Is history repeating itself?

It is generally argued that Britain historically always has had an ambivalent attitude towards the continental Europe. There are also arguments which run in the opposite direction. One possible argument can be made that British policy towards Europe was largely shaped by the reality it faced in the post-WW II world. Winston Churchill could clearly see the British Empire had almost come to an end.  He wanted Britain to have a seat at the 'high table' of the new world order. Britain could not achieve that in its own right anymore, it could only be done clutching on to the coat-tail of the USA.

Churchill needed the backing and support of the USA, the new imperial power that emerged in the wake of WW II the USA, to project an image of the UK which was still an important power to reckon with.  He banked on forging a special relationship with the USA based on its historical relationships ( sometimes not so very friendly; remember the American War of Independence) as well as the close relationships that developed between the two countries during the WW II, with the special emphasis on linguistic affinity between the two countries. The British Commonwealth also added another dimension to the complexity of Britain's attitude and policy towards the continental Europe.  Britain not only has had various special economic and political relations but also a psycho-emotional bond (a kind of an imperial nostalgia) with the Commonwealth.  This imperial baggage was pretty heavy to toss it over at least at that time.

The people collectively known as Eurosceptic (regardless of their political affiliations), who want Britain to leave EU, put their argument based on the speech Churchill delivered at the House of Commons on May 11, 1953.  Churchill said, "We have our own dream and our own task. We are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked but not combined. We are interested and associated but not absorbed. If Britain must choose between Europe and the open sea, she must choose the open see". The speech clearly made the choice to be had - in a special relationship across the Atlantic over its any relationships with Europe. Europe was thus relegated to a secondary position.  Remember this is the philosophical line; actual reasons are many and varied depending on which Euro sceptics you talk to in the UK.

Moreover, the good old imperial warrior, who had already earned reputation as a hard core racist, also had other serious concerns to attend to. The rise of the Soviet Union and the expansion of its sphere of influence in Europe and its likely spread in other parts of the world came as a big opportunity to firmly get the USA on the British side. Now out of political power at home, with plenty of time at hand Churchill found a new mission and remodelled  himself  as a "Cold Warrior".  He received an invitation from Westminster College in Fulton Missouri. On March 05, 1946, he delivered his famous "Iron Curtain Speech" at the college where he declared: "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent". This was the opening shot declaring the beginning of the "Cold War". President Truman, who had already distinguished himself by atom bombing Japan twice about nine months before, as if once was not sufficient enough, was also on the platform with Churchill and listened carefully and he loved it.  Churchill was then back again into his "special relationship" between two great powers belonging to the "English-speaking world" who by banding together would police the post-World War II world and would provide the bulwark against the Soviet expansionism.

THE USA WARMS UP TO THE IDEA OF INTEGRATED EUROPE: However, Churchill's all grovelling up to the new imperial power was of no avail to help prop up the crumbling British empire as  the Truman administration had already come to the conclusion that  Britain  could still be a useful ally in the Cold War but the British empire  was in its final stage of decay. It was not in its interest to shore it up but a weaker Britain would be a good willing and pliant partner and would be readily available to do its bidding when required.

In general terms, the US political establishment was against the old-style colonialism and that was made clear even during the Roosevelt administration's time. Empire building from the US perspective would require a whole new approach; an approach we are all too familiar with now. The Soviet leader Stalin did not waste his time either  and  denounced it as "war mongering" and dubbed Churchill's comment on the  "English-Speaking World"  as imperialist racism.

After a period of hesitation, the USA had warmed up to the idea of integrated Europe, for the reason already mentioned, to prevent Germany again becoming a problem. But more importantly, the USA also saw in it the possibility of burden sharing in containing the Soviet Union. In line with the new policy direction the USA took the initiatives in promoting European integration through the Marshall plan. In fact, there was no other choice for the USA than to take the lead because there was no one else who could have done the job. The Marshall Plan was conditional upon European countries to coordinate thus setting the ground for the future European integration. The possibility of economic conflicts with the European Common Market (predecessor of the EU) which the USA supported,   harming US economic interests was always on the US radar. But the security interests took precedence over any economic interests. It was a price worth paying for the USA. The USA was on full throttle ahead now to face the Cold-War enemy with Britain on its tow (the running dog of the US imperialist as the Mao's China would have called it at that time).

