Soon after assuming office, one of the most pressing issues before the interim government was the alleged irregularities in the power sector -- widely regarded as one the most glaring abused sectors by the Hasina regime. This was an area that clearly demanded a thorough inquiry to identify the nature and scope of the irregularities, the financial implications and those responsible for the malpractice. For years, even under the previous government, the media had reported extensively on controversial deals involving "quick rental power plants." The interim government moved promptly, forming two committees amid widespread allegations of inflated capacity payments, excessive tariffs, and dubious operation and maintenance costs. The committees were tasked with investigating irregularities in power-plant deals and renegotiating what many critics have called "exorbitant" tariff rates. The first committee, known as the national committee, was formed in September 2024 under the leadership of a retired High Court judge. It was tasked with reviewing whether government interests were safeguarded in the contracts awarded under the special law. Empowered to collect information from any source and summon individuals or institutions, this committee was expected to set the tone for transparency. The second committee, set up in January 2025 and chaired by a retired BUET professor, was mandated to renegotiate tariff rates. Its stated goal was to lower power-purchase costs and relieve the mounting debt burden of the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB). Yet, nearly a year later, neither committee has submitted its report. Nor have they provided any clear timeframe for completion, raising concerns about transparency in a sector already under fire for inefficiency and waste.
Most of the contracts under scrutiny were signed under the Quick Enhancement of Electricity and Energy Supply (Special Provision) Act 2010, which was amended in 2021 and annulled in November 2023. The controversial law had allowed the government to award unsolicited contracts to private firms, bypassing competitive bidding, in the name of rapidly expanding power generation.
Within months of beginning work, the national committee sought detailed information on 11 major plants, including Adani's 1,496 MW coal-fired Godda plant in India, the Meghnaghat 583 MW dual-fuel plant, and several HSFO- and diesel-fired facilities in Baghabari, Potuakhali, Ashuganj, Manikganj, and Kodda. The list also included renewable projects such as the Mongla (100 MW), Sundarganj (200 MW), Lalmonirhat (30 MW), and Sutiakhali (50 MW) solar plants. The committee even recommended hiring a reputed international legal and investigative firm to assist in reviewing the major contracts. However, this step has yet to materialise, leaving the process in limbo.
What exactly has stalled the committees' work remains unclear. But the delay is troubling, particularly when power plant contracts of the previous government are widely viewed as prime examples of systemic corruption. Until the reports are submitted, the scope for potential savings from contract renegotiations remains uncertain, while the BPDB continues to struggle with ballooning subsidies and debt obligations. In this context, the onus lies squarely on the committees to expedite their tasks. The credibility of the interim government's reform agenda and the possibility of restoring integrity in the power sector depend heavily on the timely completion and making these much-awaited reports public.
