Fresh threats from Myanmar

With the Myanmar military government losing control of territories to rebels in several states of the country including Rakhine, tension is running high along the border between that country and Bangladesh. The situation is so tense there that military helicopters are flying past close to the border and sounds of firing of artillery shells and other weapons are becoming intense and louder. Similar things happened in the past when mortar shells landed in Bangladesh territory killing at least one Rohingya boy and wounding six others. Bangladesh has put its security forces on high alert not so much out of anticipation of armed conflicts with the junta government in Naypyidaw but to avoid a fresh exodus of refugees from Rakhine. The government in Myanmar is under extra pressure because of its losses of personnel, equipment and territories to the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs).

Ever since its independence on January 4, 1948, the country has seen the dominance of the majority Bamar people living in the heartland and the ethnic populations such as the Karen, the Kochin, the Mon and the Rohingya ethnic minorities living in the country's eastern, northern and western peripheral territories. With the breaking out of a full-scale civil war in May 2021 between the military regime and the National Unity Government (NUG), aligned with the EAOs, the armed campaign against the junta received fresh dynamism. Then came the offensive codenamed 1027 by the Three Brotherhood Alliance on October 27, 2023 to take Tatmadaw, the government army, by surprise. The current upsurge in violence is the continuation of that offensive and it has generated fresh political, economic, humanitarian and security concerns for Bangladesh. With the operation 1027 spreading in ethnic minority areas, including Chin and Rakhine states both of which border Bangladesh, the spillover negative effects can be multifarious.

First, the escalation of fighting can pose several other threats to Bangladesh's territorial integrity, particularly in the hill districts bordering Myanmar. In fact, the prolonged conflicts in the minority states vitiated by insurgencies has long posed a threat to Bangladesh's sovereignty and stability. Even the Myanmar Air Force and the Arakan Army have records respectively of violating Bangladesh airspace and engaging in border clashes with the latter's security forces in August 2015. Export of insurgency by an army cornered by insurgent forces to neighbouring countries is a common ploy. Apart from such political implications, bilateral trade has also suffered as it is generally conducted via the Rakine Sate. A November estimate puts Bangladesh's loss at Tk30 million a day as a consequence of disruption of trade between the two countries.

Yet the greatest of all adverse impacts is the stalling of the Rohingya repatriation process, courtesy of Chinese mediation. If the Tadmadaw's 'Four Cuts' strategy ---cut off sources of food, funds, information and recruits for the EAOs --- takes effect anew in the Rakhine State, repatriation of the 1.3 million Rohingya refugees will not only become uncertain but also fresh influx cannot be ruled out. The Chinese ambassador may have expressed hope of returning stability in that state but the ground reality does not support his optimism. Bangladesh cannot afford the economic, social and environmental costs due to the Rohingya's prolonged stay here. Unless the international community which is becoming more tight-fisted, exert pressure on the Myanmar junta government to put its house in order and facilitate the process of Rohingya repatriation, the conundrum is unlikely to come to an end.