But the USA was absolutely resolute on the issue that under no circumstances integrated Europe turned into an independent "third force'', therefore, European rearmament would only take place under US supervision within the Trans-Atlantic framework - NATO. While the Cold War is over now, the Trans-Atlantic security apparatus still remains in place - and more reinvigorated with EU in it.  The EU's any ability to manoeuvre remains seriously restricted within this security arrangement. In fact, NATO now has extended its mandate, if necessary, to go and intervene when the USA goes anywhere in the world. The EU must have to do its bit also, simply because the EU is an integral part the American empire.

Overall, the US policy towards European integration can be summed up as equivocal - while it supported, even encouraged European integration but at the same time it constrained integrated Europe to emerge as a third force or pursue any independent or specific ambitions by firmly tagging it with NATO. Therefore, the USA has been steering the whole process to serve its hegemonic interests in Europe - as also in rest of the world.

DISAGREEMENT AROSE BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UK: As for Britain, it got the message clear: special relation or not, the US was a resolute supporter of European integration. But a major disagreement arose between France and the UK on the nature and shape of European integration.  UK supported a free trade area but the French supported a Customs Union which was also the American option since 1947. As such, the US backed France. The UK kept itself out of a number of treaties signed between 1950 and 1957, most notable of which was the Treaty of Rome of 1957 which established the European Economic Community (EEC).   The UK tried its option  with  six other European countries.  But eventually realising that the option was not a viable project, it opened negotiations with the EEC and  applied for membership in 1963 only to be vetoed by De Gaulle of France. It applied for EEC membership the second time in 1967, to be vetoed by De Gaulle for the second time.  De Gaulle's rejection of  Britain's membership applications was based on a number of factors: firstly, exclusion of Britain would ensure France's dominant leadership position within the Community without any challenge; secondly, Britain was haggling too much (one can see what it is doing in Brussel's now) and that may significantly, if not radically, alter the nature of the  Community;  thirdly, in De Gaulle's view Britain was not sufficiently European enough  (one only has to look at Churchill's speech at the British Parliament in 1951); and   finally and crucially, De Gaulle was always suspicious of Britain's close relationship with the USA which thwarted his attempts to chart an independent course for Europe with its own security arrangements. To his mind Britain would do the bidding for the USA once it is inside the Community. This would go against his own vision of an independent Europe.

Oddly enough, one can see the reaction of the USA to the possibility of BREXIT and can see where De Gaulle's reservation about UK was coming from. According to the USA Today, President Obama has urged Britain to stay in the EU because it "gives (the United States) much greater confidence about the strength of the Transatlantic union". Eventually with the departure of De Gaulle from the French presidency, things started to look brighter for Britain with the new French President Pompidou who was sympathetic to Britain's membership. After much negotiations and with the support of the new French president, the UK joined the European Community (EU) on January 01, 1973.

Since then Britain has always maintained a rather semi-detached relationship with the EU; in a way, it has apparently been a reluctant partner. As the possibility of BREXIT (Britain's exit from the EU) started to be a likely reality, European leaders made passionate pleas to Britain to remain within it. All possible dire consequences from seriously weakening the foundation, threats of terrorism, economic collapse to a complete disaster are being projected to convince Britain to remain in the Union.

The social and economic consequences of BREXIT still remain unclear. The British pound has already taken a dive. It has already prompted other Eurosceptic countries to consider their option. The Czech president has already flagged his country's intention to quit if Britain's exit bid succeeds. Most important of all, if BREXIT eventuates, the spectre of unchallenged German hegemony over Europe will be back again in the strategic equation of the European power-play. And this will strain Franco-German relationship to a breaking-point with all the implications and consequences that entail.  Is history repeating itself?

The writer is an independent  economic and political analyst.

muhammad. [email protected]