Humans have perennially used wealth to compare and contrast each other, but only with the post-World War II independence of African and Asian colonies did this practice become formal and global. Not without reason either: by differentiating developed countries (DCs) from their less developed counterparts (LDCs), the modernising process fed the dictionary with all sorts of meaningful and meaningless terminologies. Alternately called the haves and have-nots, this materialistic disjuncture hijacked the First World and Third World notions from its original ideological reference: the First World referred to capitalist countries, the Second socialist (no wonder less discussed in relevant literatures), and the Third non-aligned. Both Fourth and Fifth worlds were coaxed out of the Third to placate the impossible development cases (Fifth World) and encourage the promising candidates (Third World) of top-tier membership (First World). Walt Whitman Rostow's Stages of Economic Development (1960s) streamlined this formula.
Another World War II baby, the World Bank, gave income a face. Since industrialisation, oil-export, or ready-made garments elevated South Korea, Indonesia, and Bangladesh, for example, from the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Worlds, respectively, rubrics such as high-, middle-, and low-income became multi-purpose instruments of where to direct foreign aid and find donors, not to mention all sorts of finger-pointing.
With cut-off lines periodically adjusted, today the middle-income classification begins at U.S. $1,035, rising until U.S. $12,615, generating low and high subsets. Income must increase 10-fold within this bracket before any further promotion?a growth-rate Bangladesh, despite its remarkable Fifth World ascent, has not managed in 44 years.
More than money characterises the low-to-high middle income move: lifestyle changes construct a middle-income culture upon tangible and intangible civil society dynamics. These include, for instance, institutionalising (a) tax payments and project-based public reimbursement; (b) minimum health standards; (c) upward-mobility opportunities for all, from beggars to businessmen; and (d) a self-perpetuating ladder of hope, that is, increasing freedom from fear.
Even from the 1970s, sociologists and others challenged the materialistic Rostowian measurement. Morris D. Morris's Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), for instance, exposed infant mortality, literacy, and life expectancy as relevant determinants. Environmental consciousness, health-based considerations, democracy, security, peace, and other civil society factors also demanded as much attention as takas and trinklets.
How has Bangladesh fared? Acknowledging the constantly shifting criteria and measurement scales, a pre-hartal/oborrodh appraisal informs us (a) our non-income sector can out-shine the income; (b) upward shifts have not become irreversible; (c) short-term emphases obscure long-term prospects; and (d) our relative position matters as much as the absolute.
In 2011, for example, the Quality of Life Index (QOLI) measuring wealth, health, peace, environmental conditions, security settings, education, and so forth, placed Bangladesh at the 110th spot, out of 137 countries, with a score of .427, where the highest score was .935 in Iceland and lowest .135 in Somalia. Only Pakistan and Burma had a lower score among South Asian and neighbouring countries (.358 and .374, respectively), while India scored .489 at the 100th spot and Sri Lanka .570 at 80th. Yet, the different segments reflected quite disparate performances: in health we ranked 101st (scoring .419), though Pakistan and Burma moved up faster, to the 103rd and 105th slots with .409 and .382, respectively; with education, we slipped to 126th (.336), having Pakistan still behind us; and over wealth at 115th (.342), democracy 72nd, peace 83rd, and environment 117th (Pakistan remained behind on all but wealth, at 104th and environment at 106th), we noted our assets to be non-material.
Though the QOLI criteria and scale changed significantly for 2014 or mid-2015, thus complicating comparisons, Bangladesh was not only not in the top 57 countries listed (whose data were available), but also that Pakistan, which had consistently performed poorer than us, leapfrogged to the composite 52nd spot, with India climbing to 36th. True, hartals/oborrodhs/security concerns spoiled the show and that they need not be irreversible constraints. Yet, our middle-income idea blossomed during this phase owing to a better than 6 per cent GDP (gross domestic product) growth rate, even as the economic mainstay devoured our non-material assets.
Is the middle-income identity for the few or many? If it synchronises with the growth of a middle-class, is ours large enough to make that claim? Since that claim must also mesh with various tangible and non-tangible civil society forces, is the middle-class identity a World Bank book-keeping reference every member-state must adopt, or reality?
Ultimately, whether we reform the beggars, sewage, and carbon-spewing traffic dominating the streets or not will determine if middle-class culture remains just a conversation item, or our 21st Century legacy for future generations. For the moment, though, mirror, mirror on the wall, please do not show money and materialism dominating all!
The writer is Professor Emeritus, International Relations, Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico City.
inv198@hotmail.com
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