Bangladesh liberation struggle on the stage of world politics

John W. Spanier, an American Professor of world politics, analysed how nations play games in dealing with the shifting nature of balance of power on the stage of world politics in his classic Games Nations Play. The birth of Bangladesh in 1971 emerged as a game on the stage of world politics in which several players, including superpowers, played their cards either directly or indirectly while dealing with the balance of power in the then international arena in 1971. From this perspective, the liberation struggle of Bangladesh on the stage of world politics in 1971 is both interesting and illuminating.

The international system in which Bangladesh was born as a nation-state following a bloody liberation struggle in 1971 was bipolar in nature. It was bipolar because the two superpowers, the United States of America (USA) and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Countries (USSR), were the two poles, heading the Western capitalist bloc and the Eastern socialist bloc respectively during the Cold War period. Both superpowers were acting as the preponderant powers, influencing policy options of most of the nation states.

However, the bipolar nature of the international system was further accentuated by the Cold War politics -- a period of relative stable framework of relations between the superpowers. Be that as it may, US decision makers, especially US president Richard Nixon and his national Security Advisor Henry Kissinger perceived that the other superpower, i.e., the USSR was becoming relatively stronger at the expense of the USA which was facing a host of problems, such as domestic unrest due to the Vietnam quagmire and the declining economic power. From this perspective, both Nixon and Kissinger wanted to use the People's Republic of China (PRC) to neutralise the military power of the USSR which had already developed acrimonious relations with Chairman Mao of the PRC following the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s and 1960s.

The PRC, a great power, had also weakened itself because of the turmoil resulting from the Cultural Revolution that Chairman Mao started in 1966. Owing to a perception of weakness vis-à-vis the USSR and the Ussuri River crisis in which the USSR and the PRC fought a border skirmish in April 1969, the PRC also sought to have rapprochement with the USA with a view to using the USA to neutralise the military superiority of the USSR. The PRC generally supports the liberation struggle of independence-loving people of the Third World but here both Mao and Chou En-Lai, his Prime Minister, sought to use the Bangladesh crisis as a ploy to support its all-weather friend, Pakistan and seek rapprochement with the USA. It deserves mentioning here that since the Bengalees were fighting against Pakistan, it was realpolitik that dictated Mao to stand by its ally Pakistan, though the latter was committing genocide in East Pakistan. Since both India and the USSR stood by the Bengalees, it became easier for Mao to sacrifice the Bengalees experiencing genocide and play diplomatic game on the world stage.

In this backdrop, the American duo, Nixon and Kissinger, wanted to open a secret diplomatic channel of communications with the leadership of the PRC. However, they needed a reliable diplomatic channel which they could use to reach the PRC leadership. They wanted to use Pakistan as a go-between as Pakistan was a reliable ally of both. But the stumbling bloc in their diplomatic game was the on-going liberation struggle in East Pakistan.

The USA wanted autonomy of East Pakistan, though it secretly concluded that it was not possible to prevent the break-up of Pakistan given the geographical incongruity that existed between the two wings of Pakistan and the perceived sense of deprivation and disparity which the Bengalees felt against West Pakistan. This explains why both Nixon and Kissinger sought to ignore the dispatches of former American diplomat Archer Blood sent from US consulate in Dhaka highlighting the genocide that the Pakistani army was committing in East Pakistan.

The former USSR which perceived changes that the international system had experienced also wanted to play a diplomatic game of its own to oppose both the USA and the PRC which were ganging up against it. From this standpoint, the USSR sought to make India, already a close ally, a strategic partner against both the USA and the PRC. Supporting national liberation struggles had been a cardinal principle of the USSR since the death of Stalin in 1953 because it served the ideological purpose of supporting the independence-loving people in the Third World and weakening Western imperialism. Hence, the Bangladesh crisis of 1971 appeared as a diplomatic boon to the USSR which not only sought to serve its ideological principle but also use it as an instrument to make an alliance with India and cement it as part of the Cold War politics against USA-China and Pakistan Axis.

India, a big neighbour and a rival of Pakistan, wanted to help Bengalees in East Pakistan as part of its ideological commitment to help the independence-loving people of Bangladesh but since Pakistan was its arch enemy and a pugnacious neighbour, realpolitik also dictated India's policy option. Sheltering a large number of Bengalee refugees, mostly Hindus from East Pakistan, was also an economic burden and potential social catastrophe because hosting millions of Hindu refuges in the border states could cause communal tension with the Muslim minority population there. In fact, Bangladesh crisis was a golden opportunity for India to extend its total support to the liberation struggle in Bangladesh, dismember Pakistan and thus remove it as a strategic rival in the sub-continental security complex for ever.

