Bangladesh is no longer facing a routine price adjustment. It is approaching a systemic stress point where supply pressure, public behavior, and weak enforcement capacity are beginning to reinforce each other. Long queues at filling stations are not just a symptom of shortage. They are an early signal of something more serious: a shift from price imbalance to loss of control. And once control begins to slip, recovery becomes far more difficult.
FROM SHORTAGE TO DISORDER: In a fuel-dependent economy, crises rarely remain confined to supply. They spread through behavior. When people believe fuel may become scarce, they change how they act. They buy earlier, buy more, and use faster. Transport operators raise fares preemptively. Traders adjust prices in anticipation. Even those who do not need fuel immediately feel compelled to secure it.
Demand, in effect, detaches from real need.
This is how a manageable shortage becomes an accelerating crisis. It is no longer driven by how much fuel exists, but by how people respond to uncertainty.
In such conditions, delay does not preserve stability-it accelerates disorder.
THE REAL COST OF HESITATION: There is a natural instinct to delay painful decisions-particularly those that raise prices. But in a fuel crisis, hesitation carries its own cost, and it compounds quickly.
If queues persist: (a) transport slows and becomes unreliable; (b) food supply chains weaken; (c) perishables are delayed or wasted; (d) production hours are lost; (e) small businesses reduce operations; and (f) daily wage earners lose income.
What begins as a fuel issue becomes a coordination failure across the economy.
At that stage, the damage is no longer contained. It spreads-from roads to markets, from markets to factories, and from factories to households.
And critically, inflation begins to rise anyway-through scarcity, delays, and opportunistic pricing-without restoring order.
That is the worst outcome: cost without control.
CONTROLLED SHOCK IS SAFER: In this context, a temporary, targeted price increase is not a perfect solution. It is a stabilisation tool.
By sharply raising the cost of non-essential fuel use, it can: (i) reduce discretionary travel; (ii) shorten queues rapidly; (iii) restore basic distribution discipline; and (iv) ease pressure on imports and foreign exchange.
For a country importing fuel through Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation (BPC), even a modest reduction in demand can have a disproportionate stabilising effect.
In practical terms, it makes one thing clear: not all movement is necessary.
This matters in an environment where complex administrative controls-rationing, quotas, strict enforcement-are difficult to implement quickly and consistently.
Price, in contrast, works immediately.
LOSING THE DECISION WINDOW: Every crisis presents a narrow window during which difficult but effective decisions can still shape the outcome. That window is not permanent. If action is delayed too long: (a) informal markets begin to dominate; (ii) official pricing loses relevance; (iii) distribution becomes uneven and opaque; and (iv) public trust erodes.
At that point, the state is no longer managing the system. It is reacting to it.
This is the stage policymakers must avoid at all cost-the gradual slide toward a condition where no option is easy, and every option is expensive.
A nation does not reach the point of no return at a single moment. It gets there by postponing decisions until control is no longer available.
POST-SHOCK DISCIPLINE: A price shock alone is not a solution. It is an opening move. Its success depends entirely on what follows.
First, it must be strictly time-bound. A defined 60-90 day window signals that the policy is an emergency measure, not a permanent burden.
Second, the additional revenue must be ring-fenced and visible. It should finance: (a) strategic fuel reserves; (b) secured import arrangements; and (c) targeted relief in the recovery phase.
Without thses, public acceptance will collapse.
Third, essential sectors must remain protected. Food transport, agriculture, and emergency services cannot be allowed to fail. Even within a harsh policy, minimal support is non-negotiable.
Fourth, communication must be clear, direct, and honest. This is not a moment for reassurance without substance. It is a moment for leadership that explains both the pain and its purpose.
THE REAL CHOICE: Bangladesh now faces a fundamental decision.
It can delay adjustment in the hope that conditions improve, accepting longer queues, deeper uncertainty, and growing disorder. Or it can act decisively accepting controlled, time-bound hardship to restore discipline, stabilize supply, and preserve economic coordination.
Neither path is easy. But one is predictable, and the other is not. It is to be noted that controlled pain is difficult, uncontrolled disorder is far worse.
THE TURNING POINT: This is no longer just a fuel issue. It is a test of whether the state can act before the system slips beyond easy correction.
If the current moment is used with discipline, transparency, and speed, Bangladesh can still stabilise the situation and rebuild resilience.
If it is softened by delay, denial, or half-measures, the country risks entering a phase where every response comes late-and costs more than it should.
Act now while choices still exist. Because once control is lost, it is rarely regained cheaply-or quickly. In crisis like this, the greatest risk is not taking a difficult decision-it is taking it too late.
Maj (Retd.) Mohd. Akhtaruzzaman is a former Member of Parliament (1991-1996, 1996-2001). rtlbddhaka@yahoo.com