Teesta and trust between two neighbours

Mir Mostafizur Rahaman | Published: May 11, 2026 20:44:01

For more than a decade, the unresolved Teesta water-sharing agreement has stood as one of the most visible reminders of the fragility and asymmetry that continue to shape relations between India and Bangladesh. Every few years, New Delhi reiterates its commitment to concluding the deal. Every few years, Dhaka expresses cautious optimism. And every few years, the process stalls again -- trapped in the complexities of Indian federal politics, regional calculations and electoral considerations.
The recent political shift in West Bengal may have created a real opportunity in years to finally resolve the dispute.
With Mamata Banerjee ousted from power in the West Bengal assembly elections and the Bharatiya Janata Party forming the state government, the longstanding political excuse for delaying the Teesta agreement has effectively disappeared. If India still fails to move forward now, Dhaka will inevitably conclude that the obstacle to signing the Teesta water sharing deal was never Mamata Banerjee -- but a deeper reluctance within the Indian state itself.
For Bangladesh, the Teesta is not a symbolic issue. It is a matter of survival for millions.
The Teesta River is the lifeline of northern Bangladesh, flowing through districts where agriculture, livelihoods and local ecosystems depend heavily on its waters. During the dry season, water scarcity has become acute, devastating crop production and intensifying economic hardship in the region. Farmers in greater Rangpur region and adjoining areas have long spoken of shrinking riverbeds, failed irrigation cycles and increasing uncertainty over farming.
Bangladesh has repeatedly argued that a fair distribution of Teesta waters is not only a bilateral obligation but also a humanitarian necessity. The country's expectation was shaped by earlier precedents. After years of negotiations, India and Bangladesh successfully concluded the landmark Ganges water-sharing treaty in 1996, proving that even difficult transboundary water disputes could be resolved through political will and diplomatic maturity.
The Teesta agreement appeared poised to become the next major breakthrough.
During the tenure of former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, negotiations between the two countries advanced substantially. Officials from both sides worked through technical details and reportedly reached a near-final formula for water allocation. Expectations rose sharply ahead of Singh's 2011 visit to Dhaka, during which the agreement was expected to be formally signed.
But in a dramatic last-minute reversal, the deal collapsed.
Mamata Banerjee, then chief minister of West Bengal, opposed the proposed arrangement and withdrew support just before the visit. Her government argued that West Bengal itself faced water shortages and that the proposed formula would adversely affect the state's northern districts. Banerjee maintained that the central government had failed to adequately consult Kolkata before finalising the agreement.
Her objections were rooted partly in regional politics and partly in genuine concerns over water availability. West Bengal officials claimed that the Teesta's lean-season flow was insufficient to accommodate Bangladesh's demands without hurting irrigation and agricultural needs within the state. Banerjee also argued that the hydrological data used during negotiations did not accurately reflect ground realities.
Whether one accepted those arguments or not, the political consequences were immediate and lasting.
The failure to sign the Teesta agreement during Manmohan Singh's Dhaka visit deeply embarrassed New Delhi and generated considerable disappointment in Bangladesh. For many Bangladeshis, it became a defining example of how India's internal political divisions could override solemn diplomatic commitments made to a neighbouring country.
That disappointment carried broader implications because Bangladesh, over the past 15 years, has consistently demonstrated strategic goodwill towards India.
Dhaka addressed many of New Delhi's core security concerns, particularly on cross-border insurgency and regional connectivity. Successive Bangladeshi governments facilitated transit, strengthened counterterrorism cooperation and expanded economic integration despite often facing domestic criticism for becoming overly accommodative towards India cause.
Yet on Teesta -- arguably Bangladesh's most emotionally resonant bilateral issue -- India repeatedly failed to deliver.
Successive governments in New Delhi sought to reassure Dhaka by insisting that the central leadership remained committed to the agreement. The problem, Indian officials repeatedly explained, was opposition from the West Bengal government. Since water is constitutionally linked to state interests under India's federal structure, New Delhi argued that it was unable to impose a settlement without Kolkata's cooperation.
This explanation, while institutionally valid, gradually began losing credibility in Bangladesh.
Critics asked a simple question: if India truly considered Bangladesh a strategic priority, why was it unable to build domestic political consensus on an issue it had already negotiated extensively? The perception grew that Bangladesh's interests could always be subordinated to Indian electoral politics whenever convenient.
That perception became stronger, as relations between the two countries entered a more strained phase in recent years. Political trust between them weakened further.
Disputes over border killings, the Citizenship Amendment Act, visa restrictions, trade imbalances and increasingly sharp rhetoric in Indian domestic politics have all contributed to unease intensifying further in Bangladesh.
This is precisely why the current political transition in West Bengal matters.
For years, New Delhi pointed to Mamata Banerjee's resistance as the principal barrier. That barrier is now gone. The BJP controls both the central government and the state government in West Bengal. Coordination problems that once paralysed decision-making should, in theory, no longer exist.
If the Modi government genuinely intends to strengthen relations with Bangladesh, there is no better opportunity than this.
A Teesta agreement would carry significance far beyond water sharing. It would signal that India is capable of honouring commitments to its neighbours despite domestic political complexities. It would demonstrate strategic seriousness at a time when regional geopolitics is rapidly changing. And it would help counter growing perceptions in Bangladesh that New Delhi takes Dhaka's Cooperation for granted.
The geopolitical context makes the issue even more urgent.
China has steadily expanded its footprint in Bangladesh through infrastructure investments, development financing and strategic engagement. Bangladesh, meanwhile, has increasingly sought to diversify its international partnerships rather than rely excessively on any single power. India remains Bangladesh's most important neighbour, but goodwill can no longer be assumed as permanent or unconditional.
In this environment, symbolic gestures matter. Concrete deliverables matter even more.
Resolving the Teesta dispute would not eliminate all bilateral tensions overnight. Water-sharing arrangements involving transboundary rivers are inherently difficult, particularly amid climate stress, erratic rainfall and rising demand. West Bengal's concerns regarding water availability also deserve serious scientific evaluation rather than political dismissal.
But complexity cannot become an excuse for perpetual paralysis.
The Modi government frequently speaks of "Neighbourhood First" and regional connectivity. Those ambitions require political credibility. Bangladesh has often supported India at moments when doing so carried domestic political risks. Reciprocity now demands movement from New Delhi.
There is also a larger principle at stake.
South Asia remains one of the least integrated regions in the world despite deep cultural, historical and geographical ties. One major reason is the persistent inability of states in the region to institutionalise trust. Agreements are delayed, politicised or abandoned depending on electoral calculations. As a result, regional cooperation remains hostage to short-term politics.
The Teesta dispute has become a textbook example of that dysfunction.
India now has an opportunity to change the narrative. With political alignment between Kolkata and New Delhi, the structural obstacle repeatedly cited over the last decade has effectively disappeared. If negotiations restart seriously and a final agreement emerges, it could revive confidence not only in India-Bangladesh relations but also in the broader possibility of cooperative regional diplomacy in South Asia.
The question now is whether New Delhi is prepared to seize the moment -- or whether Teesta will continue flowing as a river of missed opportunities between two neighbours who can no longer afford the luxury of distrust.
mirmostafiz@yahoo.com