The aim of Pakistan was to thwart the independence movement of the Bengalees at any cost. It was convinced that it could get maximum help from the US as a South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) ally. Likewise, Pakistan was optimistic of the help of PRC as a close ally and arch enemy of India. From this angle, its leadership wanted to act as a channel of communication between both the USA and the PRC in order to court more favor from both on the issue of the crisis in its Eastern wing.

Accordingly, Pakistani leaders were determined to achieve their goal by internationalising an internal crisis which necessitated a border war with India. They thought that once Pakistan would attack India, the UN would automatically be involved with the intervention of both USA and the PRC -- the two veto-wielding powers of the UN Security Council, which would force India to agree to a ceasefire. According to this plan, UN observers would be deployed on the border between East Pakistan and India. Once this goal was achieved, then Pakistan would negotiate with the Awami League for domestic autonomy with the help of the USA.

The Arab states, especially the members of the Arab League, wanted to save Pakistan, the largest Muslim country in the world from possible disintegration. Hence, they overlooked the human tragedy in Pakistan and stood by Pakistan. To be sure, the genocide of the Bengalee Muslims evoked no sympathy from fellow Muslim countries in the Islamic Ummah. On the other hand, Israel, an avowed enemy of the Arabs as well as the Muslims, wanted to help tactically the liberation struggle in Bangladesh with a view to dismembering Pakistan, the largest Muslim country in the world. To achieve this, Israel wanted to help India and it did so when the war commenced in December 1971.

Later, when Henry Kissinger visited China in June 1971, the international system experienced tectonic changes. Apparently, this international development was unfavourable to both Bangladesh and India, but Indira Ghandi played her Soviet card well to counter the diplomatic maneuver of both Nixon and Kissinger and neutralised the US-Chinese rapprochement. To outmaneuver both Nixon and Kissinger, she signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR in August 1971 and was thus assured of Soviet support both within the UN and outside in case of an eventual war with Pakistan.

Meanwhile, Indira Ghandi told Indian armed forces to prepare for a possible winter war and coordinate war efforts with the freedom fighters of Bangladesh. She preferred a winter war so that the PRC could not mobilise against India due to the snow in the Himalayan region. She also visited several Western countries, including the US, in November 1971 as part of the diplomatic game centring round the liberation struggle in Bangladesh. Nixon and Kissinger accorded her a cold welcome in the US. Once she became sure that the US would not pressurise Pakistan to stop the genocide in Bangladesh, she implicitly warned the US that India would go for a war with Pakistan to settle the Bangladesh issue once and for all.

Pakistan attacked India on December 03, 1971. In response, India promptly declared war against Pakistan and gave marching order to its armed forces against Pakistan in coordination with freedom fighters of Bangladesh. As part of the diplomatic game, it gave recognition to Bangladesh as an independent state on December 06, 1971. Both the US and the PRC coordinated their diplomacy in the UN Security Council for a ceasefire but Soviet diplomacy stood strong to nullify that.

Americans were surprised at the sudden collapse of the Pakistani army in East Pakistan. Frustrated, the US sent the 7th Fleet to the Bay of Bengal not to help Pakistan on its eastern front but to save West Pakistan from possible Indian assault which though never figured in Indian war strategy. The Soviets also sent their warships to the Bay of Bengal to counter the Americans. Both Nixon and Kissinger were outmaneuvered by Indira Ghandi on the eastern front. Nevertheless, they wanted to save Western Pakistan. Hence, Kissinger wanted an assurance from the Soviets that India would not dismember West Pakistan. Once India gave that assurance to the US through Soviet diplomatic channel, US retreated diplomatically.

Pakistani leadership misperceived both US and Chinese commitment since neither was willing to prevent the ensuing debacle of their ally in East Pakistan. This explains why the Pakistani Army dithered to surrender but finally it ran out of any option. As a result, Indian armed forces and freedom fighters of Bangladesh achieved a spectacular victory when Pakistani Army surrendered to the Allied Joint Command on December 16.

The victory which resulted in the birth of independent Bangladesh is a unique affair in the neo-colonial world order after 1945 because although many nations fought for liberation from various neo-colonial states, Bangladesh was the only one to come out successful. Favourable international system, among others, made it possible.

The author teaches at the University of Information Technology and Sciences (UITS), Baridhara, Dhaka, Bangladesh. [email protected]