Govt's asset recovery move may raise a few questions

The interim government, in its pursuit of recovering assets laundered abroad by powerful actors, now weighs the option of financial settlements as a pathway for restitution. Governor of Bangladesh Bank Dr. Ahsan H. Mansur reportedly made this disclosure in a recent interview with The Financial Times of London, saying the government aims to go for financial settlements in "less serious" cases using legal means. Besides, he said, the central bank team had been in touch with litigation funding firms to help asset recovery, including funds transferred abroad illegally. While asset recovery is undoubtedly essential for economic justice, the manner in which it is pursued carries significant implications for legal integrity, accountability and the broader fight against corruption. Settlements, by design, can be expedient, but they must not risk undermining the foundational principles of justice and deterrence under the guise of pragmatism.

It may appear more appealing to some to try to recover even a portion of misappropriated money through negotiated agreements than to risk losing all in drawn-out court battles. There is no doubting that lengthy and costly litigation, particularly in foreign jurisdictions, can result in uncertain outcomes. On the other side, entering into settlements with individuals implicated in money laundering can also be construed as a concession made under duress, driven more by fiscal urgency than by principle. Such a move may raise questions about the government's financial standing and suggest that it is up against the wall financially. More critically, it blurs the line between justice and expediency. If lesser offenses are settled financially, what stops more serious cases from being treated the same way? The distinction between less serious and serious offenses is often a matter of interpretation when dealing with high-level financial crimes. Without clear criteria, such a policy could create a grey zone ripe for favouritism and political manipulation. The optics of it alone could prove damaging to the credibility of the interim government's anti-corruption campaign. Already, supporters of the ousted regime have accused the administration of political vendettas, and any perception of selective or lenient application of penalties will only strengthen those claims.

There is also the ethical dimension to pursuing such a strategy. Money laundering and illicit financial flows are not merely administrative violations, they represent a systematic plunder of national resources that deepens inequality and hinders development. Settling with the accused without full transparency or judicial scrutiny may send a dangerous message that those with sufficient means can evade justice. Another immediate concern that should not be overlooked is public perception. For a population that has long borne the costs of corruption from reduced public services to growing inequality, the idea of letting alleged offenders settle their wrongdoing through payment is likely to fuel resentment. This could very well cause lasting harm to the public trust. Furthermore, the interim government must also consider whether this approach aligns with its stated commitment to rooting out corruption, or if it unintentionally legitimises the very practices it seeks to eliminate.

If the government must proceed with the option of financial settlements, it must do so with extreme caution and complete transparency. It should set clear and objective standards for identifying less serious cases and calculating settlement amounts, and these standards must be shared publicly to prevent any perception of unfair or arbitrary decisions. Additionally, measures must be put in place to ensure that these settlements do not become a mechanism for legitimising ill-gotten gains or encouraging future wrongdoing. Settlements may have their place, but they must not become a loophole for the powerful to evade the full weight of the law.