The victory over subjugation & oppression

The arms struggle continued for about nine months, and it got massive support from its neighboring country India. In this world, it was never a problem for a struggling nation to receive support from other countries. The Cambodians provided sanctuaries to the Vietcong in Vietnam and the Indians provided sanctuaries to Bengali freedom fighters. They received support from the Indian government. India, even, helped in providing training and arms for the Mukti Bahini.

According to M Ayoob and K Subrahmanyam: “This training took three forms. The remnants of EPR and regular Pakistan army were brought under a unified command and formed into regular battalions of Mukti Bahini. In addition, a large number of young men from Bangla Desh, who offered themselves for enrolment, were trained as freedom fighters. Thirdly, people within Bangla Desh were also trained in the handling of weapons and demolition charges” (The Liberation War, Delhi, 1972).

Again, Rafique Afzal, in his Pakistan: History & Politics, 1947-1971 (New York, 2001) added: “From mid-1971, it began to train the Mukti Bahini (Freedom Army), mainly from the youth in the refugee camps. In May, it opened thirty training centres whose number had risen to eighty-four by September. Each centre trained 500-2000 guerrillas and their total strength was estimated at 100,000.”

However, the Pakistani General provided a different account of the Mukti Bahini. According to General Niazi, “[T]he strength of the Bengali armed forces which rebelled after 25th March, 1971, was 162,000. The number of civilians trained by the Russians and the Indians (in stages) was about 125,000. Thus the total number of Bengalis in Mukti Bahini was 287,500.” The Pakistani Generals did not realise that they were not fighting a conventional war where the numbers matter, but it was actually a fight against the total population of the country. Therefore, the numbers do not matter; moreover, the nature of the fight was quite different. Siddiq Salik in his book Witness to Surrender (Karachi, 1997) wrote: “The main problem was to isolate the rebels from the innocent people. They usually mixed like fish in water....So the rebels and their hosts continued to mix. It was difficult to distinguish one from the other, as all of them look alike. A rebel carrying a stengun under his arm could, in emergency, throw his weapon in the field and start working like an innocent farmer. On the other hand, a harmless-looking fisherman could suspend his work to plant a mine in the way of an approaching convoy and disappear”.

It was quite natural that a spontaneous resistance movement would take some time to reach a level where it can encounter an established army head-on. It actually took about seven to eight months for the Mukti Bahini to become close to a professional army. The most encouraging news was that there was no dearth of supply of young fighters to fight for the country. Thousands of young adults were in camps to be recruited for the Mukti Bahini. The supply was unthinkable and that was one of the reason international politics did not allow the war to become a protracted war.

In recent years some attempts were made to minimise the role of Mukti Bhini by suggesting that it was fighting under the cover of the Indian army, but the comments made by the Pakistani Eastern Command General suggests a quite different picture. General Niazi wrote: “The Pakistani Army was fighting in and around cantonments and camps, and these became their fortresses of power. Their only link with Dhaka and each other was by air. All other communications were cut, blocked, or out of commission. The rest of the country was under the control of Mukti Bahini, whose morale was sky-high and who had the initiative with them.” (The Betrayal of East Pakistan; Karachi, 1998)

Hundreds and thousands of Bengali youths were ready to die, but government in exile did not have enough facilities to provide training to most of them. There was no exact figure about how many young Bengalis received training at different training camps. But it was known to many that there were thousands of young Bengalis who were eagerly waiting at the refugee camps to be called for the training. It was difficult to believe that so many young adults were waiting in line to give their lives for the country. However, there were thousands that did not get chance to serve the country, because the war ended on December 16, 1971. The world politics did not allow the war to continue for a longer period of time to prevent it from becoming a protracted war. India stepped in directly in December 3rd and joined the freedom fight of Bengalis and forced the West Pakistani armies to surrender.

There was another front, the world opinion formation front and many people did many different activities to mobilise global opinion against the atrocities of the West Pakistani army and generate support for the new nation Bangladesh. In the Month of May, Rehman Sobhan, a Dhaka University economics professor, visited the United States (US) and successfully met Members of Congress and staff, held press conferences, appeared three times on TV, and met academics. His visit to the US and Canada helped motivate awareness to support the cause of Bangladesh. He was very successful in refuting West Pakistani propaganda against East Pakistan by providing “unemotional refutation of GOP” (Government of Pakistan) public statement. In major US cities there emerged several organisations to support the cause of Bangladesh. In Chicago, F R Khan, an architect, provided leadership to the Chicago based organisation. In Los Angeles, the historian Stanly Wolpert was very much active in organising support for the cause of Bangladesh. These kind of support organisation emerged across the world. Support for the cause of Bangladesh became a global movement.

Though support for Bangladesh became global, still many countries of the world did not want to see the reality. Therefore, they stuck to their typical old political interests. As the political drama started unfolding during the month of December, the Pakistani army realised its vulnerability and was looking for a solution that could provide a safe passage to its home. Pakistan government tried to mobilise its support in UN Security Council and save its face, but that did not work. The situation for the Pakistani army in Bangladesh was deteriorating further. The army became concerned about its safety, and forgot about winning the war. In many places, the soldiers just surrender themselves to the Indian army. They preferred to surrender to the Indian Army than be caught in the hands of the masses that they had tortured for nine months.

