Mohammed Bouazizi from the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid set off a wave of popular protests throughout the Arab world three years ago. President Ben Ali of Tunisia fell from power and was followed soon after by other leaders - Qaddafi in Libya and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. The quest for democracy has been a complex process since then. It has moved forward within a questionable dynamics. Radical protests have also continued to nurture instability. This, in turn, is affecting development and sustainable governance within the region. The scenario has also changed in terms of depth and dimension. Violence has crossed the Suez Canal into the Sinai Peninsula and found a new home in Syria. It has cast its shadow across Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey. Cultural and racist troubles have swept through the Levant and unleashed a monster that has resulted in more than 1,30,000 deaths and millions of refugees. Human rights have been trampled and insecurity has come to the fore. The reality is that the golden thread of democracy has been replaced by the rope of repression and government-led tyranny.
Jean-Pierre Filiu, a former Professor at Columbia University, has noted in this regard that 'the alternative to democracy is chaos' and that 'is obviously true in Syria and also in Libya, where the incapacity of the General Congress to establish effective institutions feeds the warlordism of the militias'. Others have also noted in this context that the latest evolution of events in Egypt - the military coup and repression of an elected government and its functionaries - can only result in more serious disturbances instead of restoring stability. Both the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Ennahda in Tunisia can and will promote further deterioration and volatility.
It would also be worthwhile to note in this regard that most commentators familiar with this region recognise that former President Morsi in his own way has contributed to the collapse of the democratic process in Egypt by failing to choose correctly between the 'logic' of his party and that of commonly agreed Egyptian national interests as identified by the common man in the streets of Cairo. Rashid Ghamouchi, an expert on North African politics, has suggested in this regard that unlike Morsi's Egypt, the political process was rescued in Tunisia by the strong and lasting presence of the powerful Tunisian General Labor Union, which imposed an agreement between the Islamist government in that country and the nationalist opposition. This, in its own way, enabled the Arab Nahda to fulfill some of its key promises.
The current complexity within the Arab Spring matrix has been intensified through the efforts of counter-revolutionary forces and powers who have their own vested interests in exacerbating and polarising the engagement between the Islamist and the nationalist currents in various tiers of Arab society. The Arab region has ended up being in a more fluid state because of the ongoing factors related to 'the war on terror' and 'jihadi subversion'.
POST-REVOLUTION EGYPT: I will now focus more on what is happening within the army and political paradigm in post-revolution Egypt. As pointed out by Dr. Omar Ashour, an Arab analyst, the military establishment has made a 'comeback' in that country. They are now in the forefront of its political scene. It is important to point out here that in the period of three years from February 2011, military entities have ruled the country 'either in the form of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces or directly by appointing a President. The military, it may be noted, was a principal decision-maker even during the period of elected President Morsi's rule.
The armed forces have undertaken specially harsh measures in recent months in Egypt. The crackdown of August 14 in Raba al Adawiya and al-Nahda Square resulted in more deaths and victims than what Libya witnessed in June 1996. It is understood that the harsh measures were undertaken to demonstrate, once again, the importance of the armed forces in maintaining order within the Egyptian society.
This re-establishment of superior role of the military was in keeping with the gradual transition process in Egypt between 2011 and 2013. Hosni Mubarak might have vanished from the scene but the military has continued to be the dominant factor in Egypt. In the 2012 constitution, approved by almost 64 per cent of the Egyptian voters, the Defence Minister, within the democratic framework had to be exclusively a military officer (Article 195), and the National Defence Council (NDC) would have a majority of military commanders (Article 197).
This effectively gave the military a veto over any national security or sensitive foreign policy issue. Article 198 also allowed military tribunals for civilians when a crime 'harms the armed forces'. The military was granted legal immunity from civilian courts and there was no 'public indicator showing that civilian politicians were capable or willing to move against the military-industrial complex'.
Despite the presence of the above factors, there still appears to be today, some factionalism within the Egyptian military and their security establishments. In a manner of speaking there are also signs of classic post-coup divides, with one advocating the armed forces taking over completely and the other urging limited and gradual control (step-by-step) via a superficial elected institutional mechanism. The second trend appears to have emerged as the victor with the Army Chief General Sisi (promoted recently to Field Marshal) being seen as a possible candidate for the upcoming Presidential election.
THE DEEPENING OF THE SUNNI-SHIA DIVIDE: The other factor that has continued to unravel and create uncertainty and disharmony within the countries of this region has been the deepening of the Sunni-Shia divide. This appears to have deepened all the way from Pakistan to Bahrain, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. Political tension and violence have contributed to the growth of sectarianism. 'Schism', according to Rima Majed, a researcher, 'between the Muslim-majority Sunni and the Muslim-minority Shia is dominating the centre-stage'. This has been an unfortunate fallout from the Arab Spring. The Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has gone on record on the BBC and has said that sectarian strife between the Shia and the Sunni is today 'the most serious security threat not only to the region but to the world at large'.
It needs to be understood however that this emerging sectarian divide does not appear to be as a result of religious factors. It is political in nature. It reflects, as in the case of Syria, Iraq or Lebanon, a conflict that is driven over achieving power through arms and funding received from different sources. We must not forget at this point that the exportation of the Iranian revolution had clear and immediate outcomes, ranging from the creation of the Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Fiqah-e-Jafaria in Pakistan to the establishment of Hezbollah in Lebanon. The on-going Syrian conflict of today has deepened the divide and attracted extremists on both sides.
What started as a peaceful popular revolt inspired by what has since been termed as Arab Spring has now begun to take a sectarian character. This evolution has, over the last two years become more intricate with the rise of extremist Sunni groups backed by Gulf states, and the involvement of Hezbollah, supported by Iran. One could mention in this regard that the convergence of interests and identities at the local level along with the dynamics of the regional scene - namely Saudi Arabia v Iran - has also created the possibility of substitution of political and sectarian identities and using of terms like 'Shia', 'Hezbollah', 'Alawite' and 'pro-Assad regime' interchangeable. These elements and existing factors are today impacting on Lebanon's widely recognised sectarian diversity. There, the Christian-Muslim sectarian fault line is now being overlapped by Shia-Sunni schism. Competing groups are following their own agenda and the common citizen is becoming the victim on the ground.
The only winner in this paradigm of violence appears to be Israel. It continues to present itself as a true democracy within a troubled Middle East (continuing to suffer from the fallout from Arab Spring) that can flout United Nations Security Council Resolutions with impunity and carry on occupation of Palestinian territory in contravention of all international legal principles.
Muhammad Zamir, a former Ambassador, is specialised in foreign affairs, right to information good governance. mzamir@dhaka.net
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