Singapore and Hong Kong, which were once infested with corruption, are now virtually corruption-free. In this transformation, the anti-corruption agencies in those countries played a pivotal role. They eradicated corruption in a relatively short period. In contrast, countries such as Bangladesh and India, which lie at the top rung of the corruption league, are having a difficult time in making even a small dent in the problem. Why are anti-corruption agencies more successful in some countries than others?
In a scholarly monograph, Corruption, Its Control and Drivers of Change: The Case of Bangladesh, Professor Nurul Islam, the doyen of Bangladesh economists, recently addressed the issue. This book contains a wealth of information about and insight into various aspects of corruption in Bangladesh.
The central problem with the anti-corruption agency in many developing countries is its lack of effectiveness. In Bangladesh, the problem is so acute that a hapless former chief of the commission once described the agency as a "toothless tiger".
Effectiveness does not automatically flow from a simple enactment of the law - it has to be built on a solid foundation of autonomy, which has many dimensions. Islam identifies four such dimensions: (a) freedom from the executive control; (b) independence of its financial resources, and of organisational framework; (c) freedom in appointing its officials; and (d) freedom of operation and investigation. This multi-dimensional autonomy is essential not only to ensure the commission's effectiveness but also to inspire public confidence in its freedom and integrity.
According to Islam, from the get-go, the effectiveness of the commission in Bangladesh was undermined by political obstacles. This has been further exacerbated by a lack of well-defined organisational rules, brittle leadership and weak investigative capacity.
The commission is seriously under-staffed with little budgetary independence. The executive branch is exquisitely detailed in its determination of not only the budget but also the items of expenditure. Islam notes that the commission has little organisational autonomy. It can make rules for its internal organisation and functioning, but only with the prior approval of the President. There is also legal vagueness with respect to the powers and responsibilities of the commission, Islam adds.
The commission is opaque in its operations. The general public knows little about how it selects the cases against a vast array of complaints of corruption.
In prosecuting corrupt people, the commission has a lacklustre record of conviction - many of its cases have been overturned by the High Court. Part of this may reflect the fact that the commission is seriously understaffed and lacks adequate legal expertise. However, even in cases where there was conviction, there was little "sustained punishment". Islam suggests this has much to do with the "game of musical chairs" the two major political parties play to convict each other's supporters. And, as no political party has been in power for successive terms (excluding the present term), no high-profile convict remains behind bars for long, Islam posits.
Currently, the commission has little accountability other than submitting an annual report of its activities to the President. To check the abuse of power, a robust accountability mechanism is a must; otherwise, the commission can become an instrument of persecution against political adversaries, rather than combating corruption. Islam recommends that the commission publish clear and comprehensive policies to inform the public about its methods and procedures. To minimise partisan influence, he supports the establishment of a Parliamentary Standing Committee on Anti-Corruption Commission, with representatives from all political parties, to review its activities.
Islam contrasts the experience of Bangladesh with the anti-corruption agency of Indonesia - the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (which was established almost around the same time as Bangladesh's). The success of the Indonesian anti-corruption agengy has received international acclaim. However, the Indonesian commission has a much broader agenda than that of Bangladesh - of investigation, prosecution, prevention and education. The commission has the investigative powers of a law-enforcement agency; it can probe virtually any public official - from members of parliament to judges, from central bank governors to even the military. The commission is independent of the executive, legislative, judiciary and other state organisations. And it is audited by the independent Indonesian Supreme Audit Board, which has the stellar reputation for being through and impartial.
The Indonesian commission supervises and coordinates all law-enforcing institutions that are authorised to combat corruption. It partners with the ministry of establishment and bureaucracy to ensure compliance with wealth reporting of public officials. The Indonesian commission monitors the administrative and management systems of state and public institutions, recommends for change, and follows up the implementation of its recommendations. And finally, it undertakes corruption-related studies and surveys.
Since its inception in 2004, the Indonesian commission has successfully convicted many high-profile individuals including many members of parliament, a number of ministers, governors and deputy governors of the central bank, judges, prosecutors, mayors, ambassadors and a chief of police. This contrasts sharply with the situation in Bangladesh where few politicians or top government bureaucrats have been prosecuted and punished for corruption. In instances where a high-level official or politician has been arrested and convicted, Islam notes that they invariably belong to the opposition party - the party out of power. It makes the integrity of the process, even in the presence of strong evidence of culpability, suspect in the public mind, Islam reasons.
The effectiveness of an anti-corruption agency depends on its insulation from political interference, its organisational and budgetary autonomy, its transparency and public accountability - conditions which, Islam suggests, are currently lacking in Bangladesh. As a result, the commission is widely perceived to be an "also-ran" than a serious institution for fighting corruption.
The analysis of the commission and other corruption-related issues by Islam is so refreshingly candid and insightful that it merits serious attention from policymakers who are intent on improving the current situation.
Dr M.G. Quibria, Professor of Economics, Morgan State University, US, is currently Senior Fulbright Visiting Fellow at Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies. mgquibria.morgan@gmail.com
Why are anti-corruption agencies more successful in some countries?
M.G. Quibria | Published: June 18, 2014 00:00:00 | Updated: November 30, 2026 06:01:00
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