The recent escalation of conflict between India and Pakistan has once again raised pressing concerns about the fragility of nuclear deterrence in South Asia. Historically, both nations' acquisition of nuclear capabilities was believed to establish a deterrent equilibrium-one that would prevent full-scale war despite political hostility and persistent proxy conflicts. However, recent developments suggest that this deterrence is being dangerously undermined.
India's Operation Sindoor, launched on 7 May 2025, involved coordinated air and missile strikes against alleged terror infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. The operation followed the deadly 22 April bombing in Pahalgam, which claimed the lives of 26 Indian civilians, primarily Hindu pilgrims. India attributed the attack to operatives from Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), both of which are widely recognised as terrorist organisations. Pakistan's retaliation came swiftly in the form of Operation Bunyan al-Marsous on 10 May. Citing Quranic symbolism of defence and solidarity, Pakistan launched attacks on Indian military installations, including a BrahMos missile storage facility and airbases in Udhampur and Pathankot.
This tit-for-tat escalation has brought the region perilously close to a broader military conflict. The most troubling aspect is the apparent willingness on both sides to pursue conventional warfare even in the shadow of nuclear armament. In previous crises, strategic restraint prevailed under the assumption that nuclear weapons were a last-resort deterrent. Today, that assumption appears to be weakening.
The modernisation of conventional arsenals, enhanced cyber and satellite capabilities, and the lack of institutionalised crisis-management frameworks compound the risks. Media sensationalism and rapid political decision-making further narrow the margin for error. These dynamics not only threaten South Asian stability but also alarm global powers deeply invested in the region through competing geopolitical interests-the United States' Indo-Pacific strategy and China's Belt and Road Initiative through Pakistan among them.
While diplomatic efforts have thus far managed to contain full-scale war, they remain insufficient. Domestic political imperatives, particularly in election year, continue to fuel belligerent rhetoric, diminishing the space for rational statesmanship.
This crisis reveals a sobering reality: nuclear deterrence is no longer a guaranteed shield against conventional war. Worse still, it may now embolden strategic miscalculations under the belief that nuclear capability ensures impunity from escalation. The situation urgently demands renewed diplomacy, robust confidence-building measures, and operational communication channels between military and political establishments on both sides.
Mohammad Abdur Rahman
Student
Department of International Relations
University of Dhaka
