position in crucial issues like the sharing of waters, trade, connectivity, and security with India turns stronger. Thus, India, while needing to retain its regional pre-eminence and contain the growth in Chinese clout, will have to agree to better terms in bilateral agreements that Dhaka can wrench.

This article is a two-part series on how Bangladesh can use its relationship with China to break a number of longstanding impasses with India while enhancing its strategic and economic future in South Asia. In this part of the article, we cover the following issues:

Strategic Leverage Through China’s Regional Influence: China’s growing geopolitical influence over South Asia through BRI, GDI, and GSI has amplified the level of Indian unease over the fast-fleeting leverages over Bangladesh. India perceives this growing relationship between Beijing and Dhaka as part of a Chinese policy aimed at containing India within its “String of Pearls”: securing key infrastructure and strategic outposts in South Asia with the aim of encircling India. It is this budding rivalry that provides an important bargaining chip to Bangladesh in negotiating various issues with India.

Application to Bilateral Issues: Ganges Water Agreement and Teesta Water Sharing. Bangladesh and India have more than 50 transboundary rivers, and agreements on the sharing of their waters have been a recurring issue. The Ganges Water Treaty of 1996 was a path-breaking agreement, but its implementation has more often than not been mired in controversy due to the scarcity of water during the dry seasons. At the same time, the Teesta River issue, so vital to Bangladesh’s agrarian economy, has been unresolved for over a decade. Despite numerous diplomatic engagements, an internal consensus has eluded India because of opposition by the West Bengal state government, and the deadlock has dragged on.

The unresolved water-sharing disputes put at risk millions of livelihoods in Bangladesh, making it imperative for Dhaka to seek alternative means of diplomatic pressure. In this context, China’s upstream control over major South Asian rivers such as the Brahmaputra offers a geopolitical counterbalance that is simply too tempting for Bangladesh to resist.

China as Strategic Leverage. With China’s vast experience in managing transboundary rivers-including but not limited to the Mekong, Brahmaputra, and Yangtze-it exercises enormous influence within the region on issues of water politics. Greater cooperation over water could extend to or be pushed through Chinese technical help with flood control, building of dams, and river navigation, all of which will make India uncomfortable with loss of the high strategic elbowroom.

If Bangladesh secures water infrastructure development projects from China, there is a likelihood of India feeling certain pressure to fast-track the long-pending Teesta water-sharing agreement for fear of allowing Bangladesh to further slip into China’s strategic orbit. Using China’s expertise in water diplomacy might, at a time of increasing shortage and regional competition, turn Bangladesh into a vital water management partner in South Asia.

Incentives for India at the Diplomatic Level. Balancing China’s intensifying relations with Bangladesh, India can be more cooperative and pragmatic by giving favorable terms in the water-sharing agreement and broader infrastructure cooperation. Measures that may be taken include the following:

• Expedite the Teesta Agreement. India should push for finalizing the Teesta water-sharing agreement to remove one of the most important contentious bilateral issues between the two neighbors.

• Go for Multilateral Water Diplomacy. India may agree to trilateral water-sharing talks involving China in order to avoid further marginalization with respect to regional water diplomacy. More Investment in Water Infrastructure: India can propose new projects of water management with more investment in the construction of dams, flood management systems, and irrigation networks in order to outpace Chinese-funded projects in Bangladesh.

Regional and Strategic Implications: Water disputes in South Asia also have wider geopolitical implications: “Fierce competition for freshwater may well become a source of conflict in the future.”-Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General. If India delays the right pace for an equitable water-sharing agreement, China’s growing influence in the management of water might introduce irreversible changes in the geopolitics of South Asia, binding India to rapid and pragmatic measures.

Window of Opportunity for Equitable Solutions: Bangladesh’s growing partnership with China brings both pressure and opportunity for India to resolve long-standing water-sharing disputes. In this respect, India should reconsider its water diplomacy strategy and approach Bangladesh with much more urgency and flexibility. As the former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee once said, “You can change friends but not neighbors.” Resolving water-sharing disputes would guarantee Bangladesh’s long-term need for water and foster a relationship of mutual trust and regional stability.

Economic Bargaining Through Chinese: Investments China has emerged as the largest trading partner of Bangladesh, investing billions of dollars in strategic infrastructure projects like the Padma Bridge, Payra Deep-Sea Port, and various industrial zones. Such Chinese-aided initiatives speed up economic development for Bangladesh on one hand and strengthen its bargaining leverage in trade negotiations with India on the other, against its current huge trade surplus with that country.

Diversification of Trade Partnerships and Reduction of Economic Dependency. Bangladesh always runs a constant trade deficit with India since its imports far outweigh exports. The dominant position of India in the import market of Bangladesh has been a contentious issue, both economically as well as politically, for quite a long time now. In this backdrop, closer trade relations with China would allow Bangladesh to reduce dependence on Indian goods through diversification of its imports.

The strong manufacturing base in China creates a wide range of products available for Bangladesh, from consumer goods to industrial machinery, serving as bargaining chips with which it may negotiate better trade terms with India. Also, China’s Belt and Road Initiative promises to create superior trade routes to Bangladesh by circumventing Indian-controlled transit corridors.

Incentivising Bilateral Trade Negotiations. The threat of losing out on market dominance to China might coerce India into renegotiating its trade agreements with Bangladesh through the following means: (a) Reduction in Tariffs. Tariffs on Bangladeshi textiles, jute, and agro-products can come down. (b) Removing Trade Barriers. Reduce nontariff barriers to have smooth customs procedures and thereby allow trade to flourish. (c) Market Access Expansion. India may provide greater market access to the northeastern markets where Bangladeshi products enjoy proximity competitiveness.

Competitive Trade Environment. As Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen once said, “Trade is an engine of development.” Greater economic competition between India and China for influence over Bangladesh could imply more foreign direct investment, improvement in trade infrastructure, and opening of new markets to Bangladeshi exporters.

More importantly, India’s proactive economic engagement in the urge to balance China might reshape the regional trade landscape to the benefit of Bangladesh and its trading partners. This could mean a surge in economic independence and geopolitical standing of Bangladesh in South Asia.

Strategic Power for the Future of Bangladesh: In essence strengthening its ties with China would, therefore, reshape the Bangladesh regional diplomacy, in such a way as to use the leverages of both economic and geopolitical compulsions in trying to push India toward more cooperative and mutually advantageous bilateral negotiations. The Ganges and Teesta water-sharing agreements, trade imbalances, and regional connectivity remain outstanding issues between the two countries; here lies a promising direction through which Bangladesh can strike favorable terms with India.

This would, therefore, be an implication of such an approach to pursue a balanced foreign policy but carefully calibrated for interests from both China and India while safeguarding sovereignty and economic futures. Thus, as Bangladesh positions itself to act as the bridge between two contending powers, geographic vulnerability should emerge as a source of strategic strength, with its bright promise to rise as the premier regional powerbroker of South Asia.

As former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger so aptly put it, “The task of the leader is to get his people from where they are to where they have not been.” Bangladesh has the chance, through bold and visionary leadership, to transcend its historic challenges in today’s rapidly changing world. With foresight in diplomacy and strategic partnerships, it can reinvent its role for the region in such a way that long-standing disputes become milestones of progress toward securing a future marked with stability, prosperity, and global relevance.

Dr Serajul I Bhuiyan is a Professor and Former Chair, Department of Journalism and Mass Communications, Savannah State University, Georgia, USA. He did his MBA and Ph.D. from USA universities. [email protected]