At the urging of Yahya’s administration, the Nixon administration tried to float some resolutions in the Security Council, but these were thrown out due to the direct objection support of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) as it applied veto, and indirect rejection of the British and France governments through their conspicuous absence at the time of vote. Of all the Pakistani key players for the creation of human tragedy in the eastern part of Pakistan, it was Bhutto whose adamant behaviour forced the Pakistani Army not to call a date for the National Assembly meeting and that triggered the final episode of the breaking up of Pakistan, now came to the UN to plea for the saving of Pakistan. Bhutto, the master of all performances acted his last performance at the UN when Poland was presenting its modified resolution which called for transfer of power to the lawfully elected representatives, and initial cease-fire for seventy two hours, withdrawal of the Pakistani forces to pre-set positions for their evacuation, return of West Pakistani civilian personnel and other West Pakistanis willing to return to West Pakistan, and withdrawal of the Indian forces after consulting the newly established authorities.

At this, Bhutto became highly emotional and tore up the agenda papers and stormed out of the Security Council. Bhutto was not stuck in East Pakistan when the West Pakistani Army was looking for a safe passage. Similarly, he was not in Rann of Kutch facing Indian army in 1965. He was a politician so he could say anything that suited time and place. While Bhutto was storming out from the Security Council, the Pakistani armies were counting their days in East Pakistan.

Stephen Philip Cohen, in his book The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, 1984), wrote: “Bhutto was such an opportunist that even after the surrender and dissolution of united Pakistan, when he became the President of truncated Pakistan, intentionally ‘delayed the prisoners’ return to Pakistan because he was afraid that they would turn to political action at a time when his own position was unsteady.” Another American scholar, Wayne Wilcox, wrote about the situation: “The end of the war left so many prisoners in Indian hands that the magnitude of defeat could not be denied, and the weak performance of the army on the Kashmir front ended all talk of the superiority of the Muslim fighting man against his ancient Hindu foe.” (The Emergence of Bangladesh; Washington, 1973).

When Bhutto was performing at the Security Council, the West Pakistani armies were preparing for surrender. By December 13, 1971, it became certain that the advancing Indian army and Mukti Bahini would reach the capital Dacca [now spelled Dhaka] city at any moment. Siddiq Salik described the situation vividly: “The Governor, his cabinet and West Pakistani civil servants moved, on 14 December, to the Hotel Intercontinental, which the International Red Cross had converted into a ‘Neutral Zone’. The West Pakistani V.I.P.s included the Chief Secretary, the Inspector of Police, the Commissioner, Dacca Division, Provincial Secretaries and a few others. They “dissociated” themselves in writing from the Government of Pakistan in order to gain admittance to the neutral zone, because anybody belonging to belligerent state was not entitled to Red Cross protection.”

The 14th December was actually the last day of West Pakistani rule over East Pakistan. General Niazi, by now realised that the movement of Seventh Fleet in Indian Ocean and the prospect of US help was nothing but simple bluff. He came to terms that only surrender to the Indain Army would be the best or only option open to him and contacted General Hamid. Niazi requested Hamid [General Abdul Hamid Khan, HQA, SPk, was the Army Chief of Staff (COS) under President general Yahya Khan, and the de-facto Army Commander-in-Chief during the 1971] to get in touch with the Commander-in-Chief Yahya Khan to review the proposal Niazi sent to the President earlier. In response to the Niazi’s proposal, President Yahya Khan asked him to take necessary measures to stop the fighting and preserve lives.

Finally, on December 16, 1971, the whole Eastern Command of Pakistan armies surrendered to the Joint Command of India and the Bangladesh army. The surrender ceremony took place at the Ramna Race Course in Dacca, where Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib gave his famous March 7 speech to the people of East Pakistan. In the early morning of December 16, West Pakistan General Niazi drove to Dacca airport to receive Lieutenant-General Jagjit Singh Aurora, Commander of Indian Eastern Command. Niazi gave him a military salute and from there they drove to Ramna Race Course where thousands of Bengalis were waiting to witness the surrender of the West Pakistan boastful army who had committed atrocities against its own people.

The instrument of surrender was signed by Lieutenant-General Aurora and Lieutenant-General Niazi in full view of nearly million Bengalis and scores of foreign media people. The end came to 4:31 PM on December 16, 1971, and Niazi, as wrote by Robert Payne: “...tore off his epaulettes and presented them to the Indian General Jagjit Singh Aurora, and then handed over his revolver. Finally he pressed his forehead against the forehead of the Indian general in the ancient oriental token of submission, which is also a plea for mercy. It was strange that he should plea for mercy, for he had never shown mercy to anyone in the past.” (Massacre: The Tragedy of Bangladesh & the Phenomenon of Mass Slaughter Throughout History; 1973).

Unfortunately, at the same time, West Pakistani media in West Pakistan were proclaiming that powerful allies were coming to their aid and that was certain. “If all else fails,” they wrote. “at least the warriors of Islam know how to die.” This was being said at a time when the armies of General Niazi were surrendering en masse to the Indians, and the Pakistani soldiers were begging to be protected from the Mukti Bahini. The surrender of ninety six thousand Pakistani soldiers brought closure to a long chapter in a history of the struggle of the people called Bengali and Bangladesh called it a victory over subjugation and oppression.

Dr Mokerrom Hossain is Professor of Sociology and Criminal Justice at Virginia State University, USA and a freedom fighter. The piece is excerpted from the author’s book titled “From Protest to Freedom: The Birth of Bangladesh-A Book for the New Generation (Shahitya Prakash, Dhaka, 2010)