The nation witnessed, during the official visit of the Indian Prime Minister to Dhaka in September 2011, a drama concerning the Teesta river upon which millions in Bangladesh depend for their lives and livelihoods. The Awami League-led government was assured by India that it would sign the Teesta Water Sharing Treaty during that visit. That agreement would have given Bangladesh a 50 per cent share of the Teesta flow in the dry season at Gazaldobaon on the Indian side, after 20 per cent was reserved for the river's navigation.
That agreement was not signed. New Delhi withdrew the Teesta deal literally at the 11th hour for its failure to complete "internal discussions" with the Paschimbanga government. Sources close to the Indian side stated unofficially that the deal got stuck because Mamata Banarjee had objected to it and as water was a provincial subject, the centre's hands were tied. For the next three years, New Delhi failed to complete the "internal discussions" but kept promising Dhaka that the deal would be signed "soon'.
In return, New Delhi received from Dhaka major concessions, most notably on its critical security needs. New Delhi also got from Dhaka land transit on a trial basis and with that concession, built the 700MW Palatana gas-fired power station in Tripura that caused great damage to Bangladesh's roads as heavy equipment were carried over it.
New Delhi's promise to deliver the Teesta deal was never soon enough. In February this year, the Indian Prime Minister personally regretted to the Bangladesh Prime Minister his country's inability to give Bangladesh the Teesta deal until a new government assumed power in New Delhi. Meanwhile, without a water-sharing agreement, water flow in the dry season in the Teesta in Bangladesh came down to a trickle. As a result, millions in the Teesta catchment area have been condemned to desperation; some have already lost their livelihoods and become beggars. Farmers are close to giving up farming because of lack of Teesta water and unable to extract water from underground source as it is too costly.
The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) organised a 'long march' on April 23-24 to attract people's attention to the failure of the government in getting legitimate share of Teesta waters. The march attracted national attention that the BNP expected and the media focused it as a major political issue. All on a sudden, a miracle happened with the flow of the Teesta on the Bangladesh side a day before the march was due to reach the Teesta Barrage at Dalia Point. People in the catchment area woke up that morning to find that the river, which had been gasping for life with a flow of 300 cusecs, had suddenly become alive and vibrant with a flow of 3000 cusecs!
The sudden flow in the Teesta was a repeat of another drama like the one people of Bangladesh witnessed in September 2011 but only in reverse. The BNP was taken by surprise by the sudden flow. It needed a dry Teesta to draw national and international attention to the adverse effect of the lack of water in the river. It also needed a dry Teesta to hold India responsible for the desperation of the people and for the environmental damage. The major political intention of the long march for the BNP was, however, to put blame on the Awami League-led government for its failure in negotiating a deal on the Teesta with India and instead wasting its precious security and land transit negotiating cards.
The BNP was quick to claim that its long march was the reason why New Delhi decided to send more water flowing. That claim led the Awami League (AL) to claim that the water flowed because of its successful diplomatic negotiations with New Delhi. The minister for communications, who speaks in the media all the time that neither helps his image nor the interests of the government, had it right when he said that both the BNP and the AL made claims that were not true. The people believed his statement. There was no reason for New Delhi to feel any pressure from the BNP's march and release more water. There was no reason either for New Delhi to feel Dhaka's ability at diplomatic negotiations to be so brilliant so suddenly to encourage it to release the water.
Further, before the AL made its claim, there was no news at all that Dhaka and New Delhi were in diplomatic negotiations over the Teesta. In fact, after the Indian Prime Minister had advised Dhaka to discuss the future of the pending Teesta deal with the new government in New Delhi, the government leaders, including the foreign minister, had stated in the media that they would act as advised. The AL-led government's claim of successful negotiations for the sudden increased flow therefore contradicted what its leaders had stated publicly about Teesta negotiations before the flow. The claim landed the AL into an even worse predicament when another drama occurred with the Teesta - this time similar to the one in September 2011. The flow of the Teesta ebbed as suddenly as it flowed! As the smiles of the people in the catchment area vanished with the receding water, so did the AL's claim that its diplomatic skills had resulted in the dramatic flow. The AL-led government, as the cliché goes, was caught with its pants down when the water vanished from the Teesta!
Therefore, in between the claim and the counter-claim, it was the AL that ended embarrassing itself. The BNP would have faced serious political problem if New Delhi had not stopped the flow as suddenly as it had started it. If the flow had continued, the people would have trashed BNP's claim against New Delhi and the AL-led government and rejoiced in the flow instead.
They would have also set aside the obvious contradictions in the AL's claim and would have instead given credit to it even if no credit were due. New Delhi would have overcome some of negative perception about it among the people of Bangladesh that has hit a nadir for its role in the country's January 05t elections. Instead, New Delhi not only strengthened that perception, it also left a very poor perception of its ability to conduct its diplomacy.
Clearly, there was no discussion between New Delhi and Dhaka over how to handle the BNP's long march. New Delhi was aware that its failure to deliver to the AL-led government the Teesta deal was a serious breach of trust and that too after Dhaka went out of its way to help it on its crucial national interests at great political risks. Therefore, it had decided to release the water unilaterally to take the wind off the sail of BNP's long march. When the BNP claimed that the flow was the success of its March, New Delhi again unilaterally decided to stop the flow to counteract the BNP's claim. Only, it failed to comprehend that by doing so, it destroyed the AL's claim of diplomatic success! New Delhi by the ease with which it allowed the flow and ebb of the Teesta also undermined its earlier claim that in the matter of river water, provinces had over-riding powers over the centre. It also undermined arguments it had earlier made to Dhaka that releasing Teesta water to Bangladesh Teesta was a complicated technical matter.
In retrospect, New Delhi strengthened a view now widely held in Bangladesh after the January 05 elections, that it saw India's relations with Bangladesh as not with the country but with the Awami League. Just as its foreign secretary had pleaded with HM Ershad to help the AL against the BNP before the January 05 elections to help it return to power, it tried to do the same with the Teesta drama. Unfortunately, it did a very poor job in trying to help the AL and instead burdened the AL further with the pro-India tag without giving it anything to show to the people for its pro-Indian stance, leaving many to conclude that in the strange drama with the flow and ebb, India left a very poor show of its diplomatic skills.
The writer is a retired career Ambassador.
ambserajulislam@gmail.com
Teesta: Strange flow and ebb
M. Serajul Islam | Published: May 03, 2014 00:00:00 | Updated: November 30, 2024 06:01:00
Teesta barrage in the first week of April, 2014